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Dissertation Summary  
 
Stability versus Sustainability: Energy Policy in the Gulf Monarchies, by Jim Krane 
Rising consumption of oil and natural gas inside the six Gulf Arab monarchies threatens to displace 
hydrocarbon exports that have long provided a large source of GDP. This trend is, in large part, a 
result of subsidized energy pricing and distribution, practices which form an integral part of rentier 
structures of political control. However, these practices are insufficiently analyzed in the rentier 
literature. 
This dissertation addresses this shortfall by incorporating the theoretical significance of energy as a 
physical commodity – rather than as a source of rent – into the rentier literature. Energy subsidization 
has fostered within these states a structural dependence that has driven choices in industrialization, 
city design, technology preference and use, and personal habits. These subsidies have also helped 
build and maintain public support for unelected regimes, alongside the well-known role of energy 
rents. Energy thus has a conflicting dual role in the rentier state that contributes to the difficulty of 
subsidy reform. Externally, energy exports are the main source of state revenue; but domestically, 
energy is an important source of political support.  
The literature’s portrayal of subsidies as unreformable citizen entitlements conflicts with the 
increasing economic imperative of reforming these distribution practices. Since rentier consumption 
patterns threaten the flow of rents, the self-defeating nature of domestic resource distribution is 
emerging as a long-term weakness within rentier theory. I present evidence that reforms have already 
taken place, despite theoretical predictions to the contrary, and demonstrate the economic imperatives 
that make further reforms likely in at least two of the six states: Saudi Arabia and the United Arab 
Emirates. I also show that citizen understanding of energy subsidies is more nuanced than the 
entitlement portrayals found in the literature. This dissertation suggests revising the theory to accept a 
more flexible interpretation of subsidies as customary privileges, which allows for reform of these 
practices.  
Reforms in rentier monarchies’ energy policies are important not just because they challenge the most 
important theories of governance of these states, but because examining these reforms allows for 
understanding the difficult tradeoffs between politics and economics that underlie the survival of these 
peculiar regimes. 
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Foreword and Acknowledgements 
 
I spent four happy years living in the Gulf, between 2005 and 2009, and have had the good fortune to 
return many times since. I found in these six countries a disarming warmth and hospitality and a 
profound natural beauty. I was unprepared for the huge amount of personal interest that I would 
develop in the region. After nine years of studying and writing about little else, I remain mesmerized.  
The Gulf is also beset by some urgent problems, just one of which is covered here. The importance of 
energy to daily life was driven home to me during a 2005 blackout in Dubai. There was no escaping 
the 40-degree (110 degrees Fahrenheit) heat, which was magnified by the design of buildings that 
quickly trapped heat and offered no means to vent it. The experience drove home in a tangible way 
that energy policy and social contracts need to be re-calibrated for the longer term, rather than for a 
short era of conspicuous consumption. 
I made many friends in the region, some of whom contributed in various ways to this dissertation, 
whether offering places to sleep, shared meals, anecdotes over a beer, even copies of their electricity 
billing statements. I also met my wonderful wife Chloe in nearby Baghdad, and the explorations of 
the Gulf that I describe in this thesis and my previous book were done as much through Chloe’s eyes 
as mine. Saying I couldn’t have done it without her is an understatement. Our adventures ranged from 
hikes among the mountain villages and canyons of Ras al-Khaimah, to our secret campsites in 
Fujairah, the Musandam, Jebel Misht and, most memorably, Jebel Rawdah; our breakfasts on the 
beach, and cocktails among the dunes and atop the Burj al-Arab. Best of all was the birth and first 
year of life of our son Jay. 
After leaving the Gulf, we spent our next four years together in Cambridge, where – on the first day of 
my studies – Chloe gave birth to our daughter, Connie, to whom this work is dedicated. While 
Cambridge was more work than fun, I came to enjoy its eccentric ways, its medieval pubs, and 
cycling under vast East Anglian skies churning with clouds.    
At Cambridge I was lucky to work under the impressive faculties of my academic supervisor, David 
Reiner, whose knowledge of literature in political science, economics and energy policy is matched 
by his affability and dedication. I am grateful for his diligence in reading so many drafts and offering 
so many comments, edits and suggestions. I will prize the memories of discussing this thesis with 
David in various pubs, as well as in two fabulous Cambridge Beer Festivals.  
I am also indebted to Pierre Noël for taking an early interest in my topic, providing penetrating 
commentary, and introducing me to GDF Suez, the French energy firm that funded my PhD. At GDF, 
I am most grateful to Jean Rappe, who took a chance on funding my research, as well as Alain 
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Sanglerat, Alex Katon, Florence Verzelen, Brigitte Diercx, Suresh Bhaskar, Shankar Krishnamoorthy, 
Alda Engoian, Valerie-Ann Duval and others. My trips to the Gulf were punctuated by meetings, 
dinners and presentations at GDF Suez, and the company made me feel welcome there and in Paris 
and Brussels.  
My gratitude extends to the Qatar National Research Fund and my talented and gracious research 
colleague, Steve Wright at Qatar University. Steve was kind enough to arrange my room and board in 
Doha, while Nancy Jarrah at the QU Research Office was instrumental in helping Steve and I navigate 
the intricacies of the grant. I also owe major thanks to head tutors Philip Pattenden and the Rev. 
Stephen Hampton at my college at Cambridge, Peterhouse, for their generosity in providing me with 
several creatively sourced grants.   
Big thanks are also due to Cambridge’s Energy Policy Research Group and especially Bill Nuttall, 
who offered so many prescient out-of-the-box comments, including one that turned out to be 
statistically significant. The generosity of the King Abdullah Petroleum Studies and Research Center 
in Riyadh, and especially Bashir Dabbousi and Mark Tuttle, made possible my research visit to the 
kingdom. I also need to thank YouGov Cambridge and Joel Faulkner Rogers and Sean Kirwan for 
running a survey on my behalf at no cost. 
I gave several guest lectures in which my expenses were covered, allowing me to conduct interviews 
and fieldwork. For these, I am especially grateful to the following: The UAE Prime Minister’s Office 
in Dubai and especially Maryam Kalban, Abdulla bin Touq and Azzan Lootah; Georgetown 
University Doha and Gerd Nonneman; American University of Kuwait and Ramzi el-Houry and 
Farah al-Nakib; the Dubai School of Government and Heba Shaaban (as well as formers Tarik Yousef 
and Steve Brannon), Case Western Reserve University and Pete Moore and Cyrus Taylor; the Union 
Club in Cleveland and Meredith Seikel; National Defense University in Washington and Denise 
Natali; Durham University and Chris Davidson; and Rice University’s Baker Institute and Ken 
Medlock. Also helpful along the way was Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, who so often read and critiqued 
early work; as well as Giacomo Luciani, Justin Alexander of Qatar National Bank, John Tottie at 
HSBC Riyadh, Bruce Smith at the Abu Dhabi Water and Electricity Authority, and Mike Wood at the 
Ministry of Electricity and Water in Kuwait. 
I owe big thank-yous to the very smart folks who read drafts of the work that comprises this thesis, 
especially to Mary Ann Tétreault who helped enormously with early drafts, and Jocelyn Sage 
Mitchell, who provided numerous excellent last-minute comments, as did Matthew Gray. My 
colleague Marwa Shalaby at Rice University helped enormously with some of my statistical work in 
Chapter 6, as did Richard Stoll. Pedro Rodriguez of the IMF helped me convert his demand equation 
for use in with my demand calculations in Chapter 4, as did Mark Agerton and Sean Leong at Rice. 
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Johnston. Thanks are due to the participants in my Expert Elicitation survey who provided the data 
that drives these chapters, and the dozens of patient interview subjects.  
Finally, my family: I would have spent far more late nights in the PhD room if it weren’t for Jay and 
Connie, whose infectious personalities lured me home by dinnertime most nights. My wife Chloe 
deserves a Q-Max tanker-load of my love and gratitude for – first of all – allowing me the indulgence 
of going back to school, and secondly, putting up with the resulting economic privations. Chloe did all 
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and being an outrageously loveable wife in general, all in good humor. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
In 1932, a drill operated from a rig on a Bahraini hilltop ground through a layer of blue shale 1,250 
feet below ground. The crew drilling the aptly named Oil Well Number 1, under the banner of 
Standard Oil of California, got the first whiff of a substance that would transform the desolate lands 
surrounding them. The black oil that geysered from Jebel Dukhan would be found again and again 
under the barren east Arabian landscape, in reservoirs of unprecedented size. Drillers struck crude in 
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in 1938, Qatar in 1939, Abu Dhabi in 1958 and Oman in 1964.  
The six Arabian Peninsula monarchies that emerged as independent states by the early 1970s used the 
proceeds from these resources to improve the lives of a people that had, until then, lived in nearly 
primeval deprivation, with little access to electricity, clean water, medicine or school. The tribal 
sheikhs who controlled access to the oilfields exploited the flow of rents to strengthen the continuity 
of their regimes. They embarked on nationalizations of their oil resources and seized control of 
production, greatly increasing their share of profits. And they distributed welfare benefits, jobs, cash 
and business licenses to marginalize rivals and secure the support and political quiescence of their 
people. By 1981, when these states banded together in the federation known as the Gulf Cooperation 
Council, or GCC, the current set of societal expectations and state obligations known as social 
contracts were in place. The very same ruling families that governed these lands in the times of pre-oil 
privation were those that still exercise near-absolute control over their vast state bureaucracies today. 
This collection of isolated tribal sheikhdoms found itself transformed into an essential force within the 
global economy. Together the six monarchies hold 40 percent of the world’s proven reserves of crude 
oil and 23 percent of its natural gas,1 the largest known concentration of hydrocarbons on Earth. The 
Gulf monarchies have become synonymous with oil and gas, with borders and maritime boundaries 
shaped by field locations, and the symbols of the industry emblazoned on bank emblems and postage 
stamps. Their steady resource stewardship has kept markets supplied with energy sufficient to fuel the 
world through periods of unprecedented economic and population growth, and they have 
demonstrated that their manipulation of supply can plunge the world into crisis. Energy is not just the 
main business of the Gulf Cooperation Council countries. It is the basis of their independence and of 
their continued economic and political viability. Within these states, the distribution of energy 
proceeds is the most important means by which ruling families maintain themselves in power. 
But the six Persian Gulf monarchies are not just providers of energy to the rest of the world. In recent 
years they have begun to represent a growing market for energy, with some of the world’s highest 
per-capita consumption. Growth in energy demand in these countries has averaged 9% per year over 
1 BP 2012 
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the 40 years since 1972, far outpacing the world average of 2%.2 Several factors have encouraged this 
growth in consumption, including fast-growing populations and personal wealth,3 and energy-
intensive industrialization. Price is also a major factor behind the momentum of consumption growth. 
In the Gulf, energy is considered one of the benefits enshrined within the social contract, and prices 
are extremely low relative to incomes and to prices outside the region. Governments have steadfastly 
maintained historical prices with origins in the socio-political objectives of the early days of the oil 
economy. Subsidized energy has contributed mightily to development and the post-independence 
phase of state formation, and probably also to political stability, but subsidies have also contributed to 
an exorbitant level of demand for commodities that still comprise the region’s chief export and 
biggest contributor to GDP. 
Therefore the expectation for the GCC to retain its role as reliable supplier of crucial commodities to 
world markets is coming under challenge. Maintaining this status depends on Gulf citizens, and the 
flexibility in citizens’ sense of entitlement to cheap energy and willingness to submit to reform. It also 
depends on measures the state is willing to take to ensure the continuity of exports. Like all exporters 
of finite resources, the Gulf monarchies will eventually face depletion-related reductions in 
production and export. But long-running growth in domestic demand is beginning to interfere with the 
ability of these stalwart suppliers to maintain their export roles, regardless of the size of their 
remaining reserves. An era of energy uncertainty has arisen in some of the Gulf monarchies, with 
shortages of natural gas and increasing domestic use of crude oil and other valuable liquid fuels. As a 
result, the GCC’s share of global oil demand has risen sharply. (Fig. 1.1) 
 
Figure 1.1: GCC's share of global oil consumption since 1971. (Source: IEA 2013) 
2 International Energy Agency 2013a 
3 See Appendix for tables outlining growth in population, income and oil production and consumption 
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This demand story has surprised many observers. The Gulf’s reserves were previously considered so 
large in relation to population that domestic consumption was an afterthought.4 A 2008 report from 
the International Energy Agency (IEA) revealed institutional surprise in discovering the extent to 
which the world’s main supply region was becoming a center of demand, with uncertain prospects for 
future exports.5  
The IEA views regional consumption growth from the perspective of importing countries in the 
OECD, which form its membership. Viewed from the perspective of the Gulf ruling families, the 
situation is more alarming. Sixty years after the discovery of oil at Jebel Dukhan, revenues from 
hydrocarbon exports remain one of the most important factors in keeping these six monarchies in 
power. Any threat to those exports also represents a threat to the political systems overseeing them. 
The scatterplot in Fig. 1.2 illustrates the delicate position of the ruling sheikhs. The high levels of oil 
rents in GDP (more than 20%) combined with small populations relative to the resource base, provide 
these regimes with nearly unique levels of co-optive power. This power is expressed in the high GDP 
per capita, above $20,000 per year in each monarchy. Only two other countries, one of them also a 
monarchy, occupy the same upper-right quadrant. An increase in population or decrease in oil rents 
implies reduced proportional distribution, and a shift toward the vertical axis cluster of “resource 
curse” states, none of which remains a monarchy.  
4 In 1971, for instance, the 6m Saudi residents consumed 307,000 barrels of oil per day, or 19 barrels per person, 
per year. By 2011, the kingdom’s population had nearly quintupled to 28m, but oil consumption had risen nearly 
nine-fold, to 2.7m b/d. That represents 27% of production and more than 35 barrels per person per year. 
5 The IEA states that “Rising energy consumption in the MENA [Middle East and North Africa] region is one of 
the few energy stories to have skirted thorough analysis in the past five years, dwarfed by the focus on China 
and Indian consumption and a natural tendency to view the region from the supply side. However, MENA’s 
increasing demand call has already been sufficient to impact on the export availability of particular oil products 
– most notably, fuel oil and natural gas – with no apparent incentives to rein in growth while hydrocarbon 
receipts remain at current levels. … The IEA needs to understand better this emerging regional consumption 
dynamic in order to gauge the impact on export potential from the largest producing region.” See: International 
Energy Agency 2008 
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Figure 1.2: Oil exporting countries plotted on the basis of oil rents in GDP and GDP per 
capita. (World Bank 2012) 
The recent events of the Arab Spring demonstrated the counterrevolutionary value of social spending, 
as countries with large rent surpluses could afford more patronage spending and generally tended to 
experience lower levels of unrest and repression.6 To academics, the trend of Arab Spring events 
demonstrates the continued relevance of theories that attribute regime longevity to rents and allocative 
governance. Rising domestic demand for natural resources thus stands as a potent threat to rent-based 
systems, and a threat that moreover exhibits a certain level of political protection, given that the 
resources distributed form a chief patronage component within the distribution systems of these 
regimes. Reforming energy subsidies in the political context of the Gulf thus entails short-run risk for 
longer-run stability. 
6 Arab states with relatively low rent-to-population ratios such as Yemen, Syria and Egypt responded differently 
to the mobilization of their citizens, mainly by deploying the state’s repressive apparatus. By contrast, Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwait, the UAE, Qatar and Oman relied principally – or solely in the case of Qatar – on increases in 
rent allocation. These latter responses were possible because of the revenues, mainly from resource exports, 
afforded regimes the wherewithal to increase already much higher levels of patronage seen in their per capita 
public wages. This analysis does not hold true across the board. Bahrain, despite its relatively large capacity for 
patronage, went through serious unrest. Libya, which saw its regime overthrown in 2011, is also typically 
grouped in the high-rent, high-patronage category. Conversely, Algeria and Sudan saw smaller amounts of Arab 
Spring-linked unrest, despite much smaller per capita wage bills. See Appendix for a table detailing public 
employment, repression and unrest. See also: Springborg 2013; O. Ali and Elbadawi 2012 
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The question posed by the Gulf’s consumption conundrum – and that which sets the research 
parameters for this dissertation – is this: Can the Gulf monarchies reform consumption in a way that 
maintains exports without undermining public support for regimes?  
1.1 Central Argument 
The scholarship most often called upon to explain the patronage structures driving this consumption 
conundrum is the established political economy theory of the rentier state, a deeply influential 
paradigm which has been used since the 1980s in comparative politics research on natural resource 
exporters, especially those in the Middle East. However, rather than following the expected behavior 
that rentier state theory would describe, this dissertation argues that rentier regimes will confront their 
consumption problem in ways that challenge the theory’s assumptions. In particular, the literature’s 
characterization of subsidies as rights of citizenship is being undermined. This dissertation shows that, 
since continued rises in domestic consumption threaten the long-term maintenance of exports, regimes 
can be expected to protect exports by targeting domestic consumption, and the subsidies encouraging 
demand.  
Rentier theory declares that economic allocation – through state employment and government 
subsidies as well as land grants and preferential commercial opportunities – is the means by which 
regimes generate political acquiescence that perpetuates their control of the state. As will be shown in 
the next chapter, the subsidies that are driving the consumption debacle are considered a bedrock 
element of the rentier social contract, a component which the preponderance of the rentier literature 
describes as sacrosanct. The central misunderstanding of rentier theory is therefore exemplified by the 
conflict between the continuation of domestic energy subsidies and the preservation of oil exports. 
Theory’s inflexible stance toward these subsidies, portraying them as rights, implies that they cannot 
be reformed without upsetting the stability of the entire system. This dissertation argues that this tenet 
is being weakened by rising alarm expressed in regards to domestic demand, and will ultimately fail, 
as governments move to target subsidies in the interest of preserving exports. By amending rentier 
theory to allow for these reforms, this dissertation anticipates the potential for regimes to address the 
self-consuming properties of the rentier state in the interest of preserving power.  
I conclude by proposing that, while the core rentier thesis on the importance of externally generated 
rents remains robust, explanatory power can be increased by altering the portrayal of subsidies from 
“rights” to “customary privileges,” and by allowing for retraction or replacement of social contract 
benefits which are traded for regime support. These amendments provide theoretical allowance for the 
reforms that have already begun in one corner of the Gulf rentier heartland and that other regimes 
appear likely to initiate. 
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My task is to test the strength of theory’s pronouncements that these subsidies are rights which cannot 
be reformed without corresponding loss of public support for the regime. I do this in the following 
manner: 
First, by a thorough examination of the literature that details political relations between state and 
society in the Gulf monarchies (and to a lesser extent, other energy exporters) with careful attention to 
documenting its treatment of subsidies. The literature review in the next chapter includes a detailed 
analysis of the role of welfare benefits, and where possible, subsidized energy, in that relationship. 
The preponderance of views across the rentier literature converges upon the notion that actions which 
probably constitute the most effective demand-management tool – raising prices – are either 
prohibited or illegitimate. I bring in complementary works which offer similar conclusions. 
Depending on the literature, subsidy reform is either difficult (as portrayed in economics), replete 
with steep barriers to change (social contract theory), tantamount to an invitation to political violence 
(works on “relative deprivation”), difficult for centralized states which lack political cover for 
unpopular decisions (welfare state theory), or a violation of citizens’ rights (rentier theory). 
Second, after a short methodology chapter which details the techniques used to analyze these issues, I 
present three chapters which detail the consequences of subsidies and the likelihood of government 
policy responses which run counter to the prohibitions detailed in the literature review. The first of 
these (Chapter 4) uses descriptive statistics on energy demand and pricing to reveal the political-
stability-versus-economic-sustainability quandary facing these monarchies (stylized in Table 1.1). I 
argue that energy demand in the Gulf monarchies has grown to the extent that economies are shifting 
to a new and costly paradigm for electricity production and distribution. Where once electricity was 
produced cheaply, a product of surplus domestic resources, increasingly these states are moving 
toward a more expensive model. The pattern of simultaneous increases in demand and cost, and the 
potential curtailment of exports, are stress-testing energy-based welfare benefits. 
Table 1.1: The Stability versus Sustainability Dilemma 
Do regimes reform subsidies, in hopes of 
sustaining their political economies for the 
longer term?  
This risks instability. Governing legitimacy 
depends on distribution, including of in-kind 
energy commodities. 
Do regimes maintain subsidies to support 
short-term political stability? 
This encourages domestic demand, which 
could endanger longer term sustainability of 
exports, and political-economic systems 
based on export rents.  
 
Chapter 5 focuses on in-kind distribution of energy commodities. I argue that theory unwisely 
associates this practice with political stability, when in the longer run, policy that incentivizes energy 
consumption is more likely to undermine stability. The literature review will provide numerous 
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examples where authors argue against the legitimacy of retracting social contract entitlements such as 
energy subsidies, a position which is difficult to reconcile with the energy sector reform pressures 
described in this thesis. Thus, these pressures create the motivation for regimes to adjust relations with 
their citizens, while also undercutting the academic models that frame that relationship. Since my 
intent is to revise political theory that predicts behavior in resource-exporting states, my research 
follows two tracks. One documents policy action and probabilities of on-the-ground reform of social 
benefits, mainly in the electricity sector. The other focuses on the significance of reform to long-held 
assumptions regarding the practice of rentier politics. Bolstering the argument is evidence that 
reforms running contrary to theory have already taken place, and that further such reforms are likely. I 
provide aggregated expert opinion data which forecasts which regimes have the wherewithal to 
reform their social contracts, and which do not. 
In Chapter 6, the focus shifts to the less familiar citizen perspective on subsidy reform. Here, I present 
public survey results which show that the rentier literature presents too monochromatic a view of 
citizen attitudes toward energy subsidies. Many citizens do indeed claim “entitlement” to the state’s 
natural resources, and these citizens are more likely to oppose pricing reform, as predicted by theory. 
However, this “entitled” view does not represent a majority view. A substantial portion of the public 
is willing to accept subsidy reform, especially when given a national-interest explanation or offered an 
alternate benefit. 
The three substantive chapters form islands in a chain of continuity, starting from an analysis of the 
problem, moving to predictions of reform, and finishing with an exposition of the receptivity of the 
recipients to those reforms. Taken together, these findings suggest that regimes which find themselves 
under pressure may have more scope for energy subsidy reform than generally understood, and 
certainly greater than the scant opportunity portrayed in the rentier literature. The conclusion 
synthesizes these findings into an argument incorporating more theoretical significance for energy as 
a physical commodity, rather than solely as a source of rent, within the rentier literature. 
1.2 Scope and Limits of the Thesis 
This thesis, then, examines the political and economic role of energy subsidies in the Gulf monarchies 
through the lens of rentier state theory, the literature to which it intends to contribute. This approach 
defines the design of the thesis and also delineates the areas it does not cover. Since one goal is to 
show that theoretical prohibition on reducing citizen benefits is probably unmaintainable, my research 
looks most closely at electricity pricing and subsidies, since electricity can be sold at prices that vary 
depending on the category of customer. A state-mandated price increase on expatriate or commercial 
customers does not present the same direct challenge to rentier theory posed by an increase in prices 
levied on the citizen-residential category. Citizen-residential electricity prices also provide a more 
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important explanatory variable than prices on domestic transportation fuel, because retail prices of 
gasoline and diesel fuel are not differentiated by customer category. Despite this, it bears mentioning 
that subsidized gasoline and diesel prices have at various times been increased in the UAE, Oman and 
even Qatar. These increases also be perceived as violations of the state-society ruling bargain, to the 
extent that citizen customers (a minority of the total in the UAE and Qatar) have lost a portion of their 
state benefits. I also spend less time on subsidies on food, land, housing, and state employment, while 
acknowledging their importance within the social contract, since these have no direct bearing on 
commodity exports. 
Related to this point, this dissertation necessarily provides only a limited, albeit robust, analysis of 
energy demand that uses estimates of price elasticity to calculate the effects of subsidy on energy 
demand. These calculations offer plausible estimates of the portion of energy consumption that arises 
from low prices. A secondary calculation comparing Abu Dhabi and Arizona provides controls for 
effects of wealth and climate. I acknowledge that energy demand is a complex formulation driven by 
numerous factors. However, a detailed decomposition of demand that estimates effects of all drivers is 
far beyond the scope and aims of this dissertation. My interests lie not in disentangling contributors to 
demand, but going beyond these to show their effects on political economies.  
Elsewhere, the thesis does not engage deeply with development of alternate sources of rent through 
economic and industrial diversification, sovereign wealth funds or by increased refining and 
petrochemical production. Each of the Gulf states has produced economic diversification plans, the 
theoretical implications of which have been covered elsewhere.7 This dissertation assumes these 
processes will continue in the manner typical of exporters of depleting resources and that these sectors 
will in future be expected to replace contributions from declining commodity sectors.  
The dominant focus on the subsidy portion of the state-society relationship may appear at times to 
oversimplify those relations. I acknowledge the complexity of regime-citizen ties and concede that 
further variables contribute to citizen acquiescence to regimes beyond those stemming from 
subsidized energy. This suggests that regimes may have more avenues for appeasing populations that 
extend beyond the issuance of rents and subsidies. I briefly discuss alternate sources of legitimacy and 
my results suggest that regimes have more room for maneuver than that implied by the rentier 
literature, but I do not spend much time investigating legitimacy because it is tangential to the central 
task of the thesis.  
This dissertation also underplays the heterogeneity among countries often analyzed as a regional unit. 
It is thus worth emphasizing the dominance of Saudi Arabia within the GCC, as well as in the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), and arguably, in the Arab world. The Saudi 
7 In particular see Hvidt 2013 and Hvidt 2012 
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landmass claims more oil reserves, five times the land, and nearly double the population of the other 
five Gulf monarchies combined. Saudi Arabia’s prominence in the Arab and Muslim world is 
amplified by its custody over the two holiest shrines in Islam. This importance is demonstrated five 
times a day, at exactly the same hour, when a large portion of the world’s 1.6 billion Muslims turn to 
pray in the direction of the western Saudi city of Mecca. Saudi Arabia’s uniqueness in the region 
(some say the world) is underpinned by the fact that it has never been fully or directly colonized by an 
outside power.8 The Saudi role in energy markets is also unique. Saudi Arabia’s known oil reserves 
are indeed the world’s largest, but it is the kingdom’s spare capacity, the gap between actual oil 
production and its declared production capacity of 12.5 million barrels a day, which allows it to 
maintain the powerful role as “swing supplier” to global markets. This unmatched flexibility in 
production and export capacity allows it to influence market prices, offset disruptions in output 
elsewhere, and command the strategic interest and protection of the West. Spare production capacity 
is crucial to Saudi Arabia’s strong geopolitical position in the international system. 
While acknowledging that the Saudi role may be unintentionally underemphasized, the lack of 
attention paid to Bahrain is more intentional. This decision is related to Bahrain’s marginal 
contribution to oil markets, its distinct (within the GCC) sectarian character and political dynamic; the 
problem that analysis of stresses to the energy portion of its social contract are overshadowed by more 
pressing political stability concerns, and the external (mainly Saudi) reinforcement of its political 
economy which enables endurance of rentier-structural crises that might otherwise force 
policymaking action. I also do not present detailed cases on non-GCC oil states in the interest of 
preserving depth within the countries researched. 
The design of two research methods, a public survey and an expert elicitation, was done amid 
constraints in funding and with deference to time constraints of respondents. The public survey was 
limited by the polling firm to six questions that could not be differentiated by country. I was unable to 
ask important questions about respondents themselves, such as about whether they were responsible 
for paying bills, or about their consumption habits. Some of the wording on the expert elicitation 
questionnaire was deliberately vague, particularly the question asking experts whether domestic 
consumption posed an “economic threat” to the country in question. This question was meant to 
capture a respondent’s overall positive or negative characterization of energy consumption in a 
country prior to making detailed queries about particulars. Since low-priced energy is typically 
understood as an advantageous input for economic growth (witness the current perception of 
8 Although parts of it were nominally controlled by the Ottoman Empire. In an April 14, 2011 speech, former 
US Ambassador to Saudi Arabia Chas Freeman said the kingdom’s never-colonized status shapes its relations 
with its neighbors, all former colonies, as well as with the West. “Saudi Arabia is the only society on the planet 
never to have experienced coercive intrusion by Western militaries, missionaries, or merchants.  The kingdom 
has never compromised its independence.  When the West finally came here, it came not as a conqueror, 
spiritual tutor, or mercantile exploiter, but as hired help.” 
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inexpensive shale gas in the United States) the large negative response elicited in some GCC countries 
offers an atypical and countervailing example. 
In developing theoretical revisions, this dissertation points out weak constructs in rentier theory and 
proposes an alternate portrayal of subsidy, however it does not get involved in attempts to divine the 
extent of damage to regime support flowing from a hypothetical reform of subsidy, or whether or not 
that loss of support needs to be replaced by an alternate benefit or policy. These questions depend on 
distinct and complex political contexts in individual countries. My limited response to this question 
comes in the form of case studies of two successful subsidy reforms, in Dubai and Iran. Divining 
potential benefit-reform exchanges elsewhere lies outside the scope of this dissertation. 
Finally, it should be mentioned that these limitations were necessary to enable the depth of this thesis’ 
audit of rentier theory through examination of energy policy. What follows is a detailed and 
thoroughly analyzed multi-method corrective to some of the most common scholarly orthodoxies in 
Gulf studies and Middle East political economy. A broader scope would sacrifice some of this depth. 
Scholarly merit is achieved here through critical analysis of existing theory and by providing 
extensive empirical evidence not previously brought together, rather than offering extensive new 
theoretical tenets. However, my critical analysis of existing theory aims to improve the theoretical 
framework through which the political economy of the Gulf Arab monarchies is currently understood, 
and as such will provide a solid foundation for future theoretical advances in this crucially important 
area of research. 
1.3 Key Definitions and Assumptions 
This thesis’ findings also depend on assumptions that, while they may not comprise a chief focus for 
this research, lie behind the approach. They are therefore stated and supported below.  
• The term “energy subsidies” includes domestic sales at prices below those prevailing 
internationally  
• Price subsidies have made a significant contribution to energy consumption in the Gulf 
monarchies, relative to other contributing variables such as income and population growth 
• Reducing subsidies will reduce demand 
• Reducing subsidies will bring substantial savings to economies  
• Continued rises in domestic oil consumption, all else constant, will affect the ability of GCC 
producers to export 
• If exports are reduced, export revenues will also be reduced. 
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1.3.1 Defining Subsidies 
I accept IEA and OECD definitions that subsidies constitute “any measure that keeps prices for 
consumers below market levels”9 and “any government action that concerns primarily the energy 
sector that lowers the cost of energy production, raises the price received by energy producer or 
lowers the price paid by energy consumers.”10 Perhaps the most applicable subsidy definition for this 
research is the difference between a commodity’s selling price and its opportunity cost.11 According 
to the Little-Mirrlees Rule, allocative efficiency is achieved when the domestic price equals the real 
marginal opportunity cost, the best estimate of which is the world reference price for that commodity 
prior to the imposition of any local taxes.12 
Arguments against fossil fuel subsidies in exporting states are especially pertinent in the Middle East, 
the region with the world’s lowest average energy prices and highest per capita subsidies. (Table 1.2) 
On a total cost basis, Iran and Saudi Arabia are the world’s No. 1 and 2 subsidizers of fossil fuels.13  
Table 1.2: Energy subsidies in major energy exporters in 2011, ranked on per-capita basis 
 Oil Gas Coal Electricity Total subsidy  
2011 ($bn) 
Total subsidy 
as share of 
GDP 
Subsidy per 
capita 2011 
(US$) 
UAE 3.9 11.5 0 6.4 21.8 6% $    4,303 
Qatar 2 1.9 0 2.1 6 3% $    3,661 
Kuwait 4.3 2.1 0 4.7 11.1 7% $    3,185 
Saudi Arabia 46.1 0 0 14.8 60.9 9% $    2,284 
Brunei 0.3 0 0 0.2 0.5 3% $    1,232 
Iran 41.4 23.4 0 17.4 82.2 16% $    1,123 
Turkmenistan 0.8 4.4 0 0.7 5.8 20% $    1,084 
Venezuela 22 1.9 0 3.2 27.1 9% $        947 
Iraq 20.4 0.3 0 1.6 22.2 12% $        711 
Libya 2.3 0.2 0 0.7 3.1 5% $        483 
Ecuador 5.4 0 0 0.1 5.6 7% $        384 
Algeria 11.3 0 0 2.1 13.4 7% $        384 
Kazakhstan 3.2 0.3 0.6 1.7 5.8 3% $        358 
Russia 0 21.9 0 18.3 40.2 2% $        283 
Malaysia 5.4 0.9 0 0.9 7.2 2% $        258 
Azerbaijan 0.6 0.8 0 0.5 1.9 3% $        212 
Mexico 15.9 0 0 0 15.9 1% $        144 
9 OECD, cited in United Nations Environment Program 2008, 11 
10 IEA, cited in United Nations Environment Program 2008, 11 
11 Some hold that Saudi Arabia is a special case; that its low domestic energy prices do not constitute subsidies 
because spare production capacity allows it to set or influence global market prices. I acknowledge these 
arguments but, in the interest of simplicity, accept the IEA’s characterization of Saudi underpricing as a subsidy. 
For a more nuanced argument, see Alyousef and Stevens 2011 
12 Little and Mirrlees 1968, cited in Brito and Rosellon 2010; Alyousef and Stevens 2011 
13 International Energy Agency 2011 
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Indonesia 15.7 0 0 5.6 21.3 3% $          91 
Angola 1.1 0 0 0.3 1.3 1% $          70 
Nigeria 3.6 0 0 0.7 4.3 2% $          28 
Source: Subsidy data provided by IEA at author’s request, 2013; GDP figures (in current US$) and 
population figures from World Bank, World Development Indicators 2014 
 
1.3.2 Contributions of subsidy to GCC energy demand 
Price is one of the chief components of energy demand, alongside income, population, technology and 
climate. Price affects demand in a direct way, through price-influenced choices in consumption of fuel 
and electricity, as well as indirectly, through choices of energy-consuming equipment and the 
operating efficiency of that equipment, as well as the rate of its utilization.14 In the Gulf monarchies, 
low prevailing prices relative to income offer less incentive for conservation than that which might 
arise if prices reflected those in global markets. (Further detail in Chapter 4)  
Several authors have reached similar conclusions. Alyousef and Stevens describe low and subsidized 
prices in Saudi Arabia as “the single most obvious explanation for the extremely high levels of energy 
use in the Kingdom.”15 Mehrara finds that subsidies in oil exporting countries explain their otherwise 
“implausibly high energy intensity” that has caused energy consumption to grow much faster than 
overall economies. If unaddressed, Mehrara argues, subsidy-driven demand will turn exporters into 
net importers.16 Bourland and Gamble document trends of increasing energy intensity and reductions 
in efficiency of energy use in Saudi Arabia, comparing trends in the kingdom with global norms in 
which these indicators move in opposite directions. They show that the kingdom uses ten times the 
global average of oil per unit of GDP, and argue that the “key reason for the rise in consumption is 
very low energy prices.”17 Deutsche Bank examined rising domestic consumption in OPEC member-
states and found that demand increased more than four times faster than the world average during the 
last decade, 56% versus 13%. Adjusting for population growth, which in OPEC was double the world 
average, the authors found that OPEC oil demand still grew at a much stronger rate, 1.4 barrels per 
capita per year for an increase over the decade of 24%, versus 0.03 barrels per capita globally, an 
0.7% increase. The authors conclude that “there is a very strong prima facie case for saying that the 
subsidies on domestic oil consumption in OPEC countries are the main reason why per-capita 
consumption within OPEC has increased so much more quickly than per-capita consumption for the 
world as a whole over the last decade.”18 
14 Medlock III 2011  
15 Alyousef and Stevens 2011, emphasis added 
16 Mehrara 2007 
17 Bourland and Gamble 2011, emphasis added 
18 Lewis and Hsueh 2012, 13–14, emphasis added 
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However, it remains prudent to mention that while low prices may explain a large portion of 
consumption (as will be demonstrated in Chapter 4) reforms that eliminate subsidies may not, by 
themselves, resolve increases in demand for energy. The GCC states are also experiencing strong 
rates of growth in population, wealth and industrialization which, as mentioned, contribute to demand. 
1.3.3 Demand effects of reduced subsidies 
It is possible to estimate the contribution of subsidies to energy demand in the GCC countries by 
using a price elasticity calculation that involves a hypothetical removal of subsidies by the means of 
an increase in prices. In Chapter 4, I demonstrate that a rationalization of energy prices would 
significantly reduce demand for energy in the Gulf monarchies. The results allow us to infer the large 
portion of demand attributed to subsidized prices. A second calculation in the same chapter uses the 
less hypothetical example of comparing subsidized electricity demand in Abu Dhabi with 
unsubsidized consumption in Arizona, which offers a way of controlling for some income and climate 
effects. By raising Abu Dhabi prices to Arizona levels, demand falls sharply, but average 
consumption in Abu Dhabi still remains higher than that in Arizona.  
Regardless of the political feasibility of such an increase, even at the relatively low levels of price 
elasticity of demand estimates19 that circulate in literature on the Gulf, the price increases required to 
cover the full cost of various energy products is so large that corresponding reductions in demand 
become significant. It is clear that price exerts strong encouragement of energy demand in the Gulf 
monarchies. 
1.3.4 Reducing energy demand will bring substantial savings to Gulf economies 
As mentioned above and demonstrated in Chapter 4, reducing subsidies – in this case, raising retail 
energy prices – will exert an effect on demand, all else constant. It follows that reduced demand will 
result in reduced public expenditures and increased state revenues, since energy prices in the Gulf 
monarchies are controlled by the government and set at rates far below those in unsubsidized markets. 
This is because subsidies impose a cost, in fiscal terms and in terms of foregone opportunities to earn 
market revenues and domestic taxes. The more energy “sold” in these subsidized markets, the greater 
the cost to the government.  
Gupta et al. show that the average rate of subsidy among major oil exporters was 3% of GDP and 
more than 15% of government budgets in 1999.20 More recent data from the IEA (Table 1.2) place the 
GCC countries at the top of the ranks of global energy subsidizers, with energy subsidies accounting 
19 Many scholars predict that energy demand in the Gulf (and elsewhere) is not very sensitive to increases in 
price; i.e. a $1 increase in price would have a smaller corresponding effect on demand. A price elasticity of -1 
implies a one-to-one relationship between price and demand; price elasticity of -0.3 implies a 1-to-0.3 
relationship and an elasticity of -0.5 implies a demand response half as large as the price increase.  
20 Mehrara 2007; Gupta et al. 2002 
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for roughly 9% of Saudi GDP, 7% of that of Kuwait and 6% of the UAE.21 Rodriguez et al. show that 
rationalizing prices would allow Kuwait to recoup a significant portion of the outlays it currently 
expends to subsidize energy. Even if consumers were given a cash rebate equal to the value of lost 
welfare (the value of energy consumed without the excess demand attributed to the subsidy), Kuwait 
would capture net permanent savings of between 1.8% and 2.8% of GDP, which comprise 
“potentially large long-term benefits from reforming energy subsidies.”22 Besides the increased 
revenue, there would be significant savings in energy use and reduced opportunity cost in terms of 
forfeiture of export revenue. In terms of primary energy savings, the demand response to rationalized 
prices (a 183% increase using gasoline prices as a reference) in Kuwait would save the equivalent of 
nearly 18 million barrels of oil per year, about three weeks’ exports, worth $1.9 billion at current 
prices. Similar effects would be expected in neighboring monarchies. (See Table 4.5 in Chapter 4) 
Since energy subsidies generate so much waste and typically accrue disproportionately to the wealthy, 
subsidy costs represent a diversion of public funds and/or national resources that could be used to 
generate greater social benefit. In this sense reformed prices that make energy products more 
expensive raise revenues for the state, while inducing consumers to adopt habits and technologies that 
increase conservation. This, in turn, reduces state spending and preserves resources for export. 
Reduced emissions are another benefit. Damette and Seghir find that energy intensity is high enough 
in oil-exporting countries that price reforms can be made to preserve exports and revenues without 
adversely effecting economic growth.23 
1.3.5 Continued rises in oil consumption will affect the ability of GCC producers to export 
Several studies have shown the effects on exports of continued increases in demand within the GCC. 
As mentioned, their authors predict the demise of spare production capacity and, if policies are not 
adjusted, a decline in exports. These predictions are based on production of crude oil reaching a 
plateau, for reasons that include geological capacity, availability of funds for capital investment, 
access to technology, preferences for intergenerational equity, and planning for depletion. With 
production held constant, rising domestic demand first displaces any spare production capacity and 
then begins to displace exports. Figure 1.3 below uses Saudi Arabia as an example, and combines 
forecasts prepared by Riyadh-based investment bank Jadwa Investment and Business Monitor 
International for production and domestic consumption, which it uses to calculate exports. Forecasts 
of Saudi production capacity are derived from statements by oil minister Ali Naimi about long-term 
21 International Energy Agency 2011 (data provided to author by IEA.) 
22 Rodriguez, Charap, and da Silva 2012 
23 Damette and Seghir 2013 
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capacity being maintained at 12.5 m b/d.24 At current rates of demand growth, all else constant, Saudi 
Arabia would consume all of its production capacity and become a net oil importer around 2043. 
 
Figure 1.3: Effects of Domestic Consumption on Saudi Oil Exports 
It should be stated that longevity of exports can and probably will be extended beyond the dates in 
these illustrative “business as usual” forecasts through increasing production capacity and/or reducing 
domestic demand, and by substituting for oil in domestic economies. This dissertation does not create 
such a study since the phenomena have been so widely documented. Rather, it uses existing work as a 
starting point for analysis of potential reforms.  I illustrate consumption trends not because I claim 
that an end to exports is inevitable, but because these trends apply pressure on political systems and 
theory. A short-term end to oil exports is therefore not an inevitability, but rather a source of pressure 
with which politics and theory must reckon. In fact, if exports are extended through price reforms, this 
dissertation argues that such a development would represent a theoretical breach. One or more of the 
Gulf monarchies may also extend the current state of affairs by maintaining exports and 
simultaneously meeting future increases in domestic demand through increases in oil production, 
perhaps through adding new reserves and making capital investments required to extract and market 
more oil.  
24 DiPaola, Anthony and Yuji Okada. “Saudi Aramco Plans ‘Massive’ Spending to Extend Field Life.” 
Bloomberg. Oct. 14, 2013. Note that Saudi prince Turki al-Faisal suggested in 2013 that the kingdom would 
need to increase production capacity to 15 m b/d, but Naimi disputed that statement saying that the kingdom’s 
long-term production forecasts did not call for any such increase in capacity. See: Said, Summer and Keith 
Johnson. “Rift Emerges Over Saudi Oil Policy.” Wall Street Journal. Apr. 30, 2013. 
[http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323528404578454683761056470]  
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It is important to recognize that all oil-exporting states, including those no longer exporting, face or 
have faced the winding down of exports in favor of domestic demand. For example, China and the 
United States were once net oil exporters, but increased demand transformed them into net importers. 
Indonesia has recently reached this point, and Egypt and Malaysia are nearing it.25 For the Gulf 
monarchies, the demise of exports is being hastened by trends in domestic consumption: 
• Bourland and Gamble’s 2011 study for Jadwa Investment finds that for Saudi Arabia, “if local 
oil consumption continues to grow at the same pace that it has over the last eight years, then 
by 2020 it would reach 3.9 million barrels per day and by 2030 it would be 6.5 million barrels 
per day. Extending the trend even further, by 2037 domestic consumption would exceed the 
Kingdom’s current production and by 2043 it would be greater than current production 
capacity of 12.5 million barrels per day.”26 (Fig. 1.3) 
• Lahn and Stevens’ 2011 study, one of a number of Chatham House research papers 
examining depletion trajectories among oil producers, projects in its business-as-usual case 
that Saudi domestic consumption will displace exports by 2038, despite a rise in production 
capacity to 13.1m b/d.27 
• Gately, al-Yousef and al-Sheikh argue that major international energy forecasters, including 
the IEA, BP and US Department of Energy (DOE), have serially underestimated growth in 
Saudi domestic demand, and as a result are most likely overestimating future Saudi supply to 
world oil markets. They argue that these forecasts rely on Saudi consumption growth of less 
than 2%/year when historical yearly average growth has been 5.7%. The authors forecast that 
“continued high growth rates for domestic oil consumption are more likely than the dramatic 
slowdowns projected by IEA, DOE and BP.”28  
• A Citibank research report in 2012 forecast that, at continued 8% yearly growth in peak 
electricity demand, and no changes in the current electricity feedstock mix (more than half of 
which is comprised of crude oil, fuel oil and diesel), Saudi Arabia would quickly become a 
net oil importer: “Our analysis shows that if nothing changes Saudi may have no available oil 
for export by 2030.”29 
Public statements of policymakers and executives have backed up these findings on the role of 
subsidies in demand and the subsequent threat posed to exports and revenues, as have my interviews. 
For instance, Saudi oil minister Ali Naimi predicted oil consumption would double by 2030 – a 
25 See, for example: Krauss, Clifford. “Oil-Rich Nations Use More Energy, Cutting Exports.” New York Times. 
(Dec. 9, 2007) [http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/09/business/worldbusiness/09oil.html] 
26 Bourland and Gamble 2011, 22 
27 Lahn and Stevens 2011; see also Mitchell and Stevens 2008; Stevens and Mitchell 2008 
28 Gately, Al-Yousef, and Al-Sheikh 2012 
29 Rehman 2012 
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forecast which uses a lower level of growth than those which extrapolate from historical trends – and 
called for a “highly efficient rationalization program with the participation of the public and private 
sectors and all citizens in order to reduce consumption.”30 Ahmed al-Khateeb, CEO of Jadwa 
Investment, argued that energy consumption could only be reduced by raising prices, which, he said, 
should be levied on all but the poorest. “While we all like cheap energy and water, the government 
has to revise its system of offering subsidies. An individual, whether Saudi or expatriate, with an 
income of SR10,000 should pay the global market price of electricity and fuel. The government's 
subsidies should not be applicable to them.”31 Oman’s energy minister was most blunt. "We are 
wasting too much energy in the region and the barrels that we are consuming are becoming a threat 
now, for our region particularly... I think we have a serious problem," Mohammed bin Hamad al-
Rumhy said during an energy conference in Abu Dhabi. "What is really destroying us right now is 
subsidies... We simply need to raise the price of petrol and electricity. In some countries in our region 
electricity is free and you leave your air conditioning for the whole summer when you go on holiday. 
That is really a crime. Our cars are getting bigger, our consumption is getting bigger and the price is 
almost free. So you need to send a signal to the pockets of the public."32 
1.3.6 If exports are thus reduced, export revenues will be impaired 
The final link in the chain of subsidy effects is that which projects that, if exports are reduced, state 
revenues from hydrocarbon exports will also be reduced. This assumption is based on a declining 
volume of oil exports and corresponding revenues. Indonesia, a onetime major oil exporter and former 
member of OPEC that has also grappled with energy subsidies, has already experienced these effects. 
Indonesian oil exports declined after reaching their peak of nearly 1.4 million barrels per day in 1978. 
Oil rents as a percentage of GDP also began to trend downward, albeit with periodic interruptions 
from increases in oil prices. (Fig. 1.4) A similar fate may await GCC oil exporters. In the long term, 
reduced exports will probably mean reduced oil rents in GDP. However, the two are not perfectly 
correlated. A sufficiently large increase in oil prices could outweigh a decrease in export volumes and 
bring an increase in oil rents, as happened in Indonesia when prices spiked in 1979 and rents shot up 
from 13% to 30% of GDP, despite a drop in exports. A reduction in GCC oil exports – unless it was 
preceded by receding external demand – could by itself raise market prices and export revenues. Thus, 
given the right market conditions, a loss of exports from Saudi Arabia or another key supplier that 
coincided with an environment of strong oil demand could wind up augmenting revenues, at least 
temporarily. However, in the long run, as demand adjusted or new sources of supply were brought on 
stream, a decline in exports is most likely to result in a decline in revenue and GDP contribution. 
30 Dourian 2012 
31 Arab News. “Al-Khateeb: Energy subsidies need review.” Feb. 19, 2013. [http://www.arabnews.com/al-
khateeb-energy-subsidies-need-review] 
32 Fineren, Daniel. “Oman oil minister slams Gulf culture of energy subsidies.” Reuters. Nov. 10, 2013. 
[http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/10/gulf-energy-subsidies-idUSL5N0IV07V20131110] 
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After 1985, Indonesia’s oil exports reached this long-run state, remaining a smaller contributor to 
GDP than they had when exports peaked in 1978.  
 
Figure 1.4: Effects of Declining Oil Exports on Magnitude of Oil Rents in 
Indonesia (Source: IEA-exports; World Bank-rents) 
Factors beyond domestic demand may also impact exports of oil from the Gulf monarchies. 
Conceivable possibilities include internal disruptions to production, embargo, importers’ energy 
security concerns or reactions to the global climate change agenda. Whatever the cause, past 
experience has shown that reduced exports tend to correlate with reduced rents over the long term. 
This dissertation does not consider the political effects of such scenarios because they offer little 
insight into the robustness of rentier political structures that describe energy subsidies as citizens’ 
rights.  
1.3.7 Other Assumptions and Definitions 
Sustainability: This dissertation uses the term “sustainability” in the more typical dictionary sense, 
i.e. “the ability to be sustained, supported, upheld or confirmed,” rather than in the ecological sense of 
maintaining biological diversity or sustaining human life on the planet, or the economic sustainability 
debate about intergenerational equity,33 or even the Brundtland Commission’s definition of 
sustainable development which refers to ability to meet the needs of the present without 
33 See, for example, Anand and Sen 2000 
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compromising those of future generations.34 Sustainability for my purposes refers to the ability of 
states to calibrate political economies in a way that aligns domestic energy needs with those of the 
export sector.   
Regime vs. State: By regime, I refer to governance that concentrates power in the hands of a certain 
social group. The regime endures beyond changes in government if the new government is led by the 
same social group.35 By contrast, the state is the “inclusive concept that covers all aspects of 
policymaking and enforcement of legal sanctions,” as Larson writes. Thus the state also endures 
beyond changes in government, but comprises a more structural institution (or system of institutions) 
than the more socially derived regime.36  
Political Stability: When using this term I mean simply that the political environment is predictable. 
By political instability, I refer to the propensity of a government to collapse.37 I acknowledge, like 
Shepherd, that a stable or durable political environment can also involve long-term dependence on aid 
or governance by corrupt and authoritarian regimes, along with practices that can inhibit foreign 
investment and economic growth.38 However, since these factors do not comprise key phenomena for 
my study, I accept the more simple definition above. 
Other forms of legitimacy: Regime provision of subsidized energy is one legitimacy-generating 
practice among many that play a role in the complex relationship between ruler and citizen. While this 
dissertation focuses on energy subsidies because of their role in the demand equation and what I 
believe is a flawed portrayal of their significance in the literature, I acknowledge that several other 
factors contribute to regime legitimacy, among them other forms of rent distribution and patronage, as 
well as personal charisma that is linked to traditional fealty to sheikhs as “royals;” long records of 
achievements in development; proven records of survival in times of crisis; rulers’ international 
stature and reputation as skilled handlers of international relations; traditional and local legitimacy 
flowing from conscious adherence to elements of tradition, as well as to local kinship ties and 
frequent social interaction; and even religious legitimacy.39 A substantial volume of literature on 
legitimacy examines these issues in far more detail than is possible here. 
Regimes that cannot reform subsidies are not necessarily doomed: As the findings of Chapter 6 
show, actual political conduct does not follow the input-output assumptions of rentier theory, which 
imply that a decrease in patronage must be followed by a corresponding increase in repression or in 
34 United Nations World Commission on Environment and Development (aka Brundtland Commission) 1989 
35 Calvert 1987, 18; Fishman 1990, 428; S. Lawson 1993 
36 Larson 1980, 19; cited in Lawson 1993 
37 Using the definition from Alesina et al. 1996 
38 Shepherd 2010 
39 Nonneman 2005 Also see: Abdulla 2010, Schlumberger 2010, and Nonneman 2006 
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political participation. In Chapter 5, I follow the literature’s reductionist logic and hypothetically 
suggest that regimes which cannot reform subsidies will fall or undergo changes in character, 
compensating for the reduced patronage by either becoming more democratic or repressive. While 
these sorts of reactions are possible, they are not inevitable. First, economic diversification as seen in 
Dubai offers an avenue toward new sources of rents and preferential business options which can also 
bolster support for the regime. Second, reforms do not necessarily require a quid pro quo, as Dubai 
has also demonstrated. Other iterations are also possible. Third, Chapter 6 shows that the public 
appears more accepting of reform than portrayed in the literature, which suggests that regimes have 
more room for maneuver – potentially due to the array of non-patronage legitimacy resources listed 
above – than some authors suppose.  
1.4 External Factors  
Reforming the Gulf subsidy conundrum is crucial for the countries involved, of course. But, as the 
IEA argued in 2008, it is also important for global markets and the world economy, so dependent 
upon continued energy supply from the Gulf. My research focuses on circumstances inside the 
countries identified, but it is worthwhile to mention the external environment. Consumption trends 
point to a premature, albeit long-term, erosion of Gulf oil export capacity, and the simultaneous 
transformation of the region into a substantial importer of natural gas. Successful reforms of subsidies 
would enable the imposition of energy efficiency measures that could slow these trends, but, as 
mentioned, these reforms risk undermining citizen support for regimes. 
The uncertainties raised about the GCC’s ability to maintain its role as a key global energy supplier 
have attracted surprisingly little urgency from institutions representing importing countries. The 
issues illustrated here appear to have been overshadowed by the concurrent supply shock from US 
tight oil and gas, and other major finds off Brazil, East Africa, the Levant and elsewhere. These 
increases in supply coincide with and have outpaced sluggish growth (at the time of writing) in global 
demand for oil and gas.40 The unexpected appearance of new non-OPEC supply may thus have muted 
the urgency of any reduced long-term export potential from OPEC.  
Further, experts and policymakers interviewed for this research expressed assumptions that the Gulf 
monarchies, led by Saudi Arabia, would be able to reduce or even stop growth in domestic demand 
for export commodities through various policy adjustments (few of which had been enacted at the 
time of writing). These include reducing subsidies, as well as by generating more power through gas, 
nuclear and renewables; and by imposing greater efficiency (some of it legally mandated) in 
buildings, vehicle fleets and cooling systems. A senior analyst who forecasts long-term international 
40 IEA Medium Term Oil Market Report 2013 [http://iea.org/media/news/MTOMR_2013_OVERVIEW.pdf], 
IEA Medium Term Gas Market Report 2013 [http://www.iea.org/Textbase/npsum/MTGMR2013SUM.pdf] . 
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oil demand at the US Energy Information Administration (EIA) said: “We do expect Saudi Arabia 
will make necessary changes to retain its position as a major oil exporter over the next decades.” 41 
Other scenarios are certainly possible. Threats to spare oil production capacity in the Gulf could also 
be magnified by, perhaps, a return to faster growth in oil demand, especially among the non-OECD 
countries; or a sustained supply outage; or disappointing output from one or more recently booked 
sources of supply. The EIA adds that uncertainty among major exporters over “strategic choices” 
(presumably in infrastructure investment and demand management) adds to market uncertainty about 
future supply and prices.42 
The pan-Arab uprisings of the Arab Spring – accompanied by major anti-government demonstrations 
elsewhere – broke out during my research, and have dampened enthusiasm and expectations for 
subsidy reform.43 While Arab republics with long-serving autocrats bore the brunt of the uprisings, 
the Gulf monarchies were not immune. The Bahrain uprising of 2011 brought a significant portion of 
the population into the streets, triggering a brutal crackdown and intervention by the Saudi and 
Emirati militaries. Bahrain’s Sunni monarchy survived, but the virulence and scale of the uprising 
appear to have alarmed all of the Gulf ruling families. Oman, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia weathered less 
severe demonstrations, which nonetheless saw the army called in and protesters killed in Oman, the 
parliament building overrun in Kuwait, and killings of Shia demonstrators by Saudi security forces in 
the Eastern Province.44 Ruling families also responded in ways meant to shore up citizen support and 
demonstrate the perils of dissent, mixing salary and benefit increases with criminal prosecution of 
opposition figures. 
The uprisings have not just undercut impetus to reform domestic energy demand, but subsequent 
increases in social spending are thought to have constrained funds available for investment in supply-
side infrastructure. Even before the pan-Arab uprisings, the region’s national oil companies were less 
revenue-efficient than their international (IOC) counterparts.45 The Arab Spring served to expand the 
social welfare and job-generation roles of NOCs, which further reduced their investment capacities.46 
NOC revenue inefficiency may indeed worsen as Gulf governments increase distributive outlays to 
reduce the potential for unrest, while diverting oil and gas into industrial projects that aim to produce 
jobs. Further, financially stretched NOCs may be less able to pursue domestic gas-for-oil substitution 
investments, which often entail financial incentives for foreign investment in the unprofitable 
41 Author interview (via email) with Linda Doman, long-term oil demand analyst, International Energy Outlook, 
US Energy Information Administration, Jan. 7, 2013. 
42 EIA, Annual Energy Outlook 2013, Executive Summary. 
[http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/chapter_executive_summary.cfm ] 
43 Quantified in expert elicitation results in Chapter 5. 
44 Matthiesen 2012 provides detailed coverage of the underreported Saudi uprising. 
45 Hartley and Medlock III 2013 
46 Marcel 2006, 229-231, describes NOC social welfare functions and effects on investment. 
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upstream gas sector.47 Finally, the region’s rising risk profile may also deter outside investment, since 
technological advancements allow for renewed focus on depleting fields and unconventional 
resources in more stable locales.48 For these reasons and others, the Gulf states appear unlikely to 
initiate substantial increases in export capacity. 
It is possible that supply uncertainties will prompt external actors to weigh in on the Gulf’s demand 
conundrum. The GCC countries have shown susceptibility to outside pressure in the past, particularly 
in evidence during Saudi Arabia’s economic reforms ahead of joining the WTO.49 Rising carbon 
emissions could present another opportunity for international pressure, given the climate change 
implications of the region’s world-leading per-capita emissions output. Aggregate GCC emissions are 
nearly as large as those of Japan, despite a population less than a third as large.50 The IEA and IMF 
have made recent high-profile calls highlighting the role of fossil fuel subsidies in climate change. A 
recent IEA report found that an unspecified “partial” reduction in consumption subsidies would 
accomplish about 12% of the carbon emissions reductions required to meet the target associated with 
the 2-degrees-by-2020 goal.51 The Gulf monarchies’ status as large suppliers, subsidizers and 
consumers of fossil fuels exposes them to any shift in international opprobrium on climate change.    
* * * 
The intricacies of the Gulf energy conundrum create a fascinating puzzle for scholars as well as 
policymakers. Understanding the motivations behind policy provides insights into state-society 
relations in autocracies, and in economies dominated by energy exports. The research question that 
drives this scholarship is appealing on two levels. Energy policy reforms pose a challenge to the most 
important academic theories of governance of these rentier states, while also giving a window onto 
the potential for survival of these seemingly anachronistic, now nearly unique, governance systems.  
  
47 Darbouche and Fattouh 2011 
48 IEA Medium Term Oil Report 2013. 
49 Covered in Hertog 2010a 
50 BP 2012 
51 International Energy Agency 2013b 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
The goal of this chapter is to present an in-depth review of the literature on rentier states and other 
resource-exporting political economies, and investigate the factors that set such states apart from 
others. An understanding of the literature will assist in assessing questions about the sustainability of 
the rentier energy practices that concern this thesis. The chapter details works from all phases of 
rentier theory, from the classic phase that reflected a simpler era of undeveloped states undergoing the 
initial impact of an oil boom, to the most recent works which have incorporated substantial revisions 
to compensate for the deepening complexity within these states. I widen the pool of literature to touch 
upon scholarship examining social contracts and the expectations of citizens regarding welfare 
benefits. Works examining postwar “retrenchment” of social welfare cutbacks elsewhere offer 
insights into the creation of benefit constituencies and the unpopularity and political risks of reform. 
Theories of political violence, especially those dealing with the social-psychological concept of 
“relative deprivation,” offer another rationale for the “stickiness” of consumption subsidies.  
Finally, assembling this puzzle involves disentangling subsidies from rentierism to examine the state’s 
perception and treatment of natural resources. This includes the economic value with which resources 
are assigned within the state’s overall portfolio of assets and whether those resources are being 
depleted in an optimal manner. Works on these topics can provide a window on the relative tradeoffs 
faced by regimes and the resulting opportunity costs in terms of foregone investments and 
intergenerational equity. I conclude the literature review by contrasting the differing views of subsidy 
retraction within the various literature strands, and present a revised theoretical framework for 
examining consumption subsidies in the rentier state.  
* * * 
The ideas behind rentier theory begin with a simple idea: There is no such thing as easy money. This 
notion – that unearned wealth is a route to trouble, even poverty – is a long-held one. Those whose 
wealth flows not from work or financial risk but from unearned rents have been maligned for 
centuries. Fourteenth century historian Ibn Khaldun denigrated “weak minded” opportunists who 
“discover property under the surface of the earth and make some profit from it.”52 The 16th century 
French philosopher Jean Bodin wrote that “Men of a fat and fertile soil are most commonly 
effeminate and cowards” while “a barren country makes men temperate by necessity, and by 
consequence careful, vigilant and industrious.”53 
52 Khaldūn 2005, 301 
53 Quoted in Sachs and Warner 1999  
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The idea that easy wealth undermines competitive instincts and the work ethic has also been extended 
to states. Adam Smith surmised that the need to overcome poverty was one of the chief catalysts for 
building an effective state, while quick riches wrought the reverse: 16th century Spain, its rentier 
nobility awash in gold and silver bullion from the New World, slipped to the verge of famine, 
gyrating into bankruptcy and succumbing to a bout of the plague. Karl quotes an economist of the era 
lamenting that “if Spain has no gold or silver coin, it is because she has some. What makes her poor is 
her wealth.”54 
These simple ideas were forerunners to a body of literature that informs this dissertation. Its works 
falls under the broad rubric of political economy, with streams that fall on both sides of the political 
science-economics divide. Most relevant here are works in rentier state theory, which Herb describes 
as “the most influential theoretic paradigm in the study of the comparative politics of the eastern Arab 
world” which “has increasingly been applied to the study of natural resource exporters in other 
regions.”55 Also useful is related scholarship that explores the hypothesis of the “resource curse.” 
Rentier state theory argues that externally sourced rent, when it forms the chief source of a 
government’s revenue, influences (some say determines) a country’s politics, which tend to be 
authoritarian because rents displace taxes in government revenues. The resource curse literature tries 
to prove (or disprove) that reliance on commodity exports, especially oil, undermines economic 
growth or democracy.  
While both streams examine issues relevant to energy consumption in the Gulf monarchies, rentier 
theory presents the most relevant theoretical lens for a work dealing with the energy sector, which 
happens to be the engine of the rents that support these political economies. Thus energy production, 
domestic consumption and rent-generating export sales are closely intertwined. The rentier literature 
is best placed to host a discussion of the role of energy distribution within overall rent distribution, 
since rentier works already predict the effects of rents on state-society relations and describe the 
manner in which regimes use distribution to cultivate political support. By contrast, the more 
quantitative resource curse works tend to overlook these links in favor of measuring statistical 
variations in political participation or economic performance among panels of oil exporting countries.  
Rentier works are also germane because they tend to be tailored to the Gulf region and context. They 
are usually written from the regime standpoint, which provides a useful perspective for understanding 
choices in public policy that at times appear to contravene economic logic. Regime motivations tend 
to be understood as complying with and bounded by the state-society social contract, the importance 
of which is regularly echoed in casual conversations about policy formulation in the region. This 
54 Karl 1997, 32–40; the economist quoted is Martin Gonzalez de Cellorigo. 
55 Herb 2002 
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transportability makes the rentier framework for evaluating everyday politics, which cannot be 
matched by the comparative statistical calculations of the resource curse literature.  
Finally, this thesis is concerned with rentierism because it will revise some of the theory’s established 
views, especially those on rent distribution, while documenting threats to rentier systems from 
maintaining these practices, which rentier scholars tend to associate with political stability. For that 
reason, this research engages to a lesser extent with other explanations for autocracy, such as works 
espousing historical factors or political culture considerations, which – while offering useful 
explanations for variations in political behavior – are less central to a discussion of energy policy 
which, necessarily, is so tightly interwoven with rent. 
As Luciani observed, natural resource rentierism and the curses or blessings of resources are 
temporary phenomena.56 At some point, and for varying reasons, oil exporters stop exporting. 
Economies either diversify or face profound social and economic challenges. My research puzzle 
concerns these ideas, that oil and oil rents have helped cement near-absolute monarchs in power long 
after the demise of this form of government elsewhere. These resources are vitally important for 
maintaining the social contract between family-based regimes and their citizens into the future. Yet, 
despite the importance of these resources, Gulf monarchs been largely unable to curb the domestic 
resource consumption that could jeopardize their exports. How does the extant literature describe the 
possibility of reform? How robust are the limitations it perceives? These questions inform the 
literature review that follows. 
2.2 Economic Rent and Resource Depletion 
Rentier theory is predicated on political economies that depend on economic rents, which are usually 
described as excess returns originating from a situational or natural resource advantage. The concept 
of economic rent dates to the earliest endeavors in economic theory, but David Ricardo’s 1821 
interpretation of rent as a “gift of nature” remains among the most useful when examining rents 
associated with oil production.57 Mineral resource rents typically comprise income paid to landowners 
that extends beyond the opportunity cost of production. In the case of petroleum, the rent portion is 
generally accepted as the surplus left over after oil is sold, and allowances are made for the costs of 
exploration, production, transport, refining and marketing. In low-cost states like those in the GCC, 
rent typically makes up 90 percent or more of the gross receipts from international sales.  
While the Gulf ruling families’ collection and deployment of hydrocarbon rents is the focus of this 
work, it should be noted that the oil rents that began to flow in the 1930s – and especially after 1973 – 
56 Luciani 1987, 81–2 
57 Ricardo 1817; 191-2 
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were channeled into a pre-existing framework for collecting and distributing rents based on the 
“situational” advantages described by early theorists such as Ricardo and Adam Smith before him.58 
Foley shows how the al-Saud relied on Hajj fees to fund as much as half of the state budget before the 
onset of oil. The Hajj rents allowed the al-Saud to build a base of clientelist allies while avoiding the 
extraction of taxes. Even then, dependence on external rents appears to have left the pre-oil state just 
as vulnerable to cyclical forces as is the case with present-day budgeting, which depends on 
international oil prices. During the Great Depression and World War II far fewer pilgrims traveled to 
the holy cities, severely undermining the Saudi budget.59 Davidson offers similar evidence to show 
how tribal rulers in nearby Sharjah and Dubai collected rents from Britain in return for aircraft 
landing rights, and used those rents to buttress their positions. The same families retain power 
today.60 The idea is that rents did not create regimes or even the allocative framework used to 
distribute those rents; rather rents accentuated and strengthened these pathways. In doing so, rents 
helped increase regime durability. 
2.2.1 Resource Depletion 
Rent earned from an “imperishable” locational or situational advantage based on ownership of land is 
distinct from rent earned by mining that land for the depletable resources that lie beneath the surface. 
In 1914, Lewis Cecil Gray argued that decisions to exploit natural resources needed to account for 
their limited long-run availability, including the possibility of total exhaustion.61 Works by L.C. Gray 
and other early resource scholars argued that maximizing social welfare required policy intervention 
by governments, rather than allowing markets too much influence over rates of production. Theories 
of depletion that grew from the early literature refined these views in the interest of intergenerational 
equity, while later work warned of a path-dependent trap for states that undervalue natural capital.   
In 1931 Hotelling argued that there was an optimum rate of oil and gas production which tended to be 
exceeded when control was left to industry. He held that government taxes and drilling prohibitions 
were required to stem the “great wastes” stemming from what he described as “peculiarities” in the oil 
and gas sector. These include the “suddenness and unexpectedness of mineral discoveries, leading to 
wild rushes.” In particular, Hotelling decried the loss of huge volumes of oil and gas from the practice 
of mineral rights holders drilling multiple “offset wells” into a single field. Mineral rights ownership 
in North America, distinct from state ownership elsewhere, incentivizes property owners to favor 
current over future production, because by delaying they would otherwise bequeath their share of the 
resource to neighboring property owners. These zero-sum practices often resulted in storage and 
58 A. Smith 1776 
59 Foley 2010; 23-4 
60 Davidson 2005; 35-7. See also Krane 2009; 35-6 
61 L. C. Gray 1914. 
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transport infrastructure being overwhelmed, reduced market prices and profits, and subsequent 
uneconomic consumption, along with resources wasted through flaring and venting.62  
More recent work by resource economists focuses on sustainable depletion, in which the state63 is 
endowed with a duty to maximize the national wealth upon which state income is based, and to which 
petroleum resources contribute. An important aspect of sustainable depletion is intergenerational 
equity, which holds that resources should be shared equally by current and future generations.64 
Discussions of intergenerational equity revolve around economic diversification, in which depletion 
policies should leverage exhaustible resources to develop the non-oil economy and prepare the 
country to gradually replace depleting resource sectors. Authors such as Stauffer, John Mitchell, 
Stevens and Mitchell, and Heal maintain that oil and gas are assets in the wealth portfolio of a state, a 
ledger which also includes financial and capital assets.65 By producing hydrocarbons, depletable 
resource stocks are converted into cash, which represents a transfer of one type of asset to another. 
Thus, revenues from sales of natural resources should not be considered income. Sustainable 
depletion requires conversion of below-ground assets into forms of above-ground wealth, which 
include investments required to maintain production within the oil and gas sector itself, but also those 
which can generate income for future generations. Heal, like Stauffer, argues that oil revenues should 
not be reflected in GDP figures, since these revenues stem from disposal of an asset rather than 
earnings.66 Heal contends that a country becomes poorer by spending resource income for any 
purpose other than capital investment which offsets the decline in resource stocks.  
A counterpoint to this argument is found in a 2012 article by Luciani which argues that standard 
measures underestimate diversification in oil-dependent economies like those in the Gulf. Significant 
rent is required to buy political consensus in the same way that governments in democratic countries 
use shares of tax revenue to buy consensus. What matters, Luciani argues, is that the GCC countries 
still manage to invest sufficient resource rents in diversification.67  
The diversification imperative, write Stevens and Mitchell, should compel states to follow disciplined 
resource depletion practices that conform to geological conditions and maximize economic and social 
welfare. This boils down to optimizing the level of production. Rationale for slowing oil and gas 
62 Hotelling 1931 
63 Outside North America, where mineral rights can be bought, minerals are property of the state, or the state is 
the legal guardian for the nation. Even in North America, the state oversees offshore resources and those on 
public land. 
64 Intergenerational equity has spawned a large volume of literature, including works by detractors who argue 
that it is often better to consume now rather than preserve for future generations. Hartwick’s work offers a 
strong argument in its behalf, while Asheim reviews the various strands. See: Hartwick 1977; Asheim 2010 
65 Stauffer, Thomas 1987; J. V. Mitchell 2006; Stevens and Mitchell 2008; Heal 2007  
66 Heal 2007; Stauffer, Thomas 1987 
67 Luciani 2012; 9 
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production includes onset of “resource curse” factors (discussed below) as well as expectations for 
higher future prices, such that the value of the oil in the ground increases faster than the rate of return 
on financial assets purchased through oil sales. At the same time, rates of production must be 
balanced with the use of oil income for diversification. Development of a non-hydrocarbon sector 
insulates the economy from oil market volatility, and may also create industrial sectors that can 
provide jobs and income. In the short run, oil producers can diversify by investing in profit-generating 
assets abroad, such as those held by so-called sovereign wealth funds. However, while these 
investments carry advantages in terms of imposing fiscal discipline and bringing in non-oil revenue, 
they present weak substitutes for the longer-term broadening of the domestic economy.68 
Segal declares in more sanguine fashion that citizens of resource-producing countries “rightly feel that 
their natural resources belong to them and that they have a right to benefit from them.”69 But he 
argues that current distributive practices, such as subsidies on electricity and fuel consumption and 
public sector overemployment, represent regressive and inefficient methods of allocation. Segal, like 
authors cited in Section 5.3 below, advocates distribution of rent in its most parsimonious form, as 
cash. Poverty alleviation, he argues, offers the best opportunity for maximizing intertemporal social 
welfare, the crux of depletion policy.70   
A more accepted paradigm among resource economists calls for depreciation of natural capital as it is 
consumed, on the logic that natural resource stocks should be incorporated into national accounts, 
with withdrawals such as oil production counted against yearly measures of net national product. 71 
Hartwick proposes a simple way of tallying the accounts by deducting the earned rents against the 
amount of resource consumed in a given period. In this way, the natural environment receives a value 
that incentivizes thoughtful exploitation. When analyzed in this way, the subsidized domestic 
distribution of natural resources in the Gulf constitutes the simple disposal of natural capital with little 
or no remuneration. Consumption under these circumstances reduces the economy’s means to 
diversify, restricts reinvestment into the resource sector, and gives rise to depletion of an exhaustible 
resource without the capture of its full value. Dasgupta argues that early resource undervaluation 
produces a deeply ingrained path-dependence that can only begin to be addressed through appropriate 
price signals.  
“When environmental resources are free, there is absolutely no incentive to economize in 
their use. Technological innovations which are profligate with them look profitable, certainly 
more so than they ought to look. Over time, an entire sequence of resource-intensive 
68 Stevens and Mitchell 2008 
69 Segal 2011a 
70 Segal 2011a 
71 Dasgupta 1990; Dasgupta and Heal 1979; Hartwick 1990  
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technologies is thus installed. And, if we add to all this, the fact that there are often strong 
learning-by-doing and learning-by-using effects, even at the stage of research and 
development, we arrive at a depressing conclusion: it may require a big push to move 
societies away from their current profligacy in the use of environmental resources.”72 
In other words, natural resources are “too cheap for the good of future generations,” to borrow from 
Hotelling’s still relevant 1931 argument, and “in consequence of their excessive cheapness they being 
produced and consumed wastefully.”73 
2.2.2 Resource Curse Arguments 
Whereas the economics literature above argues that bad decisions about resource investment and 
valuation can lead to waste and squandered natural capital, another set of scholars argues that it is the 
natural resource endowments themselves that produce bad outcomes for societies and economies. This 
hypothesis runs counter to prior assumptions that held that large deposits of natural resources like oil 
and gas provided countries with means to reduce poverty and promote development more readily than 
states lacking these endowments. Yet empirical studies have shown that resource-poor countries have 
outperformed their resource-rich counterparts for long periods, due to a phenomenon known as the 
“resource curse.”  
Like the rentier literature, resource curse works argue that rents are behind deficiencies in 
development. But while rentier scholars focus on the sociological and political impact of rents, most 
resource curse scholarship examines macroeconomic factors. It argues that commodity export 
dependence shapes economies in ways that make them underperform their resource-poor counterparts, 
exposing them to “Dutch disease” effects of currency appreciation, which harm non-oil exports such 
as agricultural products or those from domestic manufacturing sectors.74 Sachs and Warner use 
econometric methods in an attempt to explain the poor performance of petroleum exporters after the 
first oil shock. Their study of growth across 95 developing countries claims that large revenue inflows 
had undercut development; exports of agriculture, minerals and fuels were negatively linked to 
growth between 1970 and 1990.75 Likewise, Auty finds that per capita incomes grew two to three 
times faster in resource poor countries than those well-endowed, between 1960 and 1990.76 
72 Dasgupta 1990 
73 Hotelling 1931 
74 In so doing, Dutch disease can also trigger political unrest even during boom periods, while the so-called 
“demonstration effect” of increasing wealth disparity can lead to perceptions of relative deprivation and political 
dissatisfaction among broad segments of the population. Resource curse literature is ably reviewed in: Stevens 
2003. Demonstration effects are described by: Wayne Nafziger and Auvinen 2002 
75 Sachs and Warner 2001; 14 
76 Auty 2001 cited in Stevens 2003 
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A separate stream of the resource curse literature uses large-n studies to seek correlations between 
natural resources and autocracy. These latter works overlap in many ways with rentier theory and will 
be visited in Section 2.3. Both the rentier and resource curse streams examine the effects of relying on 
external rents, which – when captured by the state – allow the government to finance expenditures 
without building institutions for taxation and penetration of society, and allow political elites to “buy” 
public consent by creating dependency among the citizenry.77 Thus commodity flows are said to 
correlate with authoritarian and clientelist politics while stifling institutional robustness.78 Some 
scholars extend the resource curse to mistreatment of minorities and women79 and allowing 
autocracies to finance development of state security apparatuses that make them more repressive and 
prone to conflict.80  
More qualitative resource curse scholarship portrays oil-rich “petro-states” on path-dependent 
trajectories set by decisions made in the early stages of their development. Karl, (but also Anderson 
1987, and Hertog 2010) write that reforms in hydrocarbon-exporting Middle East states are rarely 
tackled head-on, by challenging the citizen-clients with government extraction, but through spending 
that creates parallel institutions. Karl finds this true in Venezuela, Iran, Algeria and Nigeria,81 and 
Hertog in Saudi Arabia. By pursuing spending solutions, problems tend to become unmanageable. 
The institutional setting becomes a barrier to change, expanding state jurisdiction and weakening its 
domestic authority. Political survival dictates “profligacy and waste,” writes De Soysa, rather than 
provision of public goods.82  
While autocratic effects will be discussed below, it appears that the economic effects of the resource 
curse thesis may have been influenced by a nearly two-decade drought in oil prices which coincided 
with the period under study. Since 2002, IMF data show that economies dominated by resource 
exports have performed about twice as strongly, on average, as the world.83  Further, even during the 
oil bust, resource effects were far from uniform.84 Mikesell writes that the difference between the 
“cursed” states and those deriving a “blessing” from their resource export booms came down to the 
regime’s management prowess, rather than any inexorable result of exports. Venezuela’s debt 
problems and its loss of agricultural and industrial production were caused by bad government 
77 Karl 1997 
78 DeSoysa 2006 
79 Ross 2012 
80 Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2010; Bellin 2004  
81 Anderson 1987; Hertog 2010a; Karl 1997  
82 DeSoysa 2006; 49 
83 6.4% GDP growth on average, among major hydrocarbon exporters, versus 3.8% for the world, on average: 
Gross Domestic Product, Constant Prices, from International Monetary Fund 2012 
84 In his survey of the literature, Stevens writes that some states – Chile, Botswana, Norway and Indonesia 
among them – used resources to derive clear benefits for society. Stevens 2003 
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management, while Chile’s avoidance of those excesses stems from better policy.85 More recent work 
finds that countries with high-quality institutions were able to use them to raise aggregate incomes, 
while countries with poor institutions succumbed to rent-seeking that acted as a drag on growth.86 
Stevens argues that the effects are more accurately described as a “resource impact.” 
Meanwhile Brunnschweiler, along with Alexeev and Conrad, take aim at the central theme of the 
resource curse hypothesis, and the work of Sachs and Warner.87 They find no evidence that oil harms 
economic growth or damages institutions like government effectiveness and the rule of law. On the 
contrary, the authors declare that oil helps economic growth. The argument of Alexeev and Conrad is 
simple: If country A has higher GDP per capita than country B, then country A must have 
experienced higher economic growth over the long term. Brunnschweiler’s conclusions rely on 
measurements of a state’s “natural capital” per capita, rather than Sachs and Warner’s use of export 
data. These papers back up earlier findings by Herb (discussed below) that rentierism has not harmed 
institutions, because, counterfactually, these states would have been among the world's poorest if they 
had not produced oil, and their institutions would have been no better. The worst that can be said, 
Alexeev and Conrad argue, is that resource rents have not improved institutions.88  
2.3 Rentier State Theory 
Resource economics and the resource curse literature delve into macroeconomic and institutional 
effects of reliance on hydrocarbon exports. But my research is interested in the sociopolitical effects 
of resource reliance, and in particular the political structures linked to domestic demand for in-kind 
resources, as distinct from resource exports and rents. It is rentier theory which provides the best 
environment for exploring these themes. 
Rentier theory was developed by economists to explain the longevity of family-based regimes that 
persisted in the Middle East long after the demise of this form of governance elsewhere, and as a 
response to the failed predictions of modernization theorists who declared that rising wealth would 
bring democracy.89 The major contribution of rentier economists was in correlating monarchical 
longevity with the external sources of state revenues, rather than in declaring it as the product of 
religion, tribalism or one of the other culturally determined explanations found in once-popular 
theories of oriental despotism.90  
85 Mikesell 1997 
86 Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik 2006; Elbadawi and Soto 2012  
87 Brunnschweiler 2008; Alexeev and Conrad 2009 
88 Alexeev and Conrad 2009 
89 Lipset 1959; Huntington 1968, 140–91 
90 Brynen et al. 2013, 193 
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Despite a number of challenges that will be detailed below, the core theory retains considerable 
robustness in explaining state-society relations and predicting regime behavior, especially among the 
extreme rentiers of the Arabian Peninsula. For a work such as this one, which examines the drivers 
behind high energy intensity in the region and barriers to reform, rentier theory offers a strong 
paradigm that illuminates the state’s rationale for perpetuating political structures that are commonly 
understood to undermine its economy. Despite these strengths, the rentier theoretical model contains 
weaknesses that can be revised to improve its explanatory power. 
2.3.1 Basic Premises 
The basic premise of rentier theory holds that the massive influx of externally derived economic rent 
plays a large, perhaps dominant, role in shaping the political and social relationships between state 
and society. The enduring truth of this basic premise sustains the relevance of rentier theory and its 
persistent attraction to scholars. The theory and the literature it spawned grew from two origins. First, 
social scientists attempted to come to grips with the effects of the enormous rent windfalls earned by 
oil exporting states, particularly after nationalization of oil industries and the 1973 oil embargo, when 
prices quadrupled. Second, academics needed to explain the durability of autocracy and especially 
monarchy in the Middle East after the discrediting of works which either predicted its demise91 or 
attributed its persistence to culturally derived explanations.92 
Rentier theory allowed scholars to move beyond exceptionalist political culture approaches to the 
region which held that Arab states were prone to autocracy because of patrimonialist or “morally 
obtuse” tendencies within Islam or tribalism which inhibited their readiness for democracy.93 Instead, 
rentier theory attributed the nature of politics to economic factors, especially the structure of political 
economies and their interaction with the world economy. Rentier works argue that inflows of external 
rents allow governments to “purchase consent” of the governed without imposing taxes, the levying of 
which is a bedrock element within reallocative or democratic bargains. This exchange of patronage 
for political acquiescence is enshrined within a social contract, which, in turn, is said to bring rulers 
91 Lerner 1958; Halpern 1963; Huntington 1968 
92 Such as Oriental Despotism, see: Wittfogel 1957; Ayubi 1995, also political culture approaches cited by 
Anderson 1995  
93 Among the examples in Anderson 1995 are works by Allen Howard Podet (1992) “The Gulf War: Religious 
and Cultural Considerations,” in Carol Rae Hansen, ed., The New World Order: Rethinking America’s Global 
Role (Flagstaff: The Arizona Honors Academy Press), p. 216; Also John Entelis, Culture and Counterculture in 
Morocco (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), p. 27-28; Also:  James A. Bill and Robert Springborg, Politics in the 
Middle East, 3rd Ed. (Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman/Little, Brown, 1990), p. 88-19, 97, 161. Also: Elie 
Kedourie, Democracy and Arab Political Culture (Washington D.C.: Institute for Near East Policy, 1992), p. 1, 
5; and David E. Long and Bernard Reich, The Government and Politics of the Middle East and North Africa 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1986), p. 19. 
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wide autonomy in decision making, while releasing them from the need to concede democratic 
participation in policymaking.94  
The first work to describe “rentier” effects in this way was Hossein Mahdavy’s 1970 case study on the 
effects of “substantial amounts of external rent” on prerevolutionary Iran. Mahdavy described a 
complacent monarchy endowed with a stream of hydrocarbon income that provided the means to 
develop, while undercutting the urgency with which development was pursued.95  
It was the 1987 release of an edited volume containing the writings of economists Beblawi and 
Luciani that became the genre’s essential work. The Rentier State offered an attractively parsimonious 
portrayal of a new form of state-society relationship that positioned the state in an autonomous 
allocative role in which it need not raise income from or consult with society. This condition was the 
effect of “the oil phenomenon” on the state. Prior to oil, many of the state structures that existed in 
Arabia required British subsidies to ensure their survival. Oil, Luciani wrote, “drastically changed the 
picture.” The wealth flowed into territories that were either under colonial administration or had just 
emerged from it, or which remained quasi-tribal sheikhdoms.  
Weak states won financial resources that provided for their independence and allowed the British to 
exit the region in 1971. Oil energized a pre-existing patronage system that “restructured political life” 
and “produced a new kind of economy, built on rents,” wrote Crystal.96  
The oil income stream allowed ruling elites to sideline rivals and cement their families into a more 
centralized, autocratic governing role.97 Groups that played a political role in the pre-oil past, such as 
merchants and tribal sheikhs, saw their political power replaced by a share of the wealth, sometimes 
expressed by exclusive import licenses or partnerships with foreign businesses.98 The new balance of 
power greatly favored ruling families. “The merchants’ withdrawal from public politics suggests that 
participation demands are tied to extraction of taxes . . . Since in the rentier oil economies extraction 
of wealth from the population by the state does not occur, neither does the demand for political 
participation.”99 In this way, rents permitted the quashing of any tenuous advances toward democracy 
and funded the rapid construction of the complex distributive welfare states of today.100  
Beblawi assigned rentierism four key characteristics: The predominance of rent situations; the foreign 
origin of rents; state control of their receipt and distribution, and the participation of a minority in 
94 Mahdavy 1970; Luciani 1987; Beblawi 1987 
95 Mahdavy 1970 
96 Crystal 1990, 6 
97 Crystal 1990, 6–11  
98 Gause III 1994, 80; Davidson 2005 
99 Crystal 1990, 10 
100 Crystal 1990, 6–11; Davidson 2005, 70–96 
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their generation and a majority in receiving the benefits.101 The result was to separate the state’s 
income from the domestic economy, Luciani wrote. The state’s income came from overseas. It did not 
depend on the skills and productivity of the national population or the support of economic elites.102 
Mahdavy argued that the state was able to achieve financial independence because it did not need to 
tax or otherwise extract from society. Luciani described a state needing only to “allocate” to citizens, 
providing them with increasing welfare and prosperity. This state of affairs freed the state from the 
need to extract income domestically, which requires citizen consent and sets up a legitimacy quandary 
for the government. Taxpayers would mobilize to demand oversight of the spending of their revenues 
and “the question of democracy becomes an unavoidable issue.”103  
The link between raising taxes and government legitimacy commonly expressed in the reversal of the 
adage “no taxation without representation.”104 For an allocative state, that rejoinder might be: “No 
taxation? No need for representation.” In the Saudi case, a pre-existing tax bureaucracy was 
dismantled.105 The state was assumed to be liberated from the building of domestic bases of political 
support or legitimacy, which afforded it wide autonomy to spend rent income as it liked, as long as a 
portion was delivered to the public.  
The policymaking autonomy of rentier regimes is a key concept of the classic literature. Crystal 
argues that other states in history have leveraged high degrees of autonomy from society, but that oil 
states were bestowed with an unusually high level of autonomy from society that was part of a 
structurally determined process unique to oil, and unmatched by other exports such as coffee and 
cotton, which at least required accommodation between rulers and local elite middlemen which 
control the workforce.106  
Beblawi, Luciani and several other scholars credit the lack of democratic participation as an outcome 
of rentierism.107 Given these circumstances, Luciani argued the state did not even need a domestic 
economic policy, just an “expenditure policy.”108 
In the rentier state, dependence on unearned income is said to undercut state accountability, 
responsiveness and public participation.109 Collective bargaining is discouraged, and citizens lack 
motivation (or the political space) to forge civil society groups. Individual rent-seeking options can be 
101 Beblawi 1987 
102 Luciani 1987 
103 Luciani 1987, 73 
104 Luciani 1987; 72-73 
105 Chaudhry 1997, 6 
106 Crystal 1990, 6–7 
107 Crystal 1990; Gause III 1994; M. Moore 1998; Ross 2001; Jensen and Wantchekon 2004; Sandbakken 2006; 
Yom and Gause III 2012 
108 Luciani 1987, 74 
109 M. Moore 1998; 85 
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more lucrative than productive activity.110 To use Hirschmann’s organizational theory terms, in the 
richest rentier states, leaving the country, or “exit,” involves a loss in income and privilege, and 
“voice” entails risks. The rational choice is “loyalty” to the regime.111 Superficial vestiges of 
democracy act as pressure valves. For any remaining nonconformists, mild use of repressive apparatus 
– itself funded by oil rents – is all that is needed.112  
In describing the social effects of hydrocarbon income, Beblawi echoed ibn Khaldun and Jean Bodin, 
describing the onset of a rentier mentality, in which a “break in the work-reward causation” generates 
a mentality of complacence. In the richest rentier states, economic rewards come from citizenship, not 
from work or financial risk.113 Mahdavy, examining Iran in the 1950s and 1960s, found a striking 
lack of concern about economic and educational underperformance. Foreshadowing the resource 
curse, he described the widening of development and prosperity gaps between oil-rich and resource-
poor countries. In undeveloped countries, this kind of result would lead to alarm and “some kind of 
political explosion aimed at changing the status quo.” But in the rentier state, the urgency for change 
and economic growth is lacking. “Consequently, the economic and technical backwardness of the 
rentier states may easily coincide with a more serious kind of backwardness: socio-political stagnation 
and inertia.”114 Yates, in his work on the West African oil economies, describes an “institutionalized 
largesse” on behalf of the state in Gabon which created among its leadership and citizens an attitude 
that wealth was an “isolated fact” rather than the result of hard work and sacrifice.115 Minnis 
extrapolates rentier theory to educational underperformance by Canadian aboriginals and argues that a 
similar, albeit subnational, centralized distribution has created a “rentier mentality” that incentivizes 
rent-seeking over education.116  
Classic rentier theory holds that the result of rent-based development is institutional weakness. Since 
rentier states relinquish their extractive capacities, they became unable to mediate, regulate, and 
understand or represent their citizenry, or to develop legitimate and efficient institutions based on 
voluntary or compulsory compliance.117 Gause argues that prohibitions on extraction damage national 
security, because citizens reject obligatory military service.118 Since rent distribution follows political 
criteria based on traditional relationships and proximity to the ruler, much of the activity in rentier 
states takes place in informal spaces beyond the reach of formal institutions. The classic rentier 
110 Some of these rules are paraphrased from the compendium in Hertog 2010a; 265-6.  
111 Hirschman 1970 
112 Luciani 1987, 74; Wedeen 1999, 27, noted that regimes depend not only on the capacity to eliminate 
opponents, but as much or moreso upon strategies that make such actions unnecessary. 
113 Beblawi 1987, 52 
114 Mahdavy 1970, 436–8 
115 Yates 1996, 204–11 
116 Minnis 2006 
117 Schwarz 2008; Ayubi 1995, 400 
118 Gause III 1997, 65–6; discussed further in section 1.3.3.2 
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political economy presents a portrait of “stagnating stability based on a social contract, the mutual 
obligations of which would perpetuate the separation of state and society and render democratization 
unlikely, even irrelevant.”119   
2.3.2 Revisions to Rentier Theory 
The parsimonious and wide-ranging claims of rentier theory’s early “classic” phase have been 
criticized as deterministic and over-generalized by revisionist scholars, who subjected rentier 
theoretical claims to close empirical examination inside and outside the Middle East. However, it 
bears mention that many characteristics and practices of the states the authors described in the 1980s 
have changed or grown more complex, as Luciani himself acknowledged.120 Until at least the 1980s, 
these states were indeed able to avoid or dismantle taxation, while enjoying rent streams that were 
proportionally large enough to guarantee jobs and generous benefits to small populations of the day. 
Rentier distribution practices generated widespread citizen gratitude and regime support, especially 
given that many in the population harbored first-hand memories of famine, illiteracy and high infant 
mortality. Family-based regimes did enjoy autonomy, at least for a time, and deployed oil rents as 
they saw fit, creating the institutions that shaped the modern state.  
As these countries developed and populations grew, however, the simplicity of some theoretical tenets 
became a liability. The literature coped with numerous updates and revisions reflecting the 
establishment of economic and industrial policies and development schemes, the growth of a 
politically influential private sector, the loss of state autonomy amid path-dependent institutional 
design, and the rising expectations of and deference to citizens. Some authors even advocated diluting 
the effects of oil rents in favor of a reprise of cultural and religious influences. Follow-on works that 
expanded the rentier genre also substantiated and fleshed out some of the original links between rents 
and autocracy and underdevelopment, which were left unsupported in the original literature.  
One of the most thoroughgoing analyses of rentier theory’s initial missteps is found in Gray’s 2011 
research paper, which argues that the classic works enjoyed validity in explaining oil state dynamics 
from the 1950s until the 1980s, but that their conclusions had been outstripped by the pace of 
development and increases in complexity of these states and societies. Other works took issue with 
rentier theory’s simplified explanatory claims, including what Pete Moore termed an excessive 
reliance on economic factors and disavowal of historical and cultural factors.121 Still others repudiated 
its claims of regime autonomy and supplicant societies, pointing to, among other things, varied levels 
of political participation among states with similar rentier characteristics. As Hvidt has shown, early 
theoretical notions of the superfluous nature of economic development soon gave way to an 
119 Springborg 2013, 302 
120 Luciani 2005 
121 P. W. Moore 2004 
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acknowledgement of the tendency toward state capitalist approaches that followed clientelist and 
neopatrimonial lines,122 while Luciani amended his earlier position by documenting the emergence of 
an autonomous Saudi national bourgeoisie.123  
In many ways it is inevitable that scholars would seek to challenge rentier explanations. A theory 
deployed to explain the remarkable stability and continuity of these seemingly anachronistic regimes 
has simultaneously coped with transformative socio-economic change in the polities under study. As 
Crystal writes, “… these regimes have survived precisely because of those transformations.”124 In 
other words, as the on-the-ground context adjusts, so has the literature.  
Despite the myriad critiques, many authors who find aspects of economic determinism or 
overgeneralization in rentier theory take pains to emphasize that core tenets of rentier theory remain 
useful and valid, if less comprehensive in their explanatory power as originally envisioned. For 
instance, Herb gave more credence for monarchical survival on the unique institutions created by 
ruling families, but added that these caveats “in no way call into question the need for a rentier state 
theory, that is, for a theoretical framework to explain the distinctive economic, political, and social 
consequences of rent wealth.”125 Pete Moore, Foley and Brynen et al. argue similarly that rent effects 
remain important, but that oil rent flowed into pre-existing frameworks that dictated how it was 
deployed.126 Examination of these states therefore should not exclude important historical, political 
and institutional factors, especially those retained from pre-oil days.  
Less skeptical are Kamrava and Gray. Writing about Qatar, Kamrava declares that patronage-derived 
legitimacy reigns supreme. “By far the most central pillar of state power in Qatar is the power of 
patronage, with the country today being a rentier state par excellence thanks to revenues from 
hydrocarbon exports.”127 Gray states that “rents and rentierism are central to an understanding of the 
nature of Gulf regimes, their durability, their behavior, and the nature of their relationship with 
society.” And while “other non-rent characteristics affect the political dynamics of the region, the 
explanatory primacy of rentierism should not be under any serious challenge.”128 Springborg, in his 
122 Hvidt 2011 
123 Luciani 2005 
124 Crystal 1990, 187 
125 Herb 2005 
126 P.W. Moore 2004; Foley 2010; Brynen et al. 2013 
127 Kamrava 2013; on p. 130-7 Kamrava writes that former Qatari prime minister Hamad bin Jassim al-Thani 
once said that enriching Qatari nationals was the country’s most important domestic priority. In this pursuit, 
Qatar has met unparalleled success. Estimates of per capita GDP of Qatari nationals (when mainly low-wage 
expatriates are excluded) range between $450,000 and $700,000 per year. Kamrava cites stability emanating 
from secondary legitimacy sources cascading from rent distribution, such as the upward mobility of highly 
educated Qataris who owe their positions to the state’s free educational benefits, and as a result, their allegiance 
to the ruling family. The result is a stable system of royal autocracy. “Qatar’s dictatorship,” he writes, “is 
genuinely popular.” Also see Kinninmont 2013 cited in J. S. Mitchell 2013, 2  
128 M. Gray 2011a, 36 
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review of a four-volume edited work on the Gulf,129 summarized several of the myriad contributing 
authors as finding the rentier “concept remains relevant but needs to be modified in light of changed 
circumstances, including that of the steady transformation of rents into private fixed capital, 
accompanied by the development of state institutions able to perform more functions than simply 
allocating rents.”130 
2.3.2.1 Arguments in General Agreement with RST 
Numerous revisionist works served to flesh out and strengthen the rentier thesis, with minor 
counterarguments. Gause offered an early example, reiterating the importance of external rents, but 
arguing that rents alone were unable to explain the longevity of Gulf monarchies. Two other factors 
reinforced the role of rents, namely the external security guarantees based on alliances with western 
powers, and the institutional strength of ruling families and their skilled pursuit of domestic 
politics.131 Karl’s resource curse work on Venezuela echoed many of the rentier findings in a more 
participatory political context, including the dismantling of domestic tax systems and the “substitution 
of spending for sensible statecraft.” She documented the familiar exchange of patronage for political 
quiescence, and, like scholars writing later, argued that regime autonomy was lost amid binge-hiring 
of unqualified bureaucrats whom degraded the state’s capacity. The state’s institutional weakness in 
terms of extraction was stylized in her statement that the state “can only give; it cannot take.”132 
Other recent works displayed less interest in the state’s ability to extract from society, shifting the 
focus to the related effects of patronage spending on state-society relations. These include scholars 
using econometric techniques to test for rentier effects in panel data, which led to an intertwining of 
the resource curse and rentier genres. Several authors tried to discover explanatory factors behind the 
stubbornness of autocracy by investigating whether commodity exports lie behind the developmental 
underperformance of mineral-rich states and the longevity of their authoritarian regimes.133 
In 2001, Ross produced a large-n study that offered quantitative evidence in favor of the rentier thesis. 
Ross looked at resource-rich states in general, making a point of comparing Middle Eastern states 
with counterparts elsewhere, since rentier theory tended to focus only on the Middle East, while those 
studying resource effects on democracy tended to exclude the oil-rich Middle East.134 Using time-
series cross-national data from 113 states between 1971 and 1997 and Ross found a statistically robust 
tendency for oil to inhibit democracy, and for authoritarian regimes to use rentier techniques – low tax 
129 Springborg 2013; Luciani et al. 2012 
130 Springborg 2013 
131 Gause III 1994; Gause III 2000; 176-7 
132 Karl 1997; 16, 91, 99 
133 Ross 2001; Ross 2009; Ross 2012; Herb 2005; Alexeev and Conrad 2009; Haber and Menaldo 2011 
134 Ross 2001; P. W. Moore 2002   
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rates and high government spending – to defuse pressure for political openings.135 The influential 
paper was considered a vindication of rentier state theory, widening its applicability outside the 
Middle East. Ross reiterated his conclusions in his 2012 book, using a mix of case studies and panel 
data to argue that the onset of oil’s harmful effects began in the 1970s when governments nationalized 
their resource sectors, capturing the oil rents from international oil companies. Regimes then wielded 
those rents in an opaque fashion to stifle democracy (and sometimes repress women and 
minorities).136 Several authors have contested the findings, discussed in Section 2.3.2.4.   
In 2004, Smith published results of a cross-national test of 107 developing countries that found oil 
strongly correlated with regime durability. Smith took issue with portrayal by Crystal, Karl and 
Chaudhry of the inherent weakness of rentier states and the tenuousness of their stability, arguing that 
oil wealth has allowed regimes to build strong institutions and political organizations that helped them 
survive the long oil bust of the 1980s and 1990s. Few regimes faced serious challenges, even during 
this period.137 Weiffen came to a similar conclusion, determining that autocracy in the Middle East 
was reinforced by oil rents in combination with traditions based in Islamic cultural institutions which, 
during economic downturns, deflected pressure for political concessions.138 A 2009 paper by Desai, 
Olofsgard and Yousef tested the rentier “authoritarian bargain” thesis and found it to be accurate 
across a panel of 80 autocracies. They found political rights and welfare expenditures determined by 
common factors, and that democratic openings tended to act as substitutes for distribution when rents 
waned.139  
The drumbeat of quantitative affirmation of rentier links between oil and autocracy served to 
introduce rentier theory to a broader range of scholars, whose writings were further simplified by 
journalists trumpeting links between oil and various ills, including war, terrorism and dictatorship.140 
Ironically, write Brynen et al., these affirmations of rentier theory arrived concurrently with much 
more critical works by Middle East scholars, whom began to study and reject elements of rentier 
theory (examined in the following sections). Critics of the quantitative rentier works argued that 
statistical approaches oversimplified complex state-society relations. It was as if autocracies governed 
with a fixed set of inputs and outputs: When patronage is reduced, regimes respond with a 
corresponding increase in repression or in political participation.141 “Without factoring in the 
135 Ross 2001   
136 Ross 2012, 8–11 
137 B. Smith 2004 
138 Weiffen 2008 
139 Desai, Olofsgard, and Yousef 2009  
140 Brynen et al. 2013; 193-4; lists several examples including New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman’s 
“The First Law of PetroPolitics,” Foreign Policy, April 25, 2006.  
141 Foley, Sean. Email correspondence with author, June 12, 2013. 
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complexities of culture, values, beliefs, ideology, and legitimacy we risk being left with arid 
economistic reductionism,” writes Hudson.142 
Later quantitative approaches provided more nuanced correlations. Ali and Elbadawi examined 
resource rents, public employment and levels of political repression in the Middle East and found 
strong indications of the co-optive power of resource rents, and of the staying power of rentier 
regimes. Countries with higher rent-to-population ratios, such as the Gulf monarchies, were able to 
avoid popular revolts by funneling rents to the population through jobs in the state bureaucracy. Thus 
“authoritarian regimes with access to substantial natural resources who rule over small populations 
have a policy tool that is simply unavailable to other authoritarian governments… these governments 
have the wherewithal to distribute enough resources to their populations to effectively remove the 
incentive to revolt.” These co-optive practices significantly reduce requirements for deploying state 
repression in most of the wealthy rentiers. The opposite is true in moderately resource-endowed Arab 
states with large populations, which were unable to provide the same guarantees of public sector 
employment and thus relied more on state security.143 Of course, rents, if they are unsupported by 
statecraft and stabilizing institutions, are insufficient by themselves to ensure regime longevity, as was 
seen in Libya (in 2011 and 1969) and, arguably, in the shah’s Iran.  
Regime responses to the Arab Spring revolts tended to fall along the lines of the rent-to-population 
thesis, where Arab states with large populations relative to resource rents relied mainly on repression, 
while richer rentiers in the GCC (albeit not Bahrain) were more likely to spend their way out of 
potential trouble. Springborg argues that this revelation offers evidence that Gulf states “have returned 
to the rentierism of old, seeking to temper protest with allocation and, when that fails, with more 
severe repression.”144 
Scholars embraced rentierism for other reasons as well. Anderson argued that rentier constructs 
provided a plausible explanation for the lack of democracy in the Arab Middle East that allowed the 
avoidance of “exceptionalist” arguments based on political culture approaches. These, she wrote, were 
“sentimental favorites” of Western scholars whose normative biases led them to brand undemocratic 
societies as politically perverse or immature. Many such political culture arguments sought 
undemocratic properties within Islam, tribalism, Bedouin communities, neopatriarchical organizations 
of families and societies, even linguistic and biological factors.145 Ironically, political culture 
approaches are encouraged by the posturing of ruling families themselves, which channel tribalism 
and Islamism to bolster their legitimacy. “They want their citizens and the rest of the world to think 
142 Hudson 1995, 62 
143 O. Ali and Elbadawi 2012 
144 Springborg 2013 
145 An excellent summary of political culture approaches can be found in Anderson 1995; 77-92. Also see 
Hudson 1995, 61–76, in the same volume. 
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they are embodiments of centuries-old Arabian traditions and deeply held cultural beliefs,” writes 
Gause. “This is the core of the ideological legitimation strategies of all the Gulf monarchs.” But 
Gause dismisses both as neutral cultural distinctions that are as likely to buttress regime legitimacy as 
threaten it, as can be seen in the Islamist political opposition in Kuwait or the fundamentalist 
insurgency in Saudi Arabia last decade.146 Gause and Anderson argue that these cultural 
characteristics are less important than the positioning of these monarchies in the international political 
economy, where survival has been a factor of powerful allies, domestic political prowess and, of 
course, plentiful flows of hydrocarbon rents. 
2.3.2.2 Autonomy of the State vs Deference to Citizens 
However, as indicated, many works investigating rentier systems deviated from the key tenets of 
classic rentier theory. Perhaps most importantly, given the claims of early theorists, several authors 
have confronted the claim of regime autonomy from society. By focusing on allocation and swearing 
off of extraction, regimes were supposed to maintain great autonomy in decision-making. An early 
change in thinking was encouraged by Ayubi, who declared that distributive politics was engendering 
rising societal expectations and corresponding increases in deference on behalf of regimes toward 
their citizens. While the theoretical work of the 1980s and early 1990s focuses on the power and 
autonomy of the regime, Ayubi emphasized the power and autonomy of the rentier citizen. Ayubi 
writes that decades of coddling have institutionalized a situation where the citizen claims the right to 
tax the state, rather than the other way around.147 The state is less dominant and society less feeble 
than portrayed in the classic literature.  
Citizens’ sense of entitlement appears to have expanded since the early decades of the oil boom era, 
as will be discussed below, and this sense extended to a refusal to recognize the state’s authority to 
carry out any extractive function. As Gray points out, rentier states were never truly autonomous from 
society. All engaged in some reactionary policymaking in response to pressure arising from society, 
up to and including the threat of revolution. Responsiveness has only grown with time, and is a 
prerequisite for long-term survival of the state.148 Foley, who also discounts theory’s autonomy claim, 
adds that social and technological evolution poses a recurring challenge to regimes by enabling social 
actors and forces.149  
Society’s resistance to extraction extends beyond taxation and subsidy reform, to include the refusal 
to submit to military service. Gause argues that regime deference to the rentier bargain (the one-way 
delivery of resources and services from state to citizen) winds up undermining national security, since 
146 Gause III 2000, 176–7 
147 Ayubi 1995, 323–5 
148 M. Gray 2011a, 10 
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instituting obligatory military service required to staff defense forces would upset this implicit deal, 
and probably trigger demands for political participation. Hence, Gulf militaries have sought to 
circumvent these restrictions by purchasing high-tech weaponry that can make the most of limited 
manpower, while hiring foreign mercenaries and crafting defense alliances with Western powers.150 
(However, assumptions barring conscription were being challenged by recent developments. Qatar 
introduced mandatory conscription in 2013 and began training 2,000 male conscripts in 2014.151 The 
UAE Cabinet endorsed a similar law that would make military service compulsory for young male 
citizens.152) 
Jones emphasized the great advantage not of rentier regimes, but of their citizens, whose sensibilities 
required careful attention. Citizens of wealthy rentier states reap remarkable benefits from their 
acceptance of the ruling family’s position. Nationals “possess a strong sense of civic entitlement, 
while lacking a corresponding sense of civic obligation.” They expect the state to provide an 
increasing standard of living through state employment, subsidies and other perks, while feeling 
unobliged to contribute through taxation or personal effort.153  
In his 2010 book, Hertog made an examination of state autonomy a centerpiece of his unpacking of 
the Saudi state. He found that oil rents allowed the ruling al-Saud “an extraordinary degree of 
autonomy from society when it came to designing their state in the 1950s and 1960s” just as rentier 
theory predicts.154 In similar fashion, Herb shows that the Saudi ruling family – like their counterparts 
in the other Gulf monarchies – “fell upon” the state, using initial oil rents to create and fund 
departments and fiefdoms that quelled disputes and converted ruling families into ruling 
institutions.155 The result was the creation of “dynastic monarchies” which Herb presents as a new 
type of regime, based around family domination of the state.156 Likewise, Niblock describes the Saudi 
royal family, with its 7,000 princes, as comparable to a political party in a one-party state, with its 
members “embedded in all parts of the military, security and administrative frameworks, holding the 
most sensitive positions in the state infrastructure, providing information to the leadership, and 
sometimes acting as channels of communication between parts of the population and the 
150 Gause III 1997, 65–6  
151 Badawi, Nada (April 1, 2014). “Qatari men report for first day of national service.” Doha News. 
[http://dohanews.co/first-day-mandatory-national-service-kicks-2000-recruits/] 
152 Bayoumy, Yara (Jan. 19, 2014). “With eye on troubled region, UAE plans military service for men.” Reuters. 
[http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/19/us-uae-security-military-idUSBREA0I0C420140119] 
153 Jones 2011 
154 Hertog 2010a, 15 
155 Herb 1999, 2–3 
156 Herb 1999; 3, 7-10. Herb differentiates most of the eight surviving Arab monarchies from those which fell by 
the level of family control over the state, arguing that deposed monarchs in Libya, Iraq and elsewhere had not 
institutionalized their families into the power structure in sufficient manner to create interest in defending the 
monarchy beyond the reign of an individual ruler. 
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government.157 Dynastic monarchies have proven remarkably resilient. “No regime of this type has 
fallen to revolution,” Herb declares.158 
The early autonomous state-building process, fueled as it was by oil rents and carried out with little 
concern for public opinion, allowed for unconventional institutional design in these states. Elites, 
many of them members of ruling families, were given means and authority to control portions of the 
state through the creation of government agencies. The result was a sprawling and unplanned array of 
patrimonial institutions which quickly evolved into “statelets within the state.” A few operated with 
great efficiency, others acted more as labor-absorbing enterprises that established seemingly 
unbreakable clientelist relations with employees. Regime autonomy, however, was fleeting. Hertog 
argues that the initial regime autonomy that shaped the bureaucracy melted quickly away after the 
initial decisions on institutional design. The subsequent ballooning of the Saudi state expanded these 
bureaucratic compartments through patron-client cooptation of Saudi citizens into the distributive 
system. In this way, the clientelist social contract, a key facet of classic rentier theory which was 
supposed to provide for regime autonomy, had, by the post-boom years of the mid-1980s, wound up 
constraining the state’s autonomy.  
Hertog, following Karl’s work in Venezuela,159 discovered that the Saudi government could not fire 
unproductive bureaucrats, and in some cases could not even control them. Likewise, the monarch’s 
freedom of action on domestic policy had been weakened by his government’s constant need to 
buttress legitimacy. The regime could neither retract its clientelist obligations to provide jobs nor its 
subsidies on water, food, fuel, housing and electricity. Accumulating spending commitments tied up 
ever-greater revenues within an inefficient bureaucracy and confounded the regime’s ability to launch 
new policy. “The large cascades of rentier clients accrued over time have been useful in pacifying 
society on the political level, but their immovable presence in and around the bureaucracy makes 
reform and day-to-day administrative control more difficult.” The ensuing limits to governing 
decision freedom came not through collective social forces, but through the regime’s own distribution 
obligations.160 
The loss of state autonomy detailed by Hertog and Karl follows a typical rentier pattern that went 
undocumented in classic theory. “Oil rents are politically centralizing. However, as the revenues are 
spent, new domestic actors emerge (as contractors, agents, recipients of subsidies) who, in turn, begin 
to limit the freedom of maneuver of the state. This is a very typical pattern; state autonomy may rise 
157 Niblock 2013, 14 
158 Herb 1999, 3 
159 Karl 1997 
160 Hertog 2010a; 4, 18-20 
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in a particular conjuncture but then typically will decline with its exercise over time.”161 Contributing 
to that decline is either the mobilization of social groups, or the state reacting to pre-empt that 
mobilization, as stylized in Fig. 2.1. 
 
Figure 2.1: Evolutionary path to limits on rentier state autonomy as depicted in literature 
Subsidies restrict the autonomy of rentier regimes in another way. Karl, echoing themes in standard 
economic treatment of subsidies and Pierson’s work on welfare states,162 found that establishing these 
special bargains creates vested interests in their preservation, constraining the regime’s latitude for 
policy maneuver and creating groups of beneficiaries which coalesce around their interests and can 
threaten political leadership when their benefits are jeopardized. Faced with an economic crisis that 
would move an extractive state to retrenchment, rentier regimes are immobilized, unable to separate 
economic rationality from political expediency.163 Finally, Gray argues that while rent distribution did 
allow allocative states to “remain aloof” from class interests more readily than was the case among 
extractive states, their autonomy was never complete. Even in the heady days of the first oil spike, 
rentier regimes still encountered the omnipresent possibility of revolution.  
The revisions to the early theoretical principle of regime autonomy can be summed up by arguing that 
the social contract between monarch and citizen channels policy through a narrow range of 
acceptability that restricts extractive action that would undermine citizen benefits, including 
reductions in energy subsidies. This loss of autonomy makes regime pursuit of subsidy reform – the 
issue of interest to this thesis – especially difficult. Revisionist works cited thus far do not challenge 
the notion that subsidies are protected, nor do they directly challenge the early theoretical principle of 
citizen passivity. The perception that regimes have shown increased deference to their citizens, in 
terms of responsiveness to complaints and avoidance of antagonizing them with increased prices, does 
not mean that citizens have mobilized, per se, but rather that regimes are wary of mobilizing them. 
However, the principle of the passive citizen would also be challenged. 
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2.3.2.3 Citizen Quiescence 
For the price enshrined in the social contract, citizens were expected to assume political quiescence 
and let rulers to the ruling. Early literature provides few, if any, hints that this state of affairs could 
change, or that society might demand a greater say in political or socio-economic affairs. After all, 
this was the claim of 1950s and 1960s modernization theorists such as Lerner and Huntington that 
rentier scholarship sought to refute. Despots overseeing these anachronistic kingdoms – which, as late 
as the 1950s, governed the majority of Arabs – were supposed to be felled by the postcolonial growth 
of an educated urban bourgeoisie which would no longer accept its voiceless role.164  
Revisionist scholarship has downplayed this assertion of citizen quiescence. Pete Moore argues that 
core rentier theory placed too much emphasis on the power of economic structures and too little on 
political choices and behavior.165 Populations are not as latent as classic theory portrays them. 
Protests break out in times of relative plenty, during the Arab Spring, and in times of scarcity. The oil 
bust of the 1980s and 1990s brought significant political opposition to rentier states, including the 
Gulf monarchies. Okruhlik found that rentier theory lacked any mechanism that could explain this rise 
of political opposition, which, she argues, was based in inequitable rentier distribution practices that 
were squeezed during the oil bust. “Generalizations about loyalty and dissent that were derived from 
the boom period (1973-86) cannot be applied to the postretrenchment and postwar period,” Okruhlik 
argued. “The receipt of oil revenues per se does not explain development or opposition or relations 
between ruler and ruled. The manner in which the rent is deployed, however, tells us much.”166  
Even in ultra-rentierist Qatar, Jocelyn Mitchell found flaws in Luciani’s original hypothesis that 
economic relations between state and society were the only interaction required to maintain political 
stability. Qataris were neither complacent nor even particularly compliant when it came to unpopular 
government policies. Mitchell provides evidence that Qatari society views welfare benefits and other 
economic allocations a “birthright” rather than as “gifts from a benevolent ruler that should be 
rewarded with political silence.” As such, economic inducements did not restrain Qataris from 
protesting sweeping educational reforms launched in the mid-2000s. Vociferous public opposition 
forced the regime to reverse key aspects of those reforms. Ruling elites’ dogged focus on non-
economic legitimacy building, including investments in cultural and religious heritage and a national 
myth, betrays a regime understanding that the allocation-acquiescence bargain cannot maintain long-
run political quiescence.167  
164 Lerner 1958; Huntington 1968 
165 P. W. Moore 2004 
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167 J. S. Mitchell 2013, p. 6, 83. 
56 
 
 
                                                     
The hypothesis of public quiescence was undermined further by the Arab Spring uprisings that began 
in Tunisia in late 2010 quickly engulfed six Arab countries, including Bahrain, where anti-regime 
protests attracted as much as one-fifth of the citizenry.168 Smaller protests occurred in most of the 
other Arab monarchies, including Jordan and Morocco. Only Qatar experienced no such protests, 
either physical or, as in the UAE, in the form of prominent online petitions. Gulf regime responses to 
the Arab Spring uprisings have followed the time-honored techniques of increases in patronage as 
well as repression of demonstrators and those demanding political openings. Mitchell argues that 
rentier theory’s characterization of the state-society compact as an economic relationship amounts to a 
“fundamental misconception” which should be recast as a necessary but not sufficient source of 
political legitimacy. She finds, like Okruhlik and Hertog, that state and society penetrate each other, 
and that successful state-society interaction strengthens the state, while autonomy ultimately weakens 
it.169 
Gray bundles theoretical revisions related to autonomy and quiescence in his Theory of Late 
Rentierism to describe a “responsive but undemocratic state” rather than a state that is autonomous 
from its society. These are consultative states which respond to the population’s concerns, especially 
those of citizens impacted by policy. This responsiveness is aimed at maintaining the political status 
quo without increases in pluralism.170 In similar fashion, Peterson argues that regimes ignore the 
public’s grievances at their own risk. When citizens mobilize in accepted ways, it is not generally the 
state’s repressive apparatus that gets called upon to respond – a la the “mild repression” of Luciani – 
but more likely that the regime takes steps to reinforce its side of the social contract, otherwise 
acceptable forms of criticism may escalate into visible discontent.171  
2.3.2.4 Oil Effects Questioned 
More significant for the durability of the rentier thesis, a few qualitative works have targeted its 
central theoretical assumption. These have questioned the centrality of exogenous resource revenues, 
arguing that the effect of rents is conditional upon other factors that also play roles in influencing 
regime type. 
The most significant challenge to the rentier model comes from Herb’s 1999 book All in the Family, 
which argues that rents are less predictive of monarchical longevity than internal dynastic factors. 
Herb points to the fall of monarchs in Iraq (1958), Libya (1969) and Iran (1979) as evidence that rents 
alone are not enough to maintain the rule of a monarchy lacking more requisite stability resources. His 
argument revolves around dividing monarchies into two groups: “dynastic monarchies” with 
168 Yom 2012 
169 J. S. Mitchell 2013, 30-3. 
170 M. Gray 2011a 
171 Peterson 2012 
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succession mechanisms based on family consensus, and those without these characteristics. In the first 
type, rulers assemble large family coalitions by buying members off with valuable offices and 
appointed posts. Succession disputes are resolved by a process of bandwagoning among ruling family 
members who get behind a favored candidate, not necessarily guided by primogeniture.  
Of the eight current Arab monarchies, five are dynastic: Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, Qatar and 
Bahrain. Outside these, Jordan and Morocco are more “intermediate cases” with smaller roles for 
ruling families, who face competing centers of power outside the monarchical institutions. Oman is a 
hybrid case, given Sultan Qaboos’ long history of nearly single-handed rule (with British help in the 
early days) and his lack of male heirs or immediate family. Herb ascribes the three intermediate 
monarchies with less resilience to challenge and argues that regimes in Jordan and Morocco might 
have been brought down long ago but for the failure of plots against them.172 Their cases look similar 
to failed monarchies in Iraq, Libya and Iran – albeit with improved statecraft – and to the other failed, 
non-dynastic monarchies in the region: Egypt, where monarchy was overthrown in 1952, North 
Yemen, in 1962; and Afghanistan, in 1973.  
Herb’s argument provides a useful lens for examining and distinguishing surviving monarchies. His 
explanation for the persistence of regimes in Jordan and Morocco – a combination of skilled statecraft 
and good luck – compensates for their lack of direct access to oil rents. But his downplaying of the 
role of oil rents is overdone. It should be no surprise that the five monarchies with dynastic 
characteristics are those that can afford them, by the providential access to oil rents. Oman’s case, 
Herb admits, would probably be similar had Qaboos managed to produce an immediate family. This 
amounts to a round-about way of acknowledging the co-optive power of rents and the strength of the 
rent-to-population thesis, which, I believe, offers at least as strong an explanation for the failure of 
monarchies in Iraq and Iran, where rents relative to population were low. Herb says as much in a later 
paper, arguing that rent effects are strong enough to warrant a theoretical framework to explain their 
influence.173 
In Libya, where rent-to-population ratios were smaller than those in the GCC – but not by much, as 
Fig. 1.2 shows – is where Herb’s thesis is strongest. Libya’s King Idris worked actively against the 
principles of dynastic succession, excluding his relatives from rule, and ensuring they had no interest 
in defending the monarchy after his death. The king’s handpicked crown prince had little support or 
influence. In fact, observers were so pessimistic about the monarchy’s survival that competing coup 
plots were launched amid a scramble for power. The 1969 overthrow of the 80-year-old king, while 
172 Jordan’s King Hussein was nearly overthrown by an uprising in 1957, and Morocco’s King Hassan’s royal 
jet was almost shot down in a mutiny led by air force pilots who managed to disable two of its three engines. 
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on vacation abroad, was a foregone conclusion.174 “The crucial difference between Libya and the 
Gulf regimes, the difference that explains why the former fell and the latter survive, is the absence of 
the ruling family in the Libyan state and the related failure to solve the problem of succession.”175 In 
this case it might be more accurate to state that the king’s access to rents could not compensate for his 
incompetence. His refusal to create – or even allow – institutional structures that could outlast him 
ultimately overrode the stabilizing opportunities of oil rents. 
Herb’s book comprises the most exhaustive attempt to move beyond the rentier thesis across the 
theoretical heartland of the Middle East. Several others also contest “determinist” rentier explanations 
for autocracy and regime durability, or otherwise argue that oil rents merely strengthened preexisting 
authoritarian distributive structures. Gause (with Yom at times) plausibly attributes durability of the 
Gulf monarchies to three factors. Like Herb, he credits the strong monarchical institutions. But he 
does not discount the equal importance of oil rents – which provide the distributive liquidity required 
by those institutions – as well as geopolitical support from outside powers like the United States, 
which also deter tampering with the status quo. 176  
Pete Moore argues that econometric studies linking oil to autocracy, including Ross’ as well as those 
done under the rubric of the resource curse, discounted important political and historical factors that 
were being teased out more accurately in in-depth qualitative case studies done by regional specialists. 
These factors include informal patrimonial networks that may or may not be energized by oil, as well 
as cultural and religious resources, and creation of national identities.177 For instance, Anderson’s 
examination of Tunisia and neighboring Libya unearthed large differences in development and 
political culture. This she attributed to historical factors, such as Tunisia’s long colonization by 
Ottomans and Europeans in which it had established centralized institutions of a bureaucratic state, 
Libya’s short bout with Italian colonists had left it with few such institutions that could challenge its 
long-standing tribal structures and regional schisms at independence. 178 Oil rents are an important 
variable in maintaining autocratic structures, but rents flow into pre-existing frameworks (which 
account for differences between states) rather than upending the old structures and creating new ones.  
Several other scholars take less issue with the influence of oil rents, but present strong cases for 
including historical and cultural factors – or the state’s manipulation thereof – in the legitimacy 
formula that has bolstered these regimes. Niblock, along with Nonneman, argue that patronage, or as 
Niblock describes it, “eudaemonic legitimacy,” is just one of four pillars of regime legitimacy in Arab 
states, the others being religion and ideological sources, traditional leadership and personal charisma, 
174 Herb 1999, 195 
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and skill in statecraft.179 Writing on Oman, Valeri argues that Sultan Qaboos performed a feat of 
“identity engineering” by fashioning an “imagined community” for multicultural Oman. Qaboos used 
a national ideology to weave together a “timeless Omani national identity which has relied on 
standardized collective references” allowing him to place himself at the center of a unified state with 
no previous history of a single ruler, and, alongside his distributive feats, became an effective source 
of legitimacy.180 Also in this camp is Davidson, who finds himself in 2005 highlighting institutional 
stability of Gulf monarchies through their adept mixture of charismatic, patrimonial, religious and 
ideological sources of legitimacy.181 By 2012, however, Davidson argues that these assets are 
insufficient to protect Gulf rulers from the rising costs of maintaining their ruling bargains, nor can 
they prevent citizens from using distributed communication technologies to organize against regimes. 
He predicts the imminent downfall of all six by 2017.182 Weiffen adds Islam to the stabilizing mix of 
historical and cultural factors.183 Herb, in his 2005 paper, cites proximity to other autocracies as a 
strong predictor.184  
Finally, several scholars have approached the rentier/oil effects question using quantitative 
techniques, producing large-n studies that have made cases both for and against the rentier and 
resource curse theses. As mentioned, Ross’ 2001 paper and Smith’s work in 2004 found strong links 
between oil exports and autocracy and regime durability, while others challenge those findings, 
asserting that oil is unassociated with autocracy and institutional underdevelopment. Herb is one who 
challenges the oil-equals-autocracy conclusion, this time using a quantitative examination of 144 
countries over 28 years. He declares that rentierism has little or no effect on a state’s tendency toward 
democracy, because, in a counterfactual world, few of the world’s current oil states would have 
developed democracy even if they had no oil. Herb notes that rentier states are typically drawn from 
among the world’s poor countries which are more likely to be authoritarian, especially in the Middle 
East and Africa. The high likelihood that neighboring non-oil states are autocracies bolsters the 
argument. There is “little reason to think that political outcomes in the absence of rent wealth would 
have been very good. Rent wealth does not make countries better governed, but neither is it a 
curse.”185 
Haber and Menaldo wield an exhaustive series of statistical tests that found no evidence to support a 
link between resource reliance and regime type. Instead, they found increases in natural resource 
income associated with small increases in democracy. They found cases where dictators used resource 
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rents to maintain power, but argue that authoritarianism in resource-rich states is probably more 
closely associated with states that were weak before the discovery of oil – as in the Gulf – and rulers 
exploiting those resources to remain in power. The paper found omitted variables and reverse 
causality in several resource curse papers, and declared they could not find a systematic tendency that 
matched the phenomenon.186  
Ross, with Andersen, responded that Haber and Menaldo may have been correct about the lack of a 
resource curse before the nationalizations of the 1970s, but that their use of data dating to 1800 had 
obscured antidemocratic effects that occurred in the last 30 years. In comparison with the speed of 
democracy’s embrace by non-oil exporters, oil producing states adopted participatory institutions 
much more slowly. Their paper argues that the transfer of rent-capturing capability from international 
oil companies to national oil companies, mainly in the 1970s, in combination with rising global 
demand and tighter market supply, gave autocratic petro-regimes resources to survive the democratic 
wave that swept away less-endowed authoritarian regimes in the 1980s and 1990s.187 Andersen and 
Ross concede that the preponderance of academic evidence does not support an oil curse before the 
1970s, or on countries where the government does not dominate the oil industry (agreeing with Jones 
Luong and Weinthal188), or on regimes that had strong institutions before the capture of oil rents, 
embracing the argument of Douglass North and other “new institutionalists” like Elbadawi and Soto 
who say that the resource curse exists, but is based on “bad political governance.” States with high 
levels of political inclusiveness and checks on government power are able to use resource rents as a 
growth driver.189 
2.3.2.5 Late Rentierism 
As depicted above, the abundance of comparative political scholarship investigating, undermining and 
reaffirming the basic rentier thesis has introduced competing and overlapping models that grouped 
varying numbers of states and types of regime. These works have introduced new levels of 
complexity and diversity to analysis of rentier questions. At the same time, decades of population 
growth, globalization and business pressure have added new layers of complexity to the rentier state. 
Even narrowing the focus back to the GCC, recent scholarship has determined that classic rentier 
theory’s still useful core required updating.  Building upon the work of Hertog, Pete Moore, Davidson 
and Hvidt,190 Gray argues for the theory’s continued relevance, but with a reduced role for oil 
revenues. He finds that classic works were overambitious in declaring rentierism a “structural 
characteristic” of the state. Instead, he posits, rentierism is better described as a political economy 
186 Haber and Menaldo 2011 
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dynamic of state-society relations in countries that have undergone significant modernizations, yet 
which manage to retain an allocative spending model.191  
Gray documents seven features of what he describes as evolved late rentier states. These include an 
openness to globalization and foreign investment, which provides new channels for wealth creation 
and rent distribution. This significant “diversification” of the rentier model allows resource-poor 
rentiers such as Dubai to replace oil rents within existing social contracts, while resource-rich rentiers 
expand into energy-intensive sectors such as refining, petrochemicals and metals production. Where 
classic theory once held that states needed no economic policy because they could use external rents 
to co-opt the opposition, Gray documents an activist Gulf economic policy that takes the form of 
reinvigorated state capitalism with a strong planning component. Strategic state investments have 
established government-owned businesses – witness the Saudi petrochemicals firm SABIC or Dubai’s 
Emirates Airline – that compete effectively in the global marketplace.192 Gray argues that the more 
advanced (i.e. late) rentier states acknowledge the need to create meaningful jobs for citizens and 
otherwise demonstrate responsiveness to society if they want to avoid democratic reforms. And 
finally, competitive and open economies are required to pursue diversification into permanent and 
more productive sources of state income. Given the doubtful prospects for long-term reliance on 
simple energy rents, profits and taxes from state owned firms (and foreign partners) will provide a 
growing portion of state budgets and, if these states manage to retain their rentier structures, 
distributive outlays. As rentier states and institutions have complexified, elites have been forced to 
adapt with nuanced and engaged approaches to society and policymaking. Export rents have 
underwritten those changes and lie at the core of the relationship, but the structural dominance of rents 
has diminished.193 
2.4 Rentier Theory and Energy 
My research argues against a diminished role for natural resources in these states. While I agree with 
the portrayals above that call for more theoretical nuance and complexity, I argue that theory should 
be extended to include a deeper and more structural role for hydrocarbons in state formation and 
institutional outcomes. How could the role of energy be insufficiently depicted in the rentier state 
literature? At first glance, energy issues appear to pervade the literature. Energy is treated as an 
economic asset that produces rents. Scholars credit the discovery of hydrocarbons with guiding state 
formation and enabling independence, and even influencing the drawing of borders. Rentier 
economies are described as dependent on oil and gas exports to the extent that cyclical price swings 
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have gained a role in the literature’s discussions of political stability, and requirements of 
diversification beyond – or “away from” – energy.  
Notwithstanding these caveats, the rentier literature is strangely disengaged with the use of energy 
within rentier states, including the intensity of that use. The literature says little about the regime 
buying support through distribution of cheap feedstock and fuel, nor does it credit these practices with 
influence on residents’ behavior or the physical shape of the built environment in the Gulf 
monarchies. The downplaying of energy was probably justified in the classic period of rentier 
scholarship, but now – given the burgeoning dependence of petro-states on in-kind energy itself – a 
reassessment is due. 
Luciani, an energy economist, is one of the few authors to engage with the topic. Yet his 1987 
evaluation and dismissal of a structural role for energy set the tone for subsequent literature. Since 
then, this assessment has remained unchallenged. In particular, Luciani examined whether oil 
commanded the centrality that water achieved within the literature on oriental despotism, especially 
within of Wittfogel’s exhaustive 1957 book that bears this title.194 Wittfogel, bundling Marx’s 
scattered musings on the Asiatic mode of production,195 put together a Theory of the Hydraulic 
Society, declaring that exploitation of water through irrigation wrought profound effects on the state 
formation process, through which centralized, despotic bureaucracies such as those in Mesopotamia 
and Egypt resulted. These “hydraulic” structures shaped states that subjugated society through 
alliances with the dominant religion, with weak systems of private property and with very few 
independent societal or constitutional checks on power. The result was harsh “hydraulic 
despotism.”196 
Luciani, while discounting Wittfogel’s overall argument, finds initial similarities between the impact 
of oil and that of water. Crude oil is a liquid that requires similar infrastructure and centralized 
coordination to that of water irrigation. Oil production requires a comparable division of labor that 
includes technocratic expertise in geology, chemistry and finance. Oil’s location in “basins” has, like 
water, influenced the territorial definition of states, and forced regions with no oil (such as the Hijaz, 
parts of Libya and the UAE’s northern emirates) to forgo aspirations for independence and band with 
oil-rich neighbors. But Luciani finds more differences than commonalities. Oil production is not a 
labor-intensive pursuit that requires popular mobilization. Oil is less central than water to the 
population’s physical survival. In contrast to water, Luciani argues that access to oil revenue is the 
crucial aspect of production (however, like water, these revenues are mediated by the state). Oil is 
mostly consumed abroad. Oil “has value only to the extent that it is exported.” Oil is not “traded 
194 Wittfogel 1957 
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domestically in the oil-producing countries.” Luciani concedes that oil products are consumed locally, 
but it is the oil export revenues (once distributed) that allow residents in rentier states to consume 
goods that include oil products.197  
Gray also discusses the role of oil and gas in rentier theory, but – rather than calling for an increase in 
its prominence – also argues that oil, or rather, oil rent, has over time become even less dominant 
within late-phase rentier states. Economies should be described as “energy-driven” rather than 
“energy-centric” due to diversification into energy-intensive industrial and even post-industrial 
sectors, some of which compete globally and have pushed economies far beyond simple hydrocarbon 
rents.198  
This research calls for a reassessment of energy’s role that elevates its importance for producer states 
like the Gulf monarchies, where dependence on actual energy – in its primary form and as refined 
products or secondary forms such as electricity – has increased since the heyday of the oil boom 
period. Energy availability and government pricing policy has created a path-dependence that has 
shaped these societies far more deeply than the literature allows. While sources of rent have 
diversified, sources of energy have not. The Gulf monarchies now form the epicenter of a region 
identified by the IEA as a growing center of global energy demand and intensity, the result of decades 
of compounding annual demand growth.199 When the following factors are considered, it appears that 
the Gulf monarchies have moved closer to the “hydrocarbon society” status rejected by Luciani in 
1987.  
Factor 1: The Middle East as a Center of Demand 
International energy authorities no longer consider the Gulf and the broader Middle East as a “supply” 
region alone, but also a demand center of increasing importance. Domestic distribution of oil and gas 
has increased over the years in terms of total scale, as well as on a per capita basis. Oil is increasingly 
diverted from export sales into domestic markets and refined (often using domestic capacity that did 
not exist in 1987) into products that are distributed at subsidized prices for domestic use. The supply 
and demand of energy is as crucial for producer states as it is elsewhere, perhaps more so since the 
Gulf monarchies – in contrast to much of the rest of the world – depend for nearly 100% of their 
primary energy on domestic oil and gas, given their lack of coal, hydropower, biomass, and, for now, 
nuclear and renewable sources. 
Factor 2: Increasing Local Role for Energy Commodities 
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Oil and gas have increased their roles in sustaining life in the Gulf since the era of classic rentierism. 
Hydrocarbon feedstocks provide the desalinated water that now dominates supply of this vital 
resource, and hydrocarbons also enable the climate conditions – through ubiquitous cooling services – 
required to render workplaces and housing habitable. In the days of classic rentier theory, water was 
still mainly drawn from underground aquifers. Air conditioning, which became available as these 
states electrified, was far less prevalent in the 1980s. Domestic consumption of hydrocarbons has thus 
supported population growth and immigration that have integrated the Gulf into the global economy 
in ways that states with similar geographic and climactic conditions have been unable to achieve.200   
Factor 3: Path-Dependence on High-Intensity Demand 
Availability of plentiful inexpensive oil and gas early in the state-building process has created a path-
dependence on energy-intensive development. Pierson describes path dependence as a process in 
which initial steps in a particular direction induce further movement in the same direction. Over time, 
the probability of further steps along this early path is influenced by an increasing returns process that 
provides additional benefits from maintaining the current activity while increasing the costs of exit.201 
As Levi argues, “the costs of reversal are very high… the entrenchments of certain institutional 
arrangements obstruct an easy reversal of the initial choice.”202 In the Gulf, initial pricing and supply 
patterns shaped cities and infrastructure, allowing developers to reduce costs by ignoring energy 
efficient techniques and “locking in” a pattern of energy intensive development that has become 
difficult to change. The result has been energy-intensive sprawl. Settlements which once maximized 
natural cooling and favored pedestrian mobility have been converted by oil into havens for the private 
automobile, replete with energy inefficient buildings designed to specifications inappropriate for the 
Gulf climate. Cheap energy has shaped personal preferences and habits that, in combination with 
existing infrastructure design, have created path-dependence on high levels of consumption. 
Factor 4: Competing Internal and External Priorities for Energy Production 
Energy in the Gulf monarchies exhibits a duality in its role. In-kind energy, like fiscal rent, comprises 
a key distributive component in the social contract between state and society. Subsidized energy is 
used to buy citizens’ political support. A threat to domestic energy distribution therefore implies deep-
rooted consequences for politics and governance. Simultaneously, hydrocarbons remain the region’s 
economic underpinning, as an export commodity comprising the paramount source of national 
income. As such, threats to exports of energy could have dire economic consequences, as well. This 
duality of energy has fostered competition between internal and external sources of demand. As 
200 For example nearby Yemen, Eritrea and Djibouti have far smaller known energy endowments and consume a 
tiny fraction of the energy used in the GCC states.   
201 Pierson 2000; Thelen 1999 
202 Levi 1997, 28 
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production reaches a plateau, increases in internal demand endanger the ability to maintain constant 
exports. Subsidized domestic energy distribution carries further significance for intergenerational 
equity, for the continued prominence of the Gulf states in world energy markets, and for diplomatic 
and strategic relations with global powers such as the United States. (See Chapter 4 for further 
discussion.) 
Factor 5: Energy’s Influence on Institutional Design 
As discussed above, hydrocarbon dependence, like that of water dependence in the creation of 
“hydraulic despotism,” is linked by numerous scholars to the perseverance of autocratic systems and 
the thwarting of democratic institutions. Ali and Elbadawi have taken this rentier thesis a step further 
to demonstrate that the size of the resource base per capita – and the consequent per capita distribution 
of rent and public wages – also influences the type of internal security apparatus as well as the level of 
repression wielded by the state.203 As mentioned in the previous chapter, Arab Spring unrest tended to 
inflict countries with smaller per-capita resource production and higher levels of state repression, and, 
for the most part, bypassed states with those with larger production per capita. Although this factor 
closely follows the rentier thesis, it is distinct to the extent that it links resources to institutional 
design. 
 
Through these five factors, in-kind hydrocarbons – as distinct from export revenue – have shaped 
these societies in a direct way, rather than in the secondary manner enshrined in theory. That is a long 
way from arguing that these are hydrocarbon societies in the Wittfogel sense, and I acknowledge, like 
Gray and others, that there are numerous and growing nonoil dimensions to Gulf economies. However 
it bears pointing out that theory has consistently underplayed oil’s physical, behavioral and strategic 
influences on these states. The enormous influence and effects of hydrocarbons and especially the 
availability of cheap oil and gas on the shape, preferences and habits of these societies; and on their 
governance and their positions in the global trade and power structure, should at least be 
acknowledged within the rentier literature.  
This dissertation provides an initial attempt to come to grips with this task. Chapter 5 will show that 
oil and gas are key components of the distributive stream. In-kind energy is allocated alongside 
financial distributive flows and similarly incorporated into social contracts. However domestic oil and 
gas are distinct from financial distribution in that they flow from finite reserves subject to production 
limits. Their domestic consumption at low fixed prices generates a rising opportunity cost in terms of 
foregone export revenue. I argue that rentier theory erroneously correlates energy resource 
distribution with political stability, when in the longer run, it appears more likely to undermine 
203 O. Ali and Elbadawi 2012 
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stability. In this way subsidized hydrocarbon distribution amounts to self-defeating rentierism. And, 
by framing these energy subsidies as political rights, the literature has enmeshed itself in the same 
reform challenge that now confronts Gulf regimes. 
2.5 Rentier Theory and Subsidies 
This discussion now turns to the theoretical construct within the literature to which this dissertation 
intends to contribute. As mentioned, rentier theory portrays subsidies as rights of citizenship that 
cannot be reformed. This is because subsidies are enshrined within state-society governance pacts, 
where they are provided in exchange for the political quiescence of recipients. These “unreformable” 
subsidies may include housing and land benefits, health care, education, food staples, funds for 
marriage costs and unemployment benefits. Those of concern to this research are subsidies on fuel, 
desalinated water and electricity, which encourage consumption of the same energy commodities that 
simultaneously comprise the chief exports of these states. The following section examines the rentier 
literature’s portrayal of subsidies and its characterization of the potential for reform. It also scours 
rentier and other scholarship for portrayals of benefits as fixed or as fungible; that is, whether benefits 
can be withdrawn or replaced at the behest of the state.  
As will be shown, rentier scholarship affords little ambiguity on regime options vis-à-vis citizen 
subsidies. While scholars depict variation in levels and types of benefits – from jobs and loans to 
parcels of land and business licenses – these are portrayed as vital components of citizenship which, 
collectively, comprise the citizen’s most important inducement for acquiescence to his government’s 
rule. A preponderance of the literature declares that benefits cannot be retracted without offsetting 
their loss with a corresponding increase in democratic legitimacy. To do otherwise would challenge 
the basis of the state. Scholars’ treatment of substitution of benefits is only slightly less categorical. 
2.5.1 Subsidy Treatment in the Classic Literature 
As mentioned above, a key issue in the rentier social contract is the rejection of taxation and other 
forms of extraction from society. Among the prohibited extractive behavior is “retrenchment,” or the 
retraction of welfare benefits and subsidies. Acts of retrenchment are portrayed in the literature as 
equivalent to the loss of an income transfer or the imposition of a tax. In this sense, Waterbury argues 
that the “bread riots” that followed state-mandated price increases in Egypt, Algeria, Sudan, Jordan 
and elsewhere should be viewed as taxpayers’ revolts.204 This portrayal of subsidies as rights has 
grown more rigid over time. Some early characterizations of welfare benefits, including those on 
energy, describe them as once being understood by citizens as a ruler’s patrimonial gift. But any 
204 Waterbury 1997, 157 
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vestige of the latter understanding has since been eclipsed by the widespread acceptance by scholars 
of these benefits as customary entitlements or rights of citizenship.205  
In their introduction to a 1987 edited volume that is considered the cornerstone of the rentier 
literature, Beblawi and Luciani declared that subsidies, once extended, become permanent 
endowments that weak and legitimacy-deficient rentier states could neither retract nor restrict to the 
poor. “Cutting subsidies,” they wrote, is “not qualitatively different from raising taxes: either of the 
two is feasible only if the state enjoys solid democratic legitimation, justifying the degree of 
repression which may on some occasions be necessary.”206 Beblawi distills the subsidies-as-rights 
notion into a formulation that defines citizenship in the authoritarian rentier state as “a source of 
economic benefit” or a “sort of financial asset and hence a source of income” that extends beyond the 
traditional relationship between a man and his homeland: “Nationals live more in a rentier economy 
and associate with its financial manna all the rights of citizenship.”207 In similar fashion, Crystal 
describes a growing perception of state welfare functions as “rights” claimed on the basis of 
nationality.208 Writing in 1994, Gause argues likewise. After two decades of oil-derived state benefits, 
“a substantial part of the citizenry has ceased to regard these benefits as temporary benefices from 
their rulers, and has come to see them as rights of citizenship.”209  
These classic theoretical works emerged during the oil bust of the 1980s and 1990s, a period that saw 
regime finances stretched thin. Some authors predicted, in similar fashion to this work, that the 
tendency to view subsidies as “unreformable” would lead to crisis. Beblawi and Luciani wrote that the 
specter of rentier governments clinging to “detrimental” spending policies that “very clearly cannot be 
sustained in the long run” was a symptom of state weakness.210 Farsoun in 1988 warned of dangers 
inherent in the metamorphosis of subsidies into “a political right of the citizen.” Attempts to dismantle 
them in hard times “will likely trigger movements of opposition against the regime. In short, 
unwittingly, all states of the Arab Mashriq are planting the seeds of an important political principle: 
that is, the citizen's political (not merely humanitarian) right to economic security.” Farsoun predicted 
205 These arguments have been articulated in the literature by numerous authors. See, for example, classic rentier 
works by Beblawi and Luciani 1987, 16–17; Crystal 1990, 2, 191–2; Gause III 1994, 82; Farsoun 1988, 20–1; 
Farsoun and Zacharia 1995, 262; Chaudhry 1997, 274–5; and more revisionist material from Okruhlik 1999, 
301, 309; Hertog and Luciani 2009; Tetreault 2012; Davidson 2005, 97; Gause III 2011, 12; Peterson 2012; J. S. 
Mitchell 2013, 6. 
206 Beblawi and Luciani 1987, 16–17, emphasis added 
207 Beblawi 1987, 53, 56, 59 
208 Crystal 1990, 191 
209 Gause III 1994 specifically mentions state payment of citizen utility bills in this formulation. See p. 82 and p. 
61. 
210 Beblawi and Luciani 1987, 16–17 
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that “This right may then emerge in the early twenty-first century as the central issue of domestic 
Arab politics.”211  
Implications for imposing extraction extend from loss of regime autonomy, by inviting citizen 
scrutiny and demands for involvement in government policymaking; to diminished legitimacy; and 
even reduced prospects for regime survival, through decreased political support or perhaps popular 
insurrection. Gause was under no illusions about the centrality of social contract benefits to political 
stability. “Were the Gulf monarchies to find themselves unable to meet their end of the economic 
bargain with their citizens, the future of their political systems could be called into question.”212 In 
1997, Gause again found little room for either imposing taxes or cutting welfare expenditures, since 
doing so “holds the risk of alienating large portions of their populations who have come to expect 
extensive welfare state benefits as their right as citizens.”213   
The perils of reforming energy subsidies can be seen in contributions to recent political unrest in 
Nigeria, Ecuador, Bolivia, Indonesia and Jordan, in Iran’s gasoline riots of 2007, and the toppling of 
regimes in OPEC members Indonesia in 1998 and Venezuela in 1993. In Venezuela in 1989, hundreds 
of people were killed in rioting after the government attempted to raise gasoline prices.214 
Government withdrawals of food subsidies have ignited serious unrest in poorer parts of the Middle 
East, with dozens killed in the “bread uprisings” in Egypt in 1977 and as many as 500 perishing in 
1988 riots in Algeria. Food riots also broke out in Morocco and Tunisia in 1984, Sudan in 1985 and 
Jordan in 1989. As Siddiki showed, governments in all countries stricken by bread riots responded by 
increasing political participation – a boilerplate rentierist response to an inability to maintain 
distribution – and an outcome that Gulf ruling families would strenuously avoid replicating.215  
2.5.2 Subsidy in Revisionist Works 
Revisionist works in rentier theory took issue with aspects of classic scholarship, as shown above, but 
retained, and in some cases intensified the subsidy-as-rights theme. Several authors portrayed the 
state’s obligations toward the ruling bargain as growing increasingly rigid, alongside rising citizen 
expectations and increases in individual wealth. Chaudhry’s examination of institutional effects of 
boom-bust cycles finds that Saudi “welfare programs defined citizenship” to the extent that the 
government was unable to retract benefits it could no longer afford. This failure was exemplified by 
211 Farsoun 1997, 21; emphasis added 
212 Gause III 1994, 147; emphasis added 
213 Gause III 1997, 80; emphasis added 
214 In Venezuela, where the world’s lowest gasoline prices remained fixed at 6 US cents per gallon at the time of 
writing, cheap gasoline is similarly considered “almost an inalienable right of citizenship.” See: Neuman, 
William. (Jan. 20, 2014) “Venezuela May Meet New Reality, and New Price, at the Pump.” New York Times. 
(http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/21/world/americas/venezuela-gasoline-prices.html)  
215 Siddiki 2000 
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the Saudi government’s failed attempt in 1988 to reduce subsidies on fuel, water and electricity.216 
Herb, while questioning the effects of oil on monarchical longevity, embraces theory’s subsidies-as-
rights principle. “The Gulf Arabs feel an entitlement to their share of the countries’ oil wealth,” he 
writes. Citizens do not (if they ever did) feel gratitude to ruling families for sharing oil rents, because 
they “think that they themselves, as citizens, own the oil, not the ruling families. … Few are 
particularly grateful on receipt of something they think is theirs in the first place.”217 Okruhlik 
reiterates that “the receipt of goods and services through distribution is now perceived as a right of 
citizenship rather than the happy consequence of a boom period” and argued that reducing subsidy 
would be opposed as illegitimate, as if it were a tax.218  
Likewise Schlumberger’s examination of regime survival strategies through the long oil bust period 
attributes longevity to the dogged delivery of patronage in the face of economic decline. “Given the 
absence of meaningful participation and democratic legitimacy, these welfare services to the local 
population can be seen as the single most important source of political legitimacy,” he wrote.219 
Similarly, Schwarz identifies the rentier state’s provision of welfare benefits as its chief stabilizing 
function which is threatened during times of fiscal scarcity. Political acquiescence is gained “as long 
as there are enough resources to be allocated both for the state and the whole of society.” Insufficient 
distribution increases the chances for political change, even “collapse” of the state.220  
Foley documents the inability of governments to address the oil bust shortfalls through the “most 
logical approach” namely “reducing spending and imposing income and other taxes, which had 
virtually disappeared in the Gulf during the 1970s.”221 With oil revenues collapsing, “it became clear 
that their populations were unwilling to countenance any reductions in welfare spending.” Gulf 
regimes maintained spending and subsidies despite falling into debt.222 As mentioned above, Mitchell 
uses survey and case study evidence to depict Qatari society rejecting the idea that welfare benefits 
are “gifts from a benevolent ruler that should be rewarded with political silence,” but rather that these 
outlays constitute “a birthright due them as citizens.” She describes the near-total lack of state 
extraction from citizens, despite being “unique in the history of states” as having evolved over years 
of increasing citizens expectations to become “the new normal.” As an example, she cites complaints 
216 Chaudhry 1997, 149, 274-5 
217 Herb 1999, 241–2 
218 Okruhlik 1999, 301; emphasis added 
219 Schlumberger 2006a, 3  
220 Schwarz 2008, 607 
221 Foley 2010, 90 
222 Foley 2010, 85 
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by Qatari nationals over the implementation of parking charges at a shopping mall as a sign of the 
unwillingness “of Qatari society to accept any forms of extraction, no matter how small.”223  
In his works on the UAE, Davidson usefully differentiates among types of social benefits often 
lumped together, cataloging myriad sources and types of government benefit transfers. These range 
from business licenses granted to early political rivals, to “marriage funds” and housing grants aimed 
at the poor; to institutionalized privileges for business owners in terms of favorable loans and 
contracts; start-up loans and provision of business quarters and land for entrepreneurs; generous 
allowances for importing and control of foreign workers, and complimentary restrictions on business 
ownership by non-nationals. As some of these benefits have reached saturation levels – for instance 
business licenses and government employment – others with larger capacities have been extended.224 
However, despite what initially appears as a substitutable variety of benefit choices available for 
deployment by the regime, Davidson also declares a prohibition on the notion of retractability. He 
writes that citizen understanding of these benefits has evolved from one of regime benevolence to 
entitlement. Among younger Emiratis, he declares that subsidies and benefits of the distributive 
economy are perceived as an “irreversible birthright.”225 Rentierism has “created a generation of 
nationals that has no experience of an extractive state.” The “complete abolition of all taxes and the 
introduction of the ‘ruling bargain’ subsidies from the 1970s onwards has effectively created a 
population incapable of coming to terms with any form of future demands from the state.”226 In his 
2009 book on Abu Dhabi, Davidson finds “a citizenry has been cultivated over thirty-five years that is 
now wholly accustomed to material benefits and to no forms of extraction.” In comparison with 
relatively poor expatriates who must remain satisfied with tax-free salaries, the “entire national 
population forms a natural upper class, as they are the only members of society entitled to explicit 
government transfers.” As such, their national identity must be “fiercely preserved” since it implies a 
“guarantee of financial prosperity.”227 
Much of Hertog’s 2010 book is dedicated to demonstrating how the Saudi state’s distributive outlays 
become fixed commitments. He argues that the government’s accumulated “distributive obligations” 
are not only un-reformable, as portrayed in rentier literature, but also constrain the state’s 
policymaking autonomy by accounting for ever-greater amounts of government budgets. Meanwhile, 
factions created by distributional imperatives can veto policy that threatens their privileges.228  
223 J. S. Mitchell 2013; 6, 18-20 
224 Davidson 2005, 70–105 
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“Rent distribution means incurring obligations, even if individualized, and these can reduce a 
regime’s leeway to change institutions over time. This is perhaps the most striking feature of 
state autonomy in Saudi Arabia as a rentier state: oil money initially gave its elites vast 
autonomy to create and reshape institutions. This autonomy, however, has declined 
precipitously. Other rentier states seem to have seen similar shifts.  Mechanisms of 
bureaucratic growth and entitlement tend to reproduce institutional trajectories once they have 
been decided upon. Entitlements and fiefdoms in countries as different as the Gulf 
monarchies and Venezuela have proven remarkably sticky. All GCC states saw institutional 
stagnation in the lost years of the 1980s and 1990s; the fiscal crisis did not trigger reforms as 
it might have in nonrentier states, and attempts to revoke entitlements by and large went 
nowhere.”229  
Far from allowing these outlays to be tamed, benefit portfolios are subject to increase over time. Herb, 
followed by Mitchell, argues not only that benefit outlays are “fixed commitments,” but the level or 
type of patronage required to secure a citizen’s consent to ruling family control tends to rise over 
time. “[T]he price of support is not fixed: it is subject to inflation,” Herb writes.230  
Other works describe states’ needs to reform accumulating fiscal commitments, but portray tinkering 
with rentier social contracts as fraught with political risk. This scholarship retains the subsidy-as-
rights formulation, while focusing on “dangerous” links between increasing social welfare obligations 
and dependence on favorable oil markets. Hertog and Luciani address – and dismiss – the possibility 
of rationalizing energy prices, conceding that raising residential electricity tariffs is nigh impossible 
because “reduced prices have traditionally been perceived as part of the ruling bargain and attempts 
to increase them have been repeatedly reversed.”231  
Gause champions the durability of the Gulf monarchies with a pointed critique of scholarly 
predictions of their imminent downfall, particularly Davidson’s 2012 forecast that all six monarchies 
will be swept away by 2017.232 Gause argues in papers in 2011 and 2013 that the perseverance of 
monarchies through the Arab Spring attests to their resourceful and durable nature, aided by useful 
inventories of experience in surviving crises. However, regarding natural resource consumption that is 
the focus of this dissertation, Gause agrees that, in Saudi Arabia, “something will have to give.” But 
that the conventional responses of reducing spending or imposing taxes are unavailable to the Saudi 
229 Hertog 2010a, 267 
230 J. S. Mitchell 2013, 19; Herb 1999, 242 
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regime because they would “challenge the basis of the oil state the al-Saud family has built since the 
early 1970s, with uncertain political consequences.”233  
Elsewhere, the subsidies-as-rights formulation is implied. Coates Ulrichsen argues that social 
contracts will have to be reformulated away from resource dependence, but that doing so is risky, 
since patronage-based states are vulnerable to unstable transitions.234 Tétreault cautions similarly that 
the post-oil lack of “shared sacrifice” in rentier society translates to fickle citizen support for the 
regime, which poses risks for welfare reform.235 Jones portrays UAE educational reforms as a stealthy 
monarchical attempt to reduce unwieldy social contract commitments. But rather than confront 
subsidies in illegitimate top-down fashion, the state encourages “grassroots” reforms by “educating” 
students to reject rent-seeking behavior and adopt “virtues” that run counter to their financial 
interests.236  
Whether stated outright or inferred, the formulation of government subsidies as rights of citizenship 
has been and remains a fundamental tenet of rentier theory that is incorporated within the foundation 
of the literature’s arguments and narratives. In the scholarship examining the wealthy rentier states of 
the Gulf, I can find no author arguing that these benefits are fluid or that regimes merely exhibit a 
tendency to trade subsidies for political allegiance. What happens in practice is another matter. But 
within the literature, benefits are sacrosanct.    
2.5.3 Substitutability of Welfare Benefits 
There is virtually no dissent in the rentier literature that subsidies are viewed as rights, or that they are 
traded for quiescence. However, that statement does not close the door on the fungibility of benefits. 
Can welfare benefits be replaced when their continued provision damages other aspects of the 
governance structure? Can they be offset with new benefits? For instance, could electricity subsidies 
be replaced by subsidized mobile telephony services, or even a cash benefit? Is the menu flexible, 
governed by a level of spending rather than a specific set of benefits? The wherewithal of regimes to 
replace benefits is not addressed head-on in the literature, which, perhaps since it characterizes these 
benefits as rights, appears to assume that they are not substitutable. In addition, rentier works tend to 
theorize at the macro level without delving into the on-the-ground application of the rules, where, as I 
will later show, exceptions have emerged. However, a few authors visit subsidy substitution on the 
margins. Findings are mixed. 
233 Gause III 2011b, 11–12. Gause also touches on distinctions between fiscal expenditures, and implications of 
resource demand for the income side of the budget. See also: Gause III 2013 
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Benefit substitution would most likely occur under periods of duress, when a financial or other 
hardship provided pressure. Literature examining state-society relations during the oil bust of the 
1980s and 1990s generally focuses on regimes’ doggedness in maintaining benefits, to the point of 
deficit spending and accruing debt.237 In the long run, however, a rentier political bargain is stable 
only as long as it is supported by sufficient resources. Schwarz argues that a fiscal crisis therefore 
entails a “fundamental crisis of the state itself.” He finds that the rentier state avails two options to 
manage a fiscal crisis, neither of which entails fully removing or otherwise reformulating pre-existing 
benefits. First, the state can seek alternate sources of rent to distribute. Second, it can more effectively 
deploy its existing rents by narrowing their delivery to groups whose political support is most 
important for regime legitimacy.238 Gulf states have adopted both techniques. In the first case, Gray 
and Davidson have documented the broadening of the rent sources, especially in Dubai.239 In the 
second instance, this dissertation’s Chapter 5 examines policies that have focused rent distribution 
toward the most politically important groups, chiefly citizens, while reducing outlays for those whose 
support is deemed less crucial to regime legitimacy, such as commercial entities and expatriates.240 In 
this sense, a few authors have depicted regimes revealing limited flexibility on sources and delivery of 
benefits.  
In similar fashion, Lawson describes economic liberalization policies imposed during the 1990s oil 
bust as “innovations” that helped revenue-strapped monarchies cope with onerous social welfare 
mandates. “[R]eductions in government expenditure proved virtually impossible to implement in the 
face of widespread popular support for the continuation of government subsidies, particularly for 
public utilities and staples.”241 Governments turned to privatizing state services, with the intention 
that sales of (for example) telecommunications monopolies would bring temporary infusions to state 
budgets while allowing citizens to purchase assets that might eventually provide them with a 
replacement financial return.  When these intentions went unrealized, Lawson suggests that the lesson 
gleaned by regimes was not that benefits are fungible, but that they are rigid. He documents the 
response to a short-lived rise in oil prices in the early 1990s that coincided with an increasing wave of 
Islamist and sectarian citizen political expression. Given that “the potential for popular disorder was 
rising throughout the region,” Lawson shows regimes doubling down on their distributive 
237 Foley 2010, 85, writes that, even with oil prices and government revenues collapsing during the oil bust, “it 
became clear that their populations were unwilling to countenance any reductions in welfare spending” and 
governments had to maintain spending and subsidies even if they were going into debt. 
238 Schwarz 2008, 610 
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240 Bueno De Mesquita et al. 2003, 38, argue that the rentier bargain does not hinge on equality of distribution or 
even equivalent satisfaction among citizens. As long as the “winning coalition” of essential regime supporters 
remains satisfied and materially preponderant, one can expect regime survival.  
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commitments. The Saudis reduced gasoline and electricity prices in 1992 (and again in 2006242), 
while Bahrain in 1992 imposed substantial cuts in prices of electricity and water.243 Numerous 
scholars have documented similar increases in spending and benefits in reaction to the Arab Spring. 
However a significant exception bears noting: none of the Gulf monarchies reacted to the pan-Arab 
crisis by providing new or increased subsidies on energy, despite such actions constituting a staple of 
previous mollification efforts. 
Neither Schwarz nor Lawson argue that benefits can be retracted and replaced, per se; but they do 
document regime tinkering with allocations and income sources. To date, Iran is the only country 
which has directly compensated citizens for raised energy prices with cash transfers. This 
development is discussed at length in Chapter 6. Residents of Alaska also receive a yearly cash 
transfer generated from returns earned by an energy fund, but these are not linked to the absence or 
retraction of subsidies. In Chapter 5, I document Dubai’s subsidy reform, which was implemented 
without an explicit replacement benefit. Although it triggered citizen protest and a modicum of regime 
backtracking, the fact that a reduced level of benefit remains in force in Dubai suggests that some 
regimes have more room for maneuver than that portrayed within the rentier literature. Iran’s reform 
has been subject to a number of studies (outside the rentier literature) and scholars have advocated 
similar actions elsewhere, including in the Gulf monarchies. These prescriptive works typically urge 
states to recast rents or in-kind subsidies as more efficient cash benefits described as a “resource 
dividend” or “citizens income.”  
Segal, along with Tabatabai, encourages cash transfers on grounds of poverty eradication and 
economic efficiency.244 The efficiency of distributing cash rather than providing in-kind benefits has 
long been advocated by economists.245 Tabatabai argues that cash payments constituted a necessary 
part of Iran’s reform because citizens view energy subsidies as entitlements. Thus “the metamorphosis 
from price subsidies to cash subsidies is seen as merely a change of form in that entitlement.” In this 
sense Iran’s exchange of in-kind to cash “faced no psychological hurdle” among Iranians.246 An IMF 
report concurs, concluding that Iran’s recasting of in-kind benefits as cash enjoyed broad public 
support, at least initially.247  
Although the Iranian experience is undeniably useful, a different context prevails in the monarchies 
across the Gulf. Fiscal balances and external pressures (including via international embargo) exert 
242 See: Saudi Press Agency “Al-Naimi Hails King’s Order To Slash Prices of Petrol and Diesel” (May 1, 2006): 
http://www.spa.gov.sa/English/details.php?id=357585 
243 F. H. Lawson 2005 
244 Segal 2011a; Tabatabai 2011 
245 For example, see Thurow 1974 
246 Tabatabai 2011; Segal 2011a 
247 Guillaume, Zytek, and Farzin 2011 
75 
 
 
                                                     
lower levels of reform urgency than those which faced Iran at the end of 2010, and the political 
dynamics that enabled the reform – a populist Iranian president playing to his political base – appear 
improbable. Even so, Hertog has also advocated replacing subsidies on energy and other forms of rent 
allocation in the Gulf monarchies with direct cash distribution, which, he argues, would allow regimes 
to reform entitlements that otherwise damage long-term economic development. In doing so, he 
underscores the political necessity of maintaining distribution as “a political fact” in which “abolition 
is not an option.” This was proven by experience in the oil bust of the 1990s when “public 
employment and cheap public services were the very last budget items that regimes dared to touch.” 
Hertog is more circumspect about the actual possibility of imposing such dramatic reform in the GCC. 
“Even if ideal solutions might never be implemented in practice, it is important to develop them as a 
theoretical benchmark, if only to deepen our understanding of the fiscal sociology of GCC rentier 
states.”248 
While there may be strong economic reasons to convert in-kind distribution to cash, Wintrobe 
suggests that ruling elites harbor equally compelling reasons to preserve distribution on an in-kind 
basis. He argues that delivering benefits in cash introduces a level of transparency that is undesirable 
in the autocratic context, since “the desire to obfuscate the true level of redistribution is one reason 
why redistribution often takes place in kind and not in money.”249 Resource revenues have long been 
described as “stealable” and easily kept secret.250 In-kind distribution allows regimes to maintain 
control over the type of services delivered, as well as preserve a more directly dependent patrimonial 
relationship with their citizens.251 Indeed, Segal’s argument in favor of distributing cash resource 
dividends could easily be understood by ruling families as an excellent reason not to do it: “[A] 
resource dividend is the easiest form of expenditure to make transparent: Once the media and 
population know the total quantity of resource revenues and the size of the population, they know how 
much each individual should receive. It is very easy for citizens to know if they are receiving their 
due, and such transparency is likely to reduce ‘leakage’ or theft of revenues before they reach their 
intended recipients.”252  
Additionally, state jobs and subsidies serve as constant patrimonial reminders that link people more 
closely to the state than does the distribution of cash, which confers more independence in decision-
making and, at the same time, generates a greater public interest in government decisions that could 
affect the flow of resource dividends. In short, cash conversion would reduce governing autonomy. As 
Berman has shown in Alaska, the onset of the Alaska Permanent Fund did just that, converting 
248 Hertog 2012 
249 Wintrobe 2007; Ross 2012, 69-71, makes a similar point against transparency in the authoritarian context. 
250 Michaels 2010 
251 Wintrobe 2007, 98 
252 Segal 2011b, 19 
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Alaskans into stakeholders in the state’s energy policy and inculcating in them a desire to scrutinize 
public spending, at times successfully challenging it. Since the onset of the Permanent Fund, writes 
Berman, “a bad proposal is likely to wither under public scrutiny.”253 Thus, although benefit 
substitution is addressed in literature, treatments mainly occur outside rentier works that cover the 
Gulf monarchies. Hertog’s article is the main exception. Even his work includes a caveat which 
declares that, while it would be nice if benefits were fungible enough to be exchanged for cash, 
actually following through with such a trade is probably impossible. 
2.5.4 Subsidy Reform 
The difficulty of reforming subsidies, and the hostility of beneficiaries to losses of benefits, is well 
known, within and beyond the rentier literature. Recipients can be counted upon to defend subsidies 
when their gains exceed their share of the economic or environmental costs. Society at large, which 
typically bears the cost, is usually less motivated to support political action to remove the subsidy, 
since the cost is likely to be much smaller in per capita terms than the benefit to the recipients.254 
Politicians tend to be reluctant to publicly reveal the economic costs of a subsidy.255 
In the rentier state, subsides are even more difficult to reform. First, the energy subsidies described 
here are not restricted to narrow interests, but delivered to all of society (or at least all citizens), and 
therefore receive widespread backing. Second, they are delivered in exchange for political support for 
the regime, whereas in extractive states, subsidies are typically used to protect industries or vulnerable 
groups. Third, as mentioned, subsidies are understood as political rights. Thus, even though subsidies 
on exportable energy products constitute self-defeating rentierism by eroding the source of the state’s 
rents, they are difficult to do away with.256   
One of the shortcomings of the literature with regard to subsidies is the lack of differentiation among 
them and indeed among the entire stream of state benefits – i.e. “rents” – that is exchanged for loyalty. 
As this dissertation will show, major differences exist among social benefit types, and the importance 
of reforms of some outweigh that of others. Even though the literature does not address withdrawal or 
exchange of benefits in a comprehensive fashion, these sorts of reforms may indeed be possible. As 
Chapter 6 will show, the perceived difficulty in reforming subsidies is less marked among citizens and 
more so among elites and experts. Perhaps, as outlined above, subsidies cannot be eliminated or recast 
253 Berman 2005 
254 This analysis is typical of producer subsidies, which tend to benefit to individual industries or sectors, and 
which involve a smaller number of beneficiaries than do consumer subsidies. The discrepancy in difficulty of 
reform is demonstrated by Saudi Arabia’s success in its recent abolition of producer subsidies for wheat 
farming. While farm subsidies were retracted, those on consumer products, including on food products, were 
not.   
255 United Nations Environment Program 2008, 25 
256 Again, the rentier literature’s prohibitions notwithstanding, and as mentioned, prices on gasoline and diesel 
fuel have been reduced in Qatar, Oman and the UAE, as have those on electricity and water in Dubai.  
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as cash, not because citizens prefer reduced electricity and water bills, but because the state wants the 
broad, regular political benefits that are less pronounced through other rent disbursement methods. In 
this case, the state is more constrained in reformulating benefits than are citizens in accepting cuts or 
substitutions. The propensity for refashioning social contract benefits is also likely to be 
heterogeneous, even among the Gulf monarchies. First, there are varying levels of urgency: Qatar’s 
domestic resource consumption remains insignificant as a fraction of exports, while Omani demand 
has already begun to displace exports. Second, there are differing political barriers to reform. For 
example, Kuwait’s parliament is empowered to block the sort of reform proposals that have been 
imposed by emiri decree in Dubai. Ultimately, subsidy reform is closely related to – and dependent 
upon – an understanding of the social contract, which rentier theory conceives as the central reference 
point for state-society relations.  
2.6 Theories of Social Contract, Retrenchment and Political Violence 
The concept of the social contract has been invoked to explain a range of state-society interactions, 
among them the rise of postwar welfare states and social entitlements in the advanced industrial 
economies, as well as the resulting path-dependence that complicates reform.257 Social contracts have 
been cited to illustrate divergences between European and American social values258 and the 
difficulties of restructuring in democratic transition countries.259 In autocracies, the social contract 
becomes an “authoritarian bargain” that features strong state control and an exchange of guaranteed 
employment and public services for strict limits on political participation.260 Cook describes the 
results of the abrogation of that authoritarian bargain in her study of the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
discussed below.261 Mick Moore and Karl argue that “resource curse” states can improve governance 
and maximize benefits from resource depletion by establishing a “fiscal social contract” that uses 
taxation to increase state accountability.262 Finally, in the Middle East, where centralized states act as 
chief providers of public welfare, distributive social contracts have been invoked to explain the 
longevity of autocracies263 as well as society’s unsustainable expectations for entitlements.264 Several 
scholars, among them Yousef and Heydemann, have called for reforms of “unsustainable” Middle 
East social contracts.265 Several of these studies offer insights for the Gulf experience. 
257 Pierson 1996; Esping-Andersen 1999  
258 Benabou 2000 
259 Karl 1990; Haggard and Webb 1993; Sisk 1995 
260 Desai, Olofsgard, and Yousef 2009 
261 Cook 1992 
262 M. Moore 2004; Karl 2007  
263 Anderson 1986; Beblawi and Luciani 1987; Ross 2001 
264 Coates Ulrichsen 2011; Forstenlechner and Rutledge 2010; Vandewalle 1998, 169; Yousef 2004a 
265 Yousef 2004a; Heydemann 2003a; Heydemann 2003b 
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2.6.1 Retrenchment in Welfare States 
Literature on democratic welfare states which describes the risks of “retrenchment,” or retracting 
benefits, offers some relevance to the experience in autocracies. Government largesse inevitably 
creates groups of beneficiaries who can then rise up and threaten political leadership when their 
interests are jeopardized. Pierson argues that welfare societies thus maintain a constant potential for 
mobilization that raises their stakes of reform.266 Centralized state power structures offer little help. 
Concentration of authority may facilitate benefit cutbacks by reducing the number of veto wielders, 
but it also concentrates accountability, which impedes reform. Political regimes that cut benefits are 
thus exposed to the full force of public reaction, and can only pursue these policies during periods 
when they feel they can absorb the political consequences, or when they are sheltered from blame. 
This is best done under conditions of budgetary crisis or during reforms mandated by an external body 
such as the IMF or WTO.267 (However, scholars such as Tsebelis and Chang argue that systems with 
fragmented power and multiple veto players – such as Switzerland or the United States – find it more 
difficult to pursue benefit cuts than systems with more streamlined powers, such as those with 
Westminster-style parliaments.268) 
Benabou traces long-lasting alterations in social contracts to sectoral shocks such as increases in 
immigration, or shifts in demand, technology and voting rights. In more egalitarian settings, these 
shifts tend to bring redistributive rebalancing through expansion of welfare states. In others, especially 
those exhibiting higher levels of inequality, they trigger the dismantling of benefits. In comparison 
with America, more homogeneous societies like those in Europe are more likely to maintain popular 
consensus on social insurance benefits.269 In the Gulf, the distributive consensus is maintained 
because benefits are reserved for citizens, a status essentially unavailable to immigrants.  
Retrenchment is regarded as inherently unpopular and difficult to pursue, because it pits reformers 
against path-dependent institutions. Pierson shows how the Thatcher and Reagan governments, 
elected with mandates to dismantle welfare states, failed to implement the sweeping reforms promised 
or even weaken political foundations. Digging into this, Pierson and other scholars found 
retrenchment unpopular among voters as well as vulnerable to mobilization of interest groups created 
by expanded benefits, such as pensioners’ lobbies. Deep entrenchment among welfare institutions 
restricts changes to incremental adjustments that take place only within structural frameworks. When 
politicians and voters enter the mix, retrenchment becomes feasible only by stealth: politicians avoid 
radical or visible cuts and concentrate on blame avoidance. Pessimism about reform opportunities has 
266 Pierson 1996 
267 Pierson 1996; Arnold 1992; Patashnik 2003 
268 Tsebelis and Chang 2004 
269 Benabou 2000  
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led to a “resilience thesis” among welfare state scholars.270 On the other hand, Tanzi and other 
scholars argue that retrenchment is an inevitable feature of globalization, that as countries integrate 
economically, competition among states will force cutbacks in social protection, especially when 
funded by taxes. These trends can lead to a sense of “permanent austerity” within the welfare state.271 
2.6.2 Social Contracts in the Rentier State 
Most literature on the Middle Eastern social contract is bound up with rentier theory. Even so, a few 
points bear mentioning. Social contracts in the Middle East are freighted with more institutional 
magnitude than those in the advanced industrial democracies, which tend to mediate between 
organized labor and the state. (Table 2.1) Yousef describes how they encompass the shared 
expectations and guidelines for organizing the polity; even defining “the boundaries of acceptable 
policy choice.”272 The state supervises society, promising prosperity and social and economic 
freedoms, in exchange for unfettered control of politics. Public dissent tends toward demands that 
rulers adhere to traditional obligations of economic equity and transparency. When they acquiesce, 
ruling families attempt to present improvements as gifts of the regime, rather than rights of the 
people.273 
The outcomes of these bargains on economies and societies have been substantial, both positive and 
negative. On the one hand, distributive compacts guided the creation of transformative institutions in 
education and health care, alongside sharp increases in economic growth (which stagnated in the 
1980s and 1990s).274 On the other hand, remarkable advances have been accompanied by the 
accumulation of huge fiscal obligations in the form of state employment and public expectations of 
perpetual state largesse. Heydemann argues that Middle East social contracts remain formidable 
barriers to reform, despite their “negative effects on employment, productivity, foreign investment, 
trade, and macroeconomic performance.”275 
Table 2.1: Features of Middle East Social Contracts Prior to 1973 
• A preference for redistribution and equity in economic and social policy 
• A preference for states over markets in managing national economies 
• Adoption of import-substitution industrialization and protection of local markets 
• An encompassing vision of the role of the state in the provision of welfare and social services 
• A vision of the political arena as an expression of the organic unity of the nation, rather than 
270 Starke 2006 
271 Tanzi 2002. Also see: Pierson 2001 
272 Yousef 2004b 
273 Peterson 2012 
274 Heydemann 2003b 
275 Heydemann 2003a 
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as a site of political contest or the aggregation of conflicting preferences 
Source: Heydemann 2003. 
Rentier subsidy dilemmas are ominously echoed in the Gorbachev-era Soviet reforms, which sought 
to dismantle the economically crippling Brezhnev social contract. As Cook explains, Brezhnev’s 
bargain obligated the government to provide full employment, while offering extensive social services 
and subsidized essentials, including energy. In return, Soviet workers remained politically quiescent. 
In the same manner that rentier social contracts are tied to hydrocarbon export revenues, the Soviet 
compact required a command economy to deliver workers’ benefits. Gorbachev’s efforts to expand 
personal freedoms were part of a renewed social contract that sought to exchange reduced benefits for 
greater liberty. But reduction in benefits and greater opportunity for protest mobilized the once-
quiescent Soviet worker and ultimately brought down Gorbachev and the Soviet Union.276 
Social contracts in the Gulf monarchies have cemented a similar distributionist bargain in place, terms 
of which impose a comparable dilemma upon domestic policymaking. Heydemann and others 
characterize reluctance to reform as an incumbent’s rational response to circumstances in which costs 
of reform are immediate, while benefits are delayed and uncertain. Regimes pondering changes to 
state benefits – including those on energy – face the daunting prospect of unbalancing the social 
contract. 
2.6.3 Relative Deprivation 
One final strand in the literature bears review, since it presents yet another perspective on subsidy 
reform. Theories of political violence, especially those dealing with the social-psychological concept 
of “relative deprivation,” offer another avenue for consideration of reforms of social contracts and 
welfare benefits. Gurr in his path-breaking 1970 work, defined relative deprivation as a “perceived 
discrepancy between men’s value expectations and their value capabilities, i.e. a discrepancy between 
the goods and conditions of life they believe are their due and the goods and conditions they think 
they can in fact get and keep.” The idea is that individuals’ perceptions of deprivation and their level 
of discontent are driven by their expectations, which often defy an objective observer’s assessment of 
poverty or want.277 Gurr’s hypotheses offer an alternate model, based upon regime survival concerns, 
that explains government retention of economically counterproductive social benefits, as well as the 
resilience of related tenets of rentier theory that prohibit the retraction of subsidies.  
Revolutions and insurgencies are typically preceded by popular discontent over absolute or relative 
declines in economic conditions, the breakdown of established patterns of community organization 
and belief, and the demonstrated incapacity of governments either to maintain social order or to take 
276 Cook 1992 
277 Gurr 1970, 24-5, 319. 
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remedial action.278 Gurr argues that a key predictor of political violence is a progressive and palpable 
decline in living standards and economic conditions, rather than the “aspirational” unsatisfied 
expectations for values never obtained.  
In this sense, Gulf ruling elites should be expected to place greatest emphasis on maintaining 
economic wellbeing, because the loss of benefits produces dangerous “decremental and progressive 
patterns of deprivation” which render dissatisfied social groups especially susceptible to recruiting by 
anti-government forces. Conversely, the withholding of democratic participation is less threatening in 
the Gulf context because, while the level of relative deprivation may be measured by comparison with 
societies elsewhere, the unsatisfied expectations are aspirational and therefore less intense. Gulf 
societies with the exception of Kuwait, and to a lesser extent Bahrain, never attained significant levels 
of formalized political participation, so unmet democratic aspirations produce milder discontent. 
Either way, the more effective regimes are in response to relative deprivation, the greater is regime 
legitimacy and the less the potential for political violence. 
Gurr offers a strategy for incumbent regimes to minimize the potential for collective violence. First on 
his advice list is to maintain the status quo in distribution of social, economic and political goods. In 
the event that reform in any of these areas is pursued, government must take pains to show that “no 
group, at least no discontented group, should gain less rapidly than others.” Also helpful in preserving 
stability are symbolic reinforcements in legitimacy, along with censorship and the provision of 
diversionary means for expressing hostility.  
These strategies look familiar to observers of Gulf politics and regime behavior, especially through 
the oil bust years in the 1980s and 1990s, and including the present day tactics of maintaining energy 
benefits in the face of warnings over reduced exports. Regimes have single-mindedly maintained 
welfare benefits and subsidies, while allowing discontent to be channeled toward Islamism and 
solidarity with pan-Arab political grievances. Where unrest has broken out, such as in Bahrain and 
Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province, it would appear that regimes did not follow Gurr’s principle about 
ensuring no discontented group gained less than others. Otherwise, when world price movements 
reduced economic wherewithal, regimes have proven resourceful in preserving economic goods such 
as subsidized energy, social goods such as health care, land, housing and food subsidies, and either 
maintained the status quo on political goods or provided incremental openings that did not curtail 
ruling family control. As Schwarz detailed, these strategies helped the Gulf regimes maintain order 
without resorting to major increases in coercion or political concession.  
278 Gurr 1970, 338-40; also Davies 1962; Chaplin 1968 
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2.7 Discussion and Conclusions 
The aggregated literature on rentier states, social contracts, retrenchment and political violence makes 
a strong case for the political hazards of subsidy reform, including energy subsidies in the Gulf 
monarchies. Among the barriers cited: 
• Rentier theory portrays these subsidies as unreformable citizens’ rights obtained in exchange 
for political acquiescence and loyalty toward unelected regimes. 
• Subsidy reform is made difficult by the creation of beneficiary groups which fight to preserve 
privileges which may be economically damaging for the broader economy.  The difficulties 
may be more pronounced in centralized states where leaders are unshielded from blame. 
• Gulf regimes are growing less autonomous and more responsive to citizen needs and 
complaints, in part to reduce opportunities for popular mobilization. 
• Public choice literature portrays in-kind benefits offering greater opportunity for creating 
citizen dependence on the state than those delivered in cash. 
• Relative deprivation theory holds that loss of economic benefits is strongly associated with 
popular opposition to the regime and a common trigger for political violence. 
• History is replete with examples of undesirable public reaction to previous subsidy rollbacks 
in the Middle East and other oil exporting countries. 
On the other side of the ledger are more economics-based rationales in favor of ending subsidies as 
well as small signs that subsidies may be more conducive to reform than the literature posits.  
• Literature on resource depletion argues that government intervention is required to combat 
wasteful tendencies inherent in energy production and consumption. Rationalized prices 
constitute one approach. 
• Rising domestic consumption is incompatible with long-term maintenance of exports. 
• Failure to convert production of depletable resources into fixed capital assets may constitute 
simple “disposal” of those resources. 
• Recasting in-kind benefits as cash engenders greater efficiency in resource consumption and 
fairer, more progressive delivery of benefits to vulnerable groups. Iran’s experience 
(discussed in Chapter 6) offers a model for substituting welfare benefits. 
• Rentier states have demonstrated their willingness to reduce subsidies on goods delivered to 
less politically important groups. 
• Regional elites are beginning to declare reforms to be necessary. 
Giving empirical strength to these economic imperatives, I discuss in Chapter 5, Dubai’s 2011 
reduction of subsidies on electricity and water delivered to its most politically important group, UAE 
nationals in their homes. These controversial reforms triggered a backlash and saw the regime make 
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partial concessions, but the overall thrust of the measure remains in effect. The regime offered no 
substitute benefit as compensation, and the raised prices were, by and large, accepted by the 
population. 
Despite these economic imperatives, the preponderance of literature weighs against reforms that are 
being portrayed in the Gulf monarchies as increasingly necessary and urgent. Oman’s minister of oil 
and gas, Mohammed bin Hamad al-Rumhy, made an unusually strong public plea for reform in 
November 2013. “We are wasting too much energy in the region and the barrels that we are 
consuming are becoming a threat now, for our region particularly... I think we have a serious 
problem," al-Rumhy said. "What is really destroying us right now is subsidies. We simply need to 
raise the price of petrol and electricity. In some countries in our region electricity is free and you leave 
your air conditioning for the whole summer when you go on holiday. That is really a crime. Our cars 
are getting bigger, our consumption is getting bigger and the price is almost free. So you need to send 
a signal to the pockets of the public." These sorts of reform statements appear to be preparing the 
ground for a stress test of theoretical pronouncements reviewed above, although it should be made 
clear that al-Rumhy’s reform “imperative” is more urgent for some countries, Oman among them, 
than others, especially Qatar.  
One final factor that weighs on this debate is the character of monarchies. These features are likely to 
affect states’ propensity for reform, and they can present useful variables in cross-country 
comparisons on reforms and social contracts. Where rentier theory tends to view these states as an 
aggregate with rules that apply uniformly, the literature on state formation and monarchy tends to 
stress their heterogeneity and differing levels of policymaking flexibility. This literature, along with 
historical case studies on individual states, reveals the complexity of regime-society relationships, 
including the use (or invention) of traditional cultural factors to build national feeling. Divergences 
that date back to state formation processes offer signals as to why, for example, Dubai can raise prices 
on citizens while Kuwait cannot.279   
Anderson writes that monarchy allows the Middle Eastern regimes “unusual suppleness” that has 
complemented the formation of these states.280 This runs counter to modernization hypotheses in the 
1950s and 1960s that predicted the collapse of the world’s remaining monarchies, because their 
“brittleness” left them ill-prepared to adapt to a globalizing world.281 After four decades of defying 
scholars who predicted their demise, Middle Eastern monarchs appear “far better adapted than we 
have suspected to the complex cosmopolitan world in which diverse communities interact through 
279 Herb 2005 
280 Anderson 2000 
281 Lerner 1958; Deutsch 1961 
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international finance and trade, labor migration and global communications.”282 Monarchy allows 
regimes to wield inequality and social diversity, in contrast to republics and other state types that 
promote “formal interchangeability” among subjects. Acceptance of inequality allows policy 
flexibility. In energy policy, this is manifested in the dual-tariff system for citizens of the UAE and 
Qatar, who enjoy deeper subsidies than non-citizens and relief from the largest rate hikes.283 
Byman and Green argue that the “baffling” staying power of the Gulf monarchies owes itself to six 
strategies: (1) strong state security services, (2) co-opting of dissidents, (3) tactics of divide-and-rule, 
(4) ideological flexibility, (5) pseudo-participative institutions, and (6) accommodative diplomacy. 
Perhaps because they wrote their article under the shadow of the long oil bust, Byman and Green do 
not explicitly cite rent distribution as a strategy, but rather use it as a methodology within other 
strategies.284 
Monarchies also appear to benefit from a sense of fraternity that is not present among republics. Gulf 
monarchies banded together to prevent the toppling of the Bahraini King Hamad during the 2011 
uprising, sending troops and $10 billion in emergency aid to Bahrain and Oman. Further, amid the 
Arab Spring uprising, the Gulf Cooperation Council discussed extending membership invitations to 
the two remaining monarchies in the region, Jordan and Morocco.  
Many scholars have noted that the Arab Spring tended to afflict Arab republics – Tunisia, Egypt, 
Libya, Yemen and Syria – while largely bypassing its monarchies. Yom discounts monarchical 
exceptionalism in one work, arguing that monarchies survived the Arab Spring because of strong 
allies and oil rents. However, in a 2013 conference presentation Yom attributed some monarchical 
durability to closed-doors fraternization and information sharing among Middle East ruling families, 
which, he argued, led all eight monarchies to “refrain from large-scale violent repression throughout 
the Arab Spring.” Yom argues that monarchical families form an epistemic community through the 
GCC and other fraternizing, including through intermarriage, and which shares information about the 
futility of mass repression and preferences for non-repressive policy.285  
Perhaps less speculative are the numerous interlocking factors for monarchical stability compiled by 
Nonneman, starting with the basic-level legitimacy of the state and its ruling family, and the 
traditional sources of legitimacy which continue to be emphasized and enhanced by regimes. Further 
stability factors include the small size of Gulf polities (outside Saudi Arabia) and consequent 
proliferation of personal and kinship ties which cut across ideological and economic lines. Cultural 
282 Anderson 2000, 66 
283 Dual tariffs for citizens and non-citizens have emerged in the UAE and Qatar, and are under consideration in 
Bahrain. 
284 Byman and Green 2002 
285 Yom 2013; Regarding Bahrain’s violent response, Yom argues that it was less repressive than commonly 
thought. 
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attributes, such as society’s enduring deference to ruling families, have been suggested as factors 
restraining the organization of opposition movements, as have societal preferences for communal 
cohesion and stability over individual rights, all of which are in evidence in the Gulf.286 Externally, 
the diffusion or contagion effects that aided the spread of the Arab Spring elsewhere may have 
undermined its appeal in the Gulf, given that the “contagion” was cast in sectarian hues in Bahrain 
and Saudi Arabia.287 Other relevant counterrevolutionary influences include the high per capita wealth 
in these societies, which tends to enable political consensus and reduce the intensity of political 
competition, and the “segmented” nature of clientelism, which creates dependent links between 
segments of society and patrons in the regime.288  
However, despite the existence of scholarly attempts to get beyond rent, it remains difficult to dispute 
the notion that external rent influences political systems. There is little disagreement that oil rents 
remain a crucial ingredient in the survival of Gulf monarchy and of its relations with citizens. Even 
among scholars who emphasize other pathways to legitimacy and longevity – whether in terms of 
cultural narrative building, dynastic institution-building, international relations or political skill – 
there are none that this author knows of who argue against a role for resource rents.  
Recent iterations of rentier theory have seen it expanded to explain effects on politics in democracies, 
including democratic deficits in sub-national regions in Argentina289 the general sustenance of 
democratic regimes,290 distributive behavior of elected officials,291 and the onset of a new form of 
rentier populism in South America.292 Rentier effects are used to explain regime stability in 
Azerbaijan,293 harmful effects of aid in Afghanistan294 (added to a long list of aid rentiers such as 
Jordan, Egypt and others), the unlikely success of rentier state-owned business,295 military spending 
and conflict,296 even the consideration of rentier effects from water resources.297 The politics of 
natural resources and globalization merited a recent journal special issue.298 
286 Nonneman 2006, 14–23 
287 During the Arab Spring, contagion or diffusion effects in the Gulf were arguably evident in simultaneous 
unrest among Shia populations in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, for example, and, potentially, in the expressions of 
support and overall backing of Sunni populations for regimes. 
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The continuity of the core rentier bargain is a key factor concerning this dissertation. None of the Gulf 
monarchies have cultivated meaningful increases in pluralism nor imposed major alterations to their 
allocative nature described by Beblawi and Luciani in 1987. A significant share of political 
acquiescence is still purchased through patronage, despite the changing character and deepening 
complexity that Gray, Hertog, Mitchell and others describe. In practice, patronage includes in-kind 
distribution of energy. Energy distribution practices initiated in the wake of the 1973 oil price spike 
have been retained in nearly identical form today, despite major changes in the character of energy 
demand in these states, including growth in population, wealth, and the cost of supply. Rentier theory 
has proven startlingly accurate in predicting the retention of those benefits for four decades, despite 
large fluctuations in oil prices that taxed the ability of states to maintain fiscal components of the 
rentier bargain.  
2.7.1 Theoretical Revisions 
The pace of change in the rentier Gulf has been remarkable. In the 1930s, when Saudi rents flowed 
largely from Hajj fees, Ibn Saud was reputed to be able to carry his entire national treasury in the 
saddlebags of his camel.299 In 1970s Oman, oil rent that comprised most of the government’s treasury 
flowed directly into Sultan Qaboos bin Said’s personal bank account. At the time, Sultan Qaboos 
refused to establish a state budget on grounds of excessive transparency. He told an interviewer, 
“Why should I do it? It is only a technical issue about which almost all our subjects know nothing. 
We take decisions in the country’s interest. It is better if they are not questioned by ignorant 
people.”300 At the time of writing, of course, Gulf rents flowed not just into national treasuries but 
also into large and complex investment authorities, from where they are deployed worldwide in search 
of financial returns and political influence.  
Rentier theory has kept pace with these states through similar transformation. In the late 1980s, 
Luciani declared that the unsophisticated rentier state need not “formulate anything deserving the 
appellation of economic policy; all it needs is an expenditure policy.”301 As Luciani’s subsequent 
works document,302 current economic policy in the rentier Gulf is as complex, and, some argue, 
competent,303 as that in more conventional economies, with bureaucracies overseeing fiscal and 
monetary policies (albeit with fixed exchange rates), state-capitalist investment policies, trade 
policies, labor market strategies and regulating diverse and competitive private sectors. Scholars now 
299 Yergin 1991, 284 
300 Valeri 2009, 92. Note that in Oman, Sultan Qaboos’ lack of male heirs and small family size has forced him 
rely more heavily on backing of traditional merchants, which continue to play a political role in government 
while also enjoying economic endowments aimed to cultivate their loyalty. See Valeri 2009, 225 
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text-analyze economic development plans for clues to future growth trajectories,304 delve into the 
intricacies of the rentier private sector,305 or the complex layers and silos among its bureaucracies.306  
Despite these adaptations, rentier theory still falls short in important ways. This dissertation argues 
that rentier theory does not sufficiently or accurately portray the repercussions of allocation, 
especially of in-kind resources. By defining extraction to include subsidy removal, and by essentially 
“banning” necessary forms of extraction, rentier theory entraps itself in a self-defeating paradox. It 
safeguards the erosion of its rent source without allowing for reform. 
This dissertation contributes to the current debate by highlighting rentier theory’s major omission: the 
repercussions of inflexible allocation policies which undermine rent flows. By offering a revised 
perspective within this academic conversation, this dissertation sets the foundation for a more 
predictive model of rentier state behavior in the modern world. 
The literature requires updating to accommodate a new reality, that of the growing domestic burden of 
resource demand that is beginning to interfere with the core rentier structure. Rising domestic 
consumption and steady exports are incompatible. The limiting factor on resource draws is not 
reserves, but production; and production levels have reached or are nearing plateaus. Unless states 
succeed in sufficiently diversifying their economies to replace decreases in export rent, rentier 
practices will reduce the flow of rents. The self-defeating nature of rentierism’s resource distribution 
structures needs to be acknowledged in the literature, and theoretical allowances made for their 
reform. As will be discussed in Chapter 5, the urgency of reform and the political capacity for 
carrying it out is not uniform across these monarchies, which tend to be depicted with undue 
homogeneity. Qatar, Kuwait and Dubai offer utterly heterogeneous cases. 
This dissertation makes several arguments that conflict with the preponderance of rentier scholarship 
on subsidies, suggesting that established views require revising to regain relevance amid evolving 
circumstances in the Gulf. I propose new scholarship that retains the core rentier thesis on the 
importance of externally generated rents, while strengthening its explanatory power by altering the 
portrayal of subsidies from “rights” or “entitlements” to “customary privileges.” This altered portrayal 
provides theoretical allowance for the retraction of social contract benefits which are traded for 
regime support.  
I leave it to future scholars to determine whether regimes will need to extend a new subsidy or 
resource grant to replace those that may be reformed, and to offer policy suggestions for developing 
alternative sources of legitimacy. Case studies of Dubai in Chapter 5 and Iran in Chapter 6 provide 
304 Hvidt 2012; Hvidt 2013 
305 Hertog 2013 
306 Hertog 2011 
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examples of two approaches to potential losses in regime support. In Dubai, where the regime faced 
substantial citizen opposition to the raising of electricity and water prices, some aspects of the price 
increases were relaxed. However, no quid pro quo benefit exchange was provided. In Iran, 
policymakers recast energy subsidies as cash benefits in a manner acceptable to the majority of the 
public. These approaches suggest that regimes interact with their societies according to the distinct 
terms of their social contracts and amid complex and divergent political contexts. A subsidy reform 
such as that in Dubai may not be possible in the political context of Kuwait, for example.  
My amended portrayal of subsidies as “customary privileges” provides a path for theory to 
incorporate the reforms that have begun in Dubai and that other regimes appear likely to initiate. The 
three substantive research chapters that follow (after an examination of methodology used) examine 
these questions of political economy in detail, findings of which are synthesized in the dissertation’s 
concluding chapter. In the conclusion, and throughout this dissertation, I make the case that energy, as 
a physical commodity, should be accorded a more prominent role in the formation of states, 
institutions and the built environment in these monarchies. I argue that theoretical assertions which 
declare that political stability is derived from subsidies on energy should be reversed. Energy 
subsidies, in the longer run, appear more likely to correlate with instability than with stability. This 
revised framework of rentier dynamics will help strengthen our understanding of modern rentier state 
behavior, and it will provide avenues for re-orienting rentier scholarship in preparation for the future. 
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
 
To recapitulate, the purpose of this research in political economy is to revise unquestioned theoretical 
assumptions on the distributive practices of Gulf monarchies, by using interviews, expert elicitations, 
public survey, and case studies. The thesis’ central claim is threefold. First, it argues that increases in 
the scale of domestic distribution of natural resources has begun to undermine long-established views 
that citizens in rentier states are entitled to subsidized energy supplied by the state. Second, it argues 
that domestic demand for export commodities is incompatible with overall rentier distribution and 
negatively correlated with long-run political stability. Third, it argues that theory must allow for the 
reform of distributive practices which have been accepted in the literature as citizen entitlements or 
rights. 
In order to support these claims, the research that follows examines Gulf regime responses to rising 
domestic energy consumption, analyzing patronage distribution mechanisms and documenting 
evidence of reform. Where evidence is lacking, I employ the method of expert elicitation to gather the 
views of experts and key stakeholders in predicting which countries are likely to transition to 
unsubsidized energy pricing, and which are unlikely to do so. The enabling environment for reform is 
illuminated through interviews with energy sector elites, as well as through a public survey of citizen 
attitudes. 
3.1 Multiple Method Approach 
This thesis brings together multiple methods that employ coordinated data-gathering tools to compile 
a single coherent work. The practice of combining of methodologies for the study of a single 
phenomenon is sometimes known as triangulation, which borrows from a practice known to improve 
accuracy in navigation by using multiple reference points. Jick, following Denzin, argues that 
“between methods” approaches which mix quantitative and qualitative methods tend to be more 
creative and offer better opportunities for converging validation. Multiple methods can 
counterbalance inherent weaknesses in single method approaches with compensating strengths. Thus 
the power of demonstrating correlations and representativeness of observations through quantitative 
analysis can be balanced with an explanation of the causal mechanisms and context. Jick argues that 
triangulation “heightens qualitative methods to their deserved prominence and, at the same time, 
demonstrates that quantitative methods can and should be utilized in complementary fashion.”307  
My multi-method approach leverages these advantages to illuminate the context behind the numbers, 
which, it is hoped, serves to deepen understanding. Each method was chosen to inform and contribute 
307 Jick 1979; Denzin 1978, 301. Quantitative and qualitative methods are described as complementary in a 
landmark methodological review of case study research; see: Bennett and George 2005, xv. 
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to the others in a way that would create a coherent single work. Thus quantitative data from my public 
survey is counterbalanced by qualitative data from semi-structured interviews and descriptive 
statistics. Expert elicitation data is deployed quantitatively in Chapter 5 and used as a benchmark for 
the public survey in Chapter 6. The questions posed in these methods were often identical or nearly 
so, which allowed for bootstrapping within and across these techniques so that, for example, the 
expert elicitation allowed for proper weighting of interview data, and public survey responses 
provided an alternate view of the same issues as the expert elicitation results. 
Quantitative methods used mostly closed questions and multiple respondents to produce positivist 
data for statistical analysis using econometric methods. The qualitative processes allowed statistical 
results to be set into the political economy context of the Gulf, revealing the accompanying trends and 
related policy, presenting the thought processes of policymakers balancing politics and economics, 
and illuminating intangible but important concepts – such as legitimacy308 – which present strong 
policy motivations but offer few recordable metrics for econometric measurement. 
3.2 Methods: Overview by Chapter 
Chapter 4 uses the method of descriptive statistics to produce an in-depth view of the research puzzle: 
Government policies that encourage energy consumption and the potential effects of that consumption 
on exports and export-oriented political economies. Numerous statistical sources provide data used to 
profile rising consumption of oil, gas, electricity, as well as examine trends in energy intensity, and 
benchmark the energy balances of GCC states against those of other states. References to the 
economics literature allow portrayal of actual policymaking within the context of the theoretical 
optimum. The chapter contains a short analytical component which seeks to quantify the contribution 
of price (in terms of subsidized end-user prices) to energy demand in the GCC. Previous estimates of 
price elasticity of demand are aggregated to create a straightforward decomposition of energy demand 
that attempts to estimate the share attributed to energy subsidies. Descriptive statistics on growth in 
population and wealth are employed to infer the contributions from these alternate sources of demand 
growth. Interview data deepens understanding of this puzzle, by illustrating policymakers’ forecasts 
on energy supply options, costs, and likely policy responses, as well as providing otherwise 
unavailable detail on public response to price increases. 
Chapter 5 disaggregates regime allocation practices to focus on energy distribution, which, I argue, 
amounts to self-defeating rentierism which is incompatible with other modes of rent distribution. It 
uses descriptive statistics and projections based on extending historical trends in the data to portray 
effects on exports of domestic consumption. Acknowledging that future trends rarely continue in 
straight lines based on historical factors, it uses the method of expert elicitation to collect expert 
308 A “mushy” concept best avoided by political analysts, in the words of  Huntington 2012, 46 
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predictions of future policy and changes in trajectory. This method is explained in detail below. The 
chapter also dives deeply into the complex reality of societal extraction in the rentier-autocratic 
context by offering a detailed case study of energy subsidy reform, and shorter case studies of 
policymaking environments around the region. These are bolstered with interview data. By 
triangulating among the results, the chapter is able to muster sufficient supporting evidence for its 
prediction that answers the research question. 
In Chapter 6, I analyze public survey data using multiple regression to examine public perceptions of 
entitlement to energy subsidies and gauge citizen willingness to submit to the loss of those subsidies. 
Those quantitative results are used to accept or reject hypotheses in the typical fashion. However, I 
augment the statistical findings by contrasting them with results from the expert elicitation, which 
asked nearly identical questions to a different group of respondents. The intent is to capture 
perceptions of the state-society social contract from both perspectives – the state’s as well as society’s 
– and contrast any differences. The distinctions are important because of the theoretical centrality of 
the social contract to regime legitimacy in these monarchies, and the centrality of welfare distribution 
– including of exportable energy resources – to the social contract. 
It bears noting that, while a few others309 have employed micro-level studies to test rentier theory, 
none have done so in the manner pursued here: by investigating behavior within the narrow realm of 
energy across the GCC, and by using survey and elicitation data to build a statistical picture that 
reinforces the qualitative findings. Each method is presented in detail below. 
3.3 Interviews 
Through semi-structured face-to-face interviews with around five dozen subjects, I was able to map 
out an understanding of energy issues in these countries and the thinking behind strategies that aim to 
preserve political stability on one hand, and economic rationality on the other. Many of these 
discussions delved into data and sensitive topics that have not been released or discussed in public 
before. I selected interviewees based on their direct involvement in energy sectors and policymaking 
or their understanding of these processes. Interviewees comprise some of the most senior and 
knowledgeable experts in Gulf politics and energy, ranging from academics with understanding of 
rentier theory, to energy sector officials with knowledge of resource constraints. For example, in 
Saudi Arabia, I met with top advisers within the Ministry of Petroleum and Minerals and the Strategic 
Planning team at Saudi Aramco tasked with addressing domestic energy consumption in Saudi 
Arabia, as well as the governor of the kingdom’s national electricity regulator. In Kuwait, I met with 
senior officials at the Ministry of Electricity and Water, and one of the regime’s top advisers on 
national energy policy. In the UAE, I met with numerous senior energy policymaking officials in 
309 For instance, Hertog 2010a on Saudi Arabia; Davidson 2005 on the UAE; J. S. Mitchell 2013 on Qatar.  
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Dubai and Abu Dhabi, including the executive director of Dubai’s Supreme Council of Energy; Abu 
Dhabi’s chief of electricity regulation, as well as the executive director of its Economic and Energy 
Affairs Unit within the Executive Affairs Authority, a key adviser to the ruling family on energy 
policy. In the UAE I was also fortunate enough to be invited to lecture before the entire policymaking 
staff within the Office of the Prime Minister, and was able to conduct numerous interviews and an 
expert elicitation.  In Oman, where I received the support and expert elicitation participation of the 
Minister of Oil and Gas, I interviewed the senior adviser to minister, and the ministry’s director 
general of exploration and production; I also interviewed Oman’s electricity regulator and the head of 
planning and strategy at its national utility. In Qatar, I interviewed policymakers and engineers at the 
Qatar Electricity and Water Authority, the director of the country’s largest power plant, and the 
director of the General Secretariat for Development and Planning who is in charge of national 
strategic planning, including on energy policy.   
Beyond actual policymakers, I interviewed numerous economists and analysts within and beyond 
government, including those at banks and at Moody’s, the ratings agency; at APICORP, an 
investment fund; and the head of commodities research at HSBC in Riyadh and the bank’s chief 
economist for the Middle East. I also interviewed diplomatic sources, former national representatives 
to OPEC, and top executives within international energy companies operating in the region, including 
Total, Shell and GDF Suez. And finally I met with energy journalists who follow policy development 
and academics which research state and societal issues such as those covered here. 
In most cases I digitally recorded these interviews and typed transcripts, to which I referred and cross-
referenced while writing this thesis. None of the interview data in this thesis is used in a stand-alone 
fashion. All interview data are cross-referenced with other interviews or with findings in public 
surveys or the expert elicitation, or in a few cases, used to illustrate hypotheses within the literature. 
Mainly the interview data were used to add context to results from other methodologies, sometimes in 
the form of direct quotes, or to inform the narrative more generally.  
Most of the sessions were conducted in-person during several trips to the region in 2010-12. These 
interviews flowed from a script of prepared questions based around domestic energy demand as well 
as the policies to avert reductions to energy exports, including reforms of subsidies.  
Topics included: 
• Characterization of the pace of growth of energy demand and its effect on the economy 
• Characterization of thinking within the government regarding energy policy 
• Descriptions of key decision makers and their positions on the issue 
• Characterization of key decision makers’ sensitivity to public sentiment 
• Naming actors supporting and opposing subsidy reform, and the most influential among them 
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• Government rationale for subsidizing energy 
• Characterization of subsidies as rights or otherwise 
• Barriers to removing or reducing subsidies 
• Conditions required to enable reduction of energy subsidies; likelihood of reform 
• Discussion of risks to political stability and strategies to avert them  
• Characterization of the hierarchy among customers for energy resources 
• Characterization of depletion of energy resources in terms of preferences for current 
consumption versus saving for the future 
• Characterization of citizen understanding of subsidy levels and willingness to pay more 
• Characterization of applicability of Iranian subsidy reforms to the GCC case 
The list of questions and topics was adjusted for specificity based on the interview subject. For 
instance, the director for electricity planning in Abu Dhabi was asked questions regarding specific 
projections for installed capacity in 2020 and 2030 and the predicted mix and cost of feedstock. Qatari 
energy traders were asked about the percentage of future gas production that would be allotted to 
domestic use, for their LNG break-even price, and how political factors influenced export decisions. 
Those close to ministers were asked more strategic questions about demand management, or the 
ruler’s priorities on energy policy.  
Interviewing is a longstanding and widely accepted scholarly method. Arksey and Knight argue that 
interviews provide strongest validity when combined with other methods, which improves upon work 
that either excludes or relies solely on interviews.310 Interviews allow the researcher to understand 
and describe complexity, including the subject’s perspective, feelings, tacit perceptions and other 
things that cannot be observed directly. The implicit can thus be made explicit.311  
Interviews happen to be particularly useful when they complement self-completed surveys in multi-
method research. Aggregated survey responses allow the researcher to check the interpretation and 
incidence of data flowing from interviews, providing an understanding of how widely views are held 
and understandings shared. Conversely, positivist survey and questionnaire data can highlight issues 
requiring deeper examination through interviews. The addition of post-survey interviews with survey 
subjects (as distinct from interviews with subjects who have not been surveyed) allows the 
exploration of topics in ways that are fundamentally deeper than that available through standardized 
questionnaires. A post-survey interview allows the subject to clarify or add context to survey answers, 
and for understandings to be explored in depth.312  
310 Arksey and Knight 1999, 33–4; Patton 1990; McCracken 1988 
311 Patton 1990, 278; quoted in Arksey and Knight 1999, 32 
312 Arksey and Knight 1999, 32 
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I use both techniques. My interviews took place with subjects who also completed surveys prior to 
their interviews, and with others who did not complete surveys.  Numerous participants in the expert 
elicitation provided interview data as well as written commentary through an option within the survey.  
Qualitative or semi-structured interviews dovetail most readily with other methodologies because they 
allow the interviewer latitude to improvise and maximize the depth and detail of qualitative data 
collected. Interview improvisation includes varying the order and phrasing of questions to fit the flow 
of the interview conversation; asking probing follow-up questions that may not appear on the script; 
allowing an appearance of lapsing into informality or the sense that the interview has gone off-track; 
building trust and rapport by sharing the interviewer’s personal experiences, or sharing knowledge of 
the topic and surrounding literature. McCracken argues that an interviewer’s familiarity with the 
subject provides advantages in interpretation and response which outweigh the detriment of any 
preconceived understanding, allowing the provision of data that the interview subject can deny.313 It 
also bears noting that I am a former journalist with nearly two decades’ experience in interviewing, 
including several years working in the countries under examination here. (Specifics on interviews are 
available in Appendix. Named interview subjects available in Confidential Annex) 
3.4 Expert Elicitation 
Complementing the interview data are results from an extensive survey of experts done using the 
method of expert elicitation (EE), which has provided corroborative data that augments (or in Chapter 
6, contests) results from interviews and other methods. EE emerged from decision theory in the 1950s 
as a methodology for producing policy-relevant judgments on topics where uncertainty creates 
barriers to planning and policymaking. It involves obtaining subjective expert judgments that combine 
facts and opinion into probabilistic assessments of the uncertain set of circumstances under study. 
These judgments are commonly leveraged to supplant missing data and forecast trends when 
important values are unavailable. A 2009 white paper from the US Environmental Protection 
Agency’s Expert Elicitation Task Force offers formal protocols for eliciting experts’ subjective 
judgments for use in policymaking. The EPA protocols, which include procedures for reducing biases 
that affect this methodology, were used to inform the design of this dissertation’s two EE surveys, 
given their close links to policymaking. 
EE methodology offers broad applicability across policymaking and research settings. The EPA 
protocols declare that EE can be used to address any kind of uncertainty, as long as questions and 
problem statements are clearly formulated and the participants are qualified experts whose knowledge 
can provide a credible basis for insights and judgments.314 In this dissertation, EE is used to further 
313 McCracken 1988, 31; Arksey and Knight 1999, 39 
314 US Environmental Protection Agency 2009, 51 
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this dissertation’s objective of determining likelihood of future subsidy reforms among a set of states, 
and to characterize the probable extent of those reforms. 
Besides the EPA, EE is recognized as a powerful and legitimate method for policy purposes by, 
among others, the U.S. National Academy of Sciences, the White House Office of Management and 
Budget, and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The National Academy of Sciences states that 
“the rigorous use of expert elicitation for the analyses of risks is considered to be quality science,” 
while the Nuclear Regulatory Commission recommends use of EE when “empirical data are not 
reasonably obtainable” and when “uncertainties are large and significant.” Elsewhere, EE has been 
used by the European Union to inform policymaking, as well as by organizations such as the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change to quantify risk from potential climate change effects.315  
Among academic researchers, EE is commonly used in settings when forecasting or estimation forms 
part of the research design. Morgan et al. conducted elicitations among ecologists asked to describe 
effects of a doubling of global carbon emissions on forest environments.316 Curtright et al. used EE to 
gain insights into future changes in pricing and efficiency of photovoltaic solar panels.317 Hoffmann 
et al. elicited responses from food safety experts that sought to estimate distributions of illnesses 
within the United States that may have been caused by food-borne pathogens.318 Less formal EE 
surveys have proven robust predictors of forthcoming central bank decisions on interest rates, or 
consensus views on expectations for economic growth.319 In general, EE is appropriate in cases when 
superior information is too costly, unobservable – or as is the case with this dissertation – unavailable 
within the time frame of the research.320 The EE variation used here offers a meso-level approach 
between the formal institutional variety, which require a minimum of $250,000 for paid experts and 
evaluation panels, and the less formal consensus surveys used in financial journalism.321 
Perhaps most importantly, EE presents a complementary and mutually reinforcing method to the other 
methodologies used in this thesis. It provides a structured way to survey a set of experts, which acts as 
a quantitative “robustness check” on qualitative interview data. Using EE allows the researcher to 
greatly expand the number of interviewees while constraining the richness of their responses. This 
process provides a way of gauging the applicability of data gathered from individual interviews. EE 
315 US Environmental Protection Agency 2009, 20 
316 Morgan, Pitelka, and Shevliakova 2001 
317 Curtright, Morgan, and Keith 2008 
318 Hoffmann et al. 2007 
319 Noel 2000 finds that articles by Bloomberg News citing “the median estimate of economists surveyed” tend 
to be unbiased, accurate predictors of future movements in macroeconomic variables. 
320 US Environmental Protection Agency 2009, 6, 23. 
321 The results of this EE may be used as the basis for grant funding application to perform a “formal” EE using 
a panel of paid experts 
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also provides a useful benchmark for comparing expert views with those found within the academic 
literature, and those collected among the public, through survey methodology.   
3.4.1 Alternate Methods to EE 
Expert elicitation’s flexibility, its broad acceptance in policy-oriented research, and its excellent fit 
with this research setting renders it the most appropriate method for quantifying uncertainty 
associated with my research questions. A number of possible alternate methods also exist. One is 
Scenario Analysis, which allows for similar aggregation of expert judgment in building alternative 
scenarios for a range of likely outcomes. Like EE, scenario analysis allows predictions of future 
conditions, typically as a range of possible outcomes, sometimes expressed as “worst-case” to “best-
case” scenarios. However, scenario analysis appears ill-suited for the objective of determining 
likelihood of subsidy reforms among a set of states. Other methodologies for exploring uncertainty 
such as meta-analysis, which combines findings across contrasting studies, and Monte Carlo Analysis 
and Latin Hypercube sampling, associated with addressing variability in uncertainty, are inappropriate 
for this study. These require empirical data or prior studies representative of the value being 
estimated, which makes them unavailable for this research.  
3.4.2 Elicitation Design 
My expert elicitations were designed as structured stakeholder surveys that requested quantitative 
probabilistic judgments from Gulf experts about future energy prices, economic effects, and forecasts 
for reform. I administered the EEs as computer-based questionnaires, gathering individual responses 
from two groups using the Qualtrics survey platform.322 The first EE involved 92 experts who 
provided responses between November 2011 and November 2012. The requirement for such a large 
number of experts stems from the objectives of the elicitation, which sought prognostications on 
policy in six separate countries, and thus required experts to select and comment on one or more 
individual states. A list of participants appears in the Annex. Just over 200 invitations were emailed 
from within the software to experts I identified based on the following criteria: 
• Holders of positions in energy or electricity policymaking, regulation, or related research 
within the governments of the six Gulf monarchies 
• Those with prominent positions in a GCC national oil company or international oil company 
with significant GCC operations, and personal knowledge of operations related to the survey 
• Economic or consulting experts with experience in the energy sector of one or more GCC 
countries 
• Academic, think-tank or NGO experts with published records of scholarly expertise and 
commentary on regional energy policy 
322 Qualtrics is free for use by students at Cambridge University’s Judge Business School: 
http://qualtrics.com/academic-solutions/judge-business-school-at-the-university-of-cambridge/ 
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• Journalists tasked with regular coverage of the Gulf energy sector.    
In March 2012, I conducted a second expert elicitation among 35 members of the policymaking staff 
of UAE Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid al-Maktoum. This survey was similar to the 
GCC-wide EE but contained additional questions tailored to UAE conditions. This EE coincided with 
a research presentation by the author to the policymaking group. Respondents received a request from 
their supervisor to take the survey before my lecture on March 5, 2012. In contrast with the first 
exercise, only a minority of respondents reported having direct involvement in energy policymaking. 
Responses from the second EE were useful in providing a benchmark for evaluating responses from 
the first EE, and where questions differed, the second EE provided additional detail on the UAE. See 
Appendices 3 and 4 for details and participants’ names. Note that confidentiality restrictions prevent 
me from releasing names of participants in the second EE. 
Table 3: Participants in EE survey by job type 
Bank economists and commodity analysts 6 
- other economists  5 
Academic experts 
1
0 
Energy ministers 1 
Electricity market regulators 3 
National electric utility managers 4 
- other government officials 
1
1 
Independent power producer managers 4 
International oil company representatives 4 
National oil company representatives 7 
Consultants 8 
Think-tank analysts 5 
NGO members 3 
Journalists 8 
not stated 
1
3 
Total 
9
2 
 
Table 4: Are you a GCC citizen? 
Response % of 
total 
Number 
of 
response
s 
No 68% 60 
Yes 32% 28 
- of citizens, country of 
citizenship: 
Bahrain 7% 2 
Kuwait 18% 5 
Oman 21% 6 
Qatar 7% 2 
Saudi Arabia 18% 5 
UAE 29% 8 
 
Table 5: Responses by country 
Bahrain 7 5% 
Kuwait 21 15% 
Oman 13 10% 
Qatar 23 17% 
Saudi Arabia 32 24% 
UAE 39 29% 
Total 135 100% 
 
 
The first EE survey began with questions about the respondent’s expertise, citizenship, and the GCC 
country in which he/she held most expertise. After selecting a single country, the respondent was 
offered an opportunity to select one or more remaining countries on which to respond. Twenty-four of 
the 92 respondents chose multiple countries. What followed was 17 questions about energy policy that 
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sought to tease out assessments of state-society relations and citizen “rights,” rationales for energy 
subsidies, assumptions regarding citizen understanding of energy issues, perceptions of economic 
harm posed by domestic energy consumption, and the likelihood of government reforms. The survey 
also asked experts to gauge citizen amenability to tariff hikes, future evolution of state benefits, and 
predictions for 2020 crude oil prices. This dissertation focuses on responses relating to domestic 
consumption of energy and the likelihood of subsidy reform, as well as perceptions of energy as a 
citizen entitlement. The second EE survey closely resembled the first, except that (given the 
respondents’ duties across several policy areas) it asked for respondents to provide their level of 
understanding and involvement in energy policymaking in the UAE. It also requested predictions on 
tariff increases at the emirate level, since the UAE has multiple utilities with differing retail prices.  
3.4.3 Limitations of Expert Elicitation 
EE methods differ to those in traditional opinion surveys in that data obtained is not intended to 
characterize a random or representative sample of a “population,” but rather to reflect the range of 
expert judgment. The experts surveyed may not even represent a random sampling within their own 
organizations, which, depending on size, might contain a wide range of views on these subjects. I 
selected subject-matter experts from multiple perspectives and backgrounds to gather a wide range of 
plausible opinions.  
Responses from different background types are aggregated without controlling for job categories, due 
to the sample size. It should be stressed that the results presented were not obtained through 
traditional experimental means, and therefore cannot be assessed for accuracy. Rather, data should be 
considered a realistic representation of expert opinion. According to typical EE practice, these 
aggregated opinions are deployed as a substitute for missing or unavailable values under research 
conditions such as mine, characterized by an unavoidable level of uncertainty. It should be stressed 
that caution is required when interpreting results of any expert elicitation, including mine, given the 
potential for misusing results that can be misunderstood as a quantitative representation of a random 
sample of a population, when this is not the case. EE results have value because they allow an 
aggregate presentation of expert views on a handful of key variables and uncertainties, but cannot be 
interpreted in the manner of a public survey. 
EE processes are subjected to various limitations, especially the cognitive heuristics that experts 
typically use when making judgments. These “educated guesses” are subject to biases, as described in 
the heuristics literature, notably Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky, as well as by the EPA white paper, 
which outlines procedures to mitigate these biases.323 Perhaps the most common relates to the 
tendency for experts to make “overconfident” judgments which offer unrealistically narrow 
confidence intervals. The results below may be affected by overconfidence bias, which tends to be 
323 US Environmental Protection Agency 2009; Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky 1982 
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addressed to limited effect in survey environments by inserting explanations of the overconfidence 
phenomenon within the survey materials and exhorting participants to temper their responses. For 
several reasons, including clarity of questions and avoiding the overburdening of unpaid participants 
with material that could lead them to abandon the survey, I followed the EPA guidelines by 
addressing overconfidence in the post-survey phase, by grouping similar responses at varying levels 
of confidence in my contextual review of the results, and by using interview data to corroborate them.  
Since expert elicitation by its nature deals with “experts” and not random members of the public, 
experts should be expected to accord topics in their area of expertise with more importance than the 
average person. And since some invited experts choose to respond and others do not, self-selection 
introduces the possibility of motivational bias, in which participants are motivated to respond due to 
strong feelings, typically about a controversial subject on which opinion is divided. In my EE, 
motivational effects were probably small, given the lack of controversy or expert division affecting 
the issue under study and the generalized wording of elicitation requests and questions. Still, I made 
efforts to reduce the possibility of selection and motivation effects by collecting a large sample (in 
comparison with typical EE panels), by respondents’ diversity in disciplines and perspectives, as well 
as by divulging few details or characterizations of the issues at study in my solicitations.324 These 
techniques are also effective in reducing selection biases inherent in non-randomized samples.325 
EE can also be affected by “availability bias” in which infrequent events are assumed to occur with 
greater frequency because of the publicity they receive. This work does not correct for availability 
bias for a number of reasons: First, because corrective procedures require burdening of unpaid 
participants with onerous procedures for developing scenarios or listing pro and con reasons to 
support their choices, which would undermine the response rate;326 second, because the issue 
examined had not received a large amount of publicity and therefore was probably less susceptible to 
this bias; and third, since most participants were selected based on their knowledge of relevant 
statistical data rather than the issue’s limited emotional appeal.  
Anchoring bias – in which an estimate made early in the survey can affect subsequent responses – was 
addressed in two ways, through providing “redundant information” or using very similar questions to 
validate responses, and, in one case, by first requesting extreme values (high and low), followed by a 
324 Invitations asked participants for judgment on three issues: “First, whether energy policy reforms are 
necessary in the GCC; Second, whether reforms are possible, and, if so, how likely; and Third, the most likely 
shape of those reforms.” The survey purpose was described as seeking “to develop an understanding of the 
energy policy choices facing the six GCC countries in meeting growing domestic demand” to “derive an 
academically rigorous forecast of GCC energy policy.” 
325 Hoek et al. 2009; other motivation effects were more difficult to mitigate, such as respondents’ self-selection, 
with decision-makers and more senior executives appearing less likely to respond to survey requests than lower-
ranking personnel. 
326 Dube-Rioux and Russo 1988 
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request for a median estimate. The EPA credits both techniques with reducing anchoring effects. 
Related “sequential” effects, which concern to a tendency to over-emphasize the importance of the 
first and last pieces of evidence in a sequence, were addressed, where possible, by randomizing 
response order.  
Finally, perhaps the strongest indicator of validity and robustness of the outcomes of my expert 
elicitations is that they contained no surprises. Expert opinions on the likelihood of subsidy reform 
were corroborated by opinions gathered through interviews, as will be demonstrated in Chapter 5. 
Among countries regarded as most likely to reform, both methods identified Saudi Arabia and the 
UAE. Likewise, both methods deemed Kuwait and Qatar least likely. The case of Oman was slightly 
more complex, with interview results suggesting a stronger propensity for reform than those of the 
EE, however interviewees qualified their responses by saying reforms would be selective, an 
opportunity not afforded EE respondents. Validity of results for the UAE were bolstered by the use of 
a second EE, conducted among government policymakers. Results of this EE complemented and 
corresponded with interview data (as well as the Dubai case study findings), as well as with the results 
of the first EE. In summary, the complementarity of results among diverse methods, along with the 
appropriateness of the expert elicitation method within the research setting, provides a convincing 
argument in defense of the choice of methodologies as well as the robustness and applicability of 
results.  
3.5 Public Survey 
Complementing the first two methods is a public survey designed to capture citizen perceptions of 
entitlements under the autocratic social contracts in place in the Gulf, and their willingness to consider 
the loss of subsidies portrayed as rights of citizenship. Public opinion polling has long been a key 
component of politics in democracies, allowing researchers to measure the will of the people and 
deploy it in decision making. Widespread use of polling has deeply influenced democratic politics, 
since it has enabled evaluation of claims that political leaders are acting with the consent of the 
majority. Donsbach and Traugott argue that this aspect has exacerbated populism at the expense of 
principle.327 Public opinion surveys are also common in authoritarian societies, but usually within 
limits described by Horne: 
• Those sponsored by the state and used for its own purposes 
• Those conducted after liberalizations 
• Those avoiding sensitive political questions 
327 Donsbach and Traugott 2008, 1-7 
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Public opinion surveys tapping into political legitimacy issues that form the basis of this dissertation 
are less common in autocratic polities where the “will of the people” is often difficult to capture.328  
More broadly, surveys can measure attitudes, beliefs (including predictions), preferences, and facts, 
including past behavior. They are designed to allow a researcher to take a sampling from a smaller 
population that can be generalized to a larger population. As such, Weisberg argues that surveys 
exhibit strong external validity because they can be used to generalize to a full population under real-
world conditions. Surveys are useful in documenting changes over time in the rates of occurrence of 
these response types, as well as measuring differences between groups. These attributes make surveys 
an ideal and complementary method for this research, which seeks to measure attitudes and beliefs of 
citizens and, in one case, compare them with those of a different group. Survey results provide a 
robustness check on the rich data from individual interviews. And, since the questions forming the 
survey and expert elicitation were designed to reflect each other as closely as possible, the survey 
results provide a useful alternate perspective for triangulating societal reaction to subsidy reform, 
when assessed alongside aggregate output from the expert elicitation. 
3.5.1 Rationale for a Public Survey 
My public survey explores three themes: first, the rationale behind government energy subsidies; 
second, the willingness to relinquish those subsidies under multiple hypothetical scenarios; third, 
respondents’ preferred “future orientation” of government spending of resource benefits. I designed 
the survey to capture public perceptions about the potential fungibility of the energy portion of their 
welfare benefits and the importance of those benefits (i.e. cheap energy) to their support for the 
regime. By understanding what portion of the public feels “entitled” to cheap energy, one can gauge 
the accuracy of pronouncements in the literature (and less formal venues) that describe these benefits 
as rights. By understanding the public’s willingness to submit to energy subsidy reforms, one can 
gauge the level of public opposition to potential reform options that might be chosen by policymakers. 
I felt that public responses that were less than equivocal might illuminate flaws in the literature. I 
suspected that survey data might hint at reform opportunities running counter to the literature’s 
portrayal of subsidies as vital components of citizenship, and which constitute a citizen’s most 
important inducement to acquiescence to his government’s rule. 
The polling firm YouGov conducted my survey online, translating it into Arabic and administering it 
to more than 1,500 members of its Middle East panel from Nov. 28 to Dec. 4, 2011. Just under half of 
the respondents were Gulf nationals, including a broad sampling of Saudi citizens by age, gender and 
socio-economic status. The samples from smaller Gulf monarchies were unfortunately too small for 
328 Horne 2011; for more on autocracies and the lack of regime understanding of public opinion see also: 
Wintrobe 2001; Tullock 1987; Desai, Olofsgard, and Yousef 2009 
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statistical relevance by country, which led me to focus on the aggregate GCC. Responses from outside 
the six Gulf monarchies were excluded.  
3.5.2 Survey Bias 
Surveys also have their weaknesses. They are less effective in finding causation, which is better 
determined through experiments in which the researcher can manipulate variables. These provide 
greater internal validity, because design techniques can reduce extraneous influences. Surveys also 
aggregate individual opinions, which may not accurately portray public opinion, which tends also to 
be shaped as part of a group process. Focus groups may be better suited for these purposes.329 
Weisberg describes several potential statistical biases that also affect surveys, ranging from 
respondent selection and sampling problems – errors in sampling, coverage and non-response –as well 
as non-sampling issues dealing with the accuracy of responses (measurement errors on behalf of 
respondent or surveyor), and administration problems such as post-survey errors and house effects. 
Errors are inevitable in surveys “as there is never a perfect wording for questions, never a perfect 
sample, and so on.”330 Further biases are mentioned alongside results in Chapter 6. 
Most significant are biases affecting representativeness, such as those associated with online surveys, 
which may exclude older and less technologically sophisticated segments of society. YouGov warned 
me that, since its surveys are conducted online, and Internet penetration remained less than universal 
in parts of the Gulf and Middle East in 2011, its panel may not have been representative of the 
population as a whole. Results should be considered broadly illustrative of public opinion rather than 
statistically representative. This bias should decline over time as the Internet penetrates more deeply 
into these societies. However, my regression analyses of survey data were intended to mitigate this 
potential bias by testing for significant differences in response among demographic groups based on 
age, education level and income. In most cases, however, demographic variables explained no 
significant variation in relationship to the dependent variable.  
And finally, there is potential for “fear bias” which can affect surveys in authoritarian states, 
especially those which delve into sensitive subjects, where respondents give insincere responses due 
to fear of government repression or retaliation.331 Since my public survey measures opinions in six 
autocracies where governments are widely understood to be conducting electronic surveillance of 
communications unfettered by privacy laws, fear bias is worth considering. However, the topic of 
electricity subsidy – while it provides a window into regime support – is probably innocuous enough 
to allow genuine responses unbiased by fear. Further, public opinion on prices is regularly expressed 
in public debate and news media, and repression over speech issues in these states is relatively rare. 
329 Weisberg 2008 
330 Weisberg 2008, 225 
331 Horne 2011 
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3.6 Case studies 
As described by Yin, a case study “is an empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between the phenomenon and 
the context are not clearly evident.” Researchers deploy case studies to scrutinize the context and 
conditions surrounding a topic, doing so broadly and with ample detail, marshalling multiple sources 
of evidence. Case studies, like interviews, are useful in bolstering accompanying methodologies, 
especially quantitative techniques such as surveys that lack perspective and nuance.332  
This dissertation provides one short descriptive case study of subsidy reform, the 2011 electricity and 
water price increase in Dubai, which offers insight and evidence that directly contravenes rentier 
theory’s prohibitions on subsidy reform. (A second, even shorter narrative also examines the 2010 
energy subsidy reform in Iran, which involved replacing in-kind energy distribution with a cash 
benefit.) As such, the case study provides an additional perspective for triangulating among methods 
to reach this thesis’ final results.  
The Dubai case study was chosen for several reasons. First, Dubai’s distributive social compact 
exemplifies the behavior of a Gulf rentier state where a centralized monarch retains near-total control 
of decision-making, including the retention of a relatively large degree of autonomy from citizen 
participation. Second, Dubai also exhibits many of the post-oil economic and legitimacy pressures 
that are likely to afflict other rentier states as they seek to extend their governance models beyond the 
plateau of oil exports, when commodity export rents are reduced. Third, Dubai is seen among Gulf 
ruling families a test-bed for policies and initiatives that, where successful, can be adopted elsewhere. 
These include state investment ventures, trade policies, business relations, as well as reforms of 
subsidies. Fourth, Dubai’s Supreme Council of Energy was willing to provide me with access to 
policymaking officials who explained the process of tariff reform and the political difficulties they 
faced. And finally, the Dubai case exemplifies the give-and-take of autocratic policymaking in which 
initiatives are launched in what appears an ad hoc fashion, without ample knowledge of public 
opinion, and reformulated once public reactions become clear.  
*  *  * 
Overall, the methodologies I have chosen for this dissertation triangulate with one another in a 
mutually reinforcing manner. The statistical data from the expert elicitation depict a heterogeneous 
region with varying levels of energy policy reform pressure and varying levels of political capital to 
pursue reform. Interviews flesh out this picture, offering descriptive detail and informing a narrative 
that dovetails with the elicitation’s portrayal of heterogeneity. Descriptive statistics on these 
countries’ energy sectors, population growth and energy dependence add a further layer of 
332 Yin 2009 
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understanding to the picture. The Dubai case study offers concrete, if awkward, evidence that 
subsidies on energy and water may not be considered rights of citizenship; neither on behalf of the 
regime which approved the 2011 tariff hike, nor that of citizens who may have protested an unpopular 
extraction from society, but who have otherwise complied. Interviews provide rich data which provide 
a rich explanatory context for the other methods. And the final layer of evidence comes in the form of 
a public survey, which provides another nuanced and at times puzzling portrait of citizen perceptions 
of subsidized energy, including a willingness to pay higher rates in the national interest. Compiled as 
a trilogy of complementary dissertation chapters, these methods and their integral findings comprise 
an empirically robust picture of a long-serving theoretical construct that, while retaining enduring 
truths, also contains weakening precepts that require revision. 
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Chapter 4: Stability versus Sustainability: Energy Policy in the Gulf 
Monarchies 
 
 
4.1 Introduction  
The hydrocarbon bounty held by the six Gulf Cooperation Council countries, Saudi Arabia, the 
United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman and Bahrain, represents one of the world’s vital supplies 
of energy for the coming decades. Global dependence on these resources stems not just from the size 
of the reserves or the level of production, but from the small populations in these monarchies and their 
historically low levels of consumption. It is the GCC’s large resource per capita that has allowed it to 
export most of its production and to become a dominant force in international markets.  
This story is beginning to change. Rising populations and growing wealth have coupled with low 
domestic prices to threaten assumptions about the sustainability of GCC exports. At current rates of 
consumption growth, Saudi Arabia could see oil exports reduced by the end of the decade, much 
sooner than expected. Peak seasonal consumption in Kuwait and Oman is already reducing exports. 
Oman and Bahrain, the GCC states with the smallest endowments, are in depletion-led decline.333 
This scenario presents a policy puzzle. Petroleum exports form the bedrock of the GCC political 
economies. Distribution of oil and gas revenues has cemented near-absolute monarchs in power long 
after the demise of this form of government elsewhere.334 Given the vital importance of these 
revenues, what factors lie behind government policies that encourage domestic consumption of chief 
exports? How have these policies shaped demand? 
With the exception of gas-rich Qatar, these monarchies face an increasingly acute conflict between 
sustaining exports and maintaining subsidies on electricity, desalinated water and fuels. The era when 
primary energy was considered nearly free is being eclipsed by one where marginal increases in 
demand are met by higher-cost resources, either unconventional domestic energy or market-priced 
imports. For now, governments have absorbed the increased cost and insulated consumers from price 
signals that might otherwise moderate consumption. Since, as I demonstrate, subsidies account for 
333 Those discussing these trends in Saudi Arabia include Stevens and Mitchell 2008; Bourland and Gamble 
2011; Lahn and Stevens 2011; Tottie 2011; Gately, Al-Yousef, and Al-Sheikh 2012;  Wood 2011 covers 
demand effects in Kuwait, while Oman’s reduced natural gas exports have been documented by Darbouche 
2013, 239. 
334 A large body of political economy literature has made this case, under the rubric of “rentier state theory” and 
the “resource curse.” Works include:  Beblawi 1987; Luciani 1987; Anderson 1987; Crystal 1990; Gause III 
1994; Gause III 2000; Chaudhry 1997; Ross 2001; B. Smith 2004; Herb 2005; Schlumberger 2006b; Schwarz 
2008 
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between one-quarter and one-half of energy demand, this practice only intensifies the call on 
exportable resources.  
The consumption dilemma, coming at a time when opportunity for reform has been constrained by 
pan-Arab uprisings, presents difficult questions for these regimes. Hydrocarbons help ruling families 
buy political support, through in-kind domestic distribution; and they provide regimes with economic 
viability, through export revenues, some of which are also distributed. For the system to continue 
functioning, resource revenues from the international side of the equation must not be displaced by 
resource demand from the domestic side.  
The choice for regimes is one of short-term political stability versus longer term economic 
sustainability. As populations rise and energy production reaches a plateau, domestic consumption 
will gradually displace exports, as has happened in other oil exporting states. Politically difficult 
reforms that moderate consumption can therefore extend the longevity of exports, and perhaps, the 
regimes themselves.  
This quandary is illustrated in Section 4.2 by describing the state of primary energy consumption in 
the Gulf producer countries and the influence subsidized resource distribution.  Section 4.3 examines 
subsidies’ contribution to demand in electricity markets and the mounting cost of keeping pace. 
Section 4.4 looks at the equally beleaguered market for natural gas, where fixed prices have 
exacerbated demand and undercut incentives to increase supply, as the Gulf has transformed into an 
importing region. The discussion and chapter conclusion examine the implications of shrinking 
exports and rising fiscal burdens that are symptomatic of maturing resource exporters. 
4.2 GCC Energy Consumption Dynamics 
In the past four decades, energy demand in the Gulf Arab countries has undergone a dramatic 
transformation. At the start of the 1970s, these territories were poor and underdeveloped, with tiny 
populations emerging from centuries of isolation. Energy consumption in Arabia was less than one 
percent of global demand. Forty years later, the Gulf monarchies, with just 0.5% of the world’s 
population, consume 5% of its oil. Primary energy consumption in the past decade has grown more 
than twice as fast as the world average of 2.5% per year. The Gulf’s 2001 consumption of 220 million 
tons of oil equivalent nearly doubled by 2010 and is expected to nearly double again by 2020. Among 
major oil exporters, only Angola, Algeria and Iraq maintained similar growth. (Fig. 4.1) 
Energy demand in the Gulf has escaped notice until recently because of its large reserves, with oil 
reserves-to-production ratios of 63 years in Saudi Arabia, 79 years in the UAE, 89 years in Kuwait; 
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and, for Qatari gas, more than 100 years.335 However, with oil production reaching or nearing a 
plateau, rising domestic consumption will begin to displace exports, regardless of the reserve base, 
unless production is also increased. Nearly a quarter of GCC oil production is now diverted to 
domestic use. At the time of the 1973 oil spike, that figure was around 4%.  
 
Figure 4.1: Domestic consumption of potential oil exports: Avg. yearly growth in oil 
consumption, with production consumed domestically in 2011 (Source: BP, IEA 2013. Note: Libya figures omit 
2011) 
A remarkable run of rising consumption in Saudi Arabia pushed the kingdom past Brazil and 
Germany to become the world No. 6 oil consumer in 2009, despite its comparatively small 
population, economy, and industrial base. (Table 4.1) In 2011, the kingdom’s domestic oil 
consumption represented lost revenues of more than $80bn, or 13% of GDP, given the average price 
of Saudi Arabian light crude that year of $108/bbl.336  
  
335 BP 2013 
336 This calculation ignores varying prices for grades of crude and market effects of an additional 2.86m b/d of 
oil. 
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Table 4.1: Saudi oil consumption in perspective 
 Oil consumed 
2011 (m b/d)  
GDP 2011 
US$bn 
Population 
(2011) 
Oil consumption 
per capita 
Saudi Arabia 2.86 $578 bn 28 million 37.2 bbl/yr 
Brazil 2.65 $2,493 bn 195 million 5 bbl/yr 
Germany 2.36 $3,577 bn 82 million 10.5 bbl/yr 
Sources: IMF, BP 2012 
 
The GCC also represents a major repository of natural gas, but, in contrast with oil, most production 
is consumed domestically. Only Qatar is a major exporter. The remaining five countries produced 206 
billion cubic meters (bcm) in 2012 and consumed nearly all of it, 201 bcm. Overall the GCC held 
more than a fifth of global reserves, but represented only 6% of global gas demand, which 
foreshadows difficulties in production, trade and pricing.337 The UAE and Kuwait have become net 
gas importers since 2008. (Fig. 4.2) 
 
Figure 4.2: Gas consumption surpasses production in UAE and Kuwait (Source: BP 2013) 
4.2.1 Consequences of Energy Mispricing 
Energy is a key input for industrial development. Most countries increase efficiency as they develop, 
producing more output from the same input of energy. In so doing, they reduce the overall energy 
intensity of their national economies, in terms of primary energy consumption per unit of GDP. But in 
337 BP 2013; International Energy Agency 2012a 
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most of the GCC, energy demand is rising alongside energy intensity.338 In effect, these countries are 
moving in the opposite direction from most of the rest of the world, growing less economically 
productive in energy terms. (Fig. 4.3)  
 
Figure 4.3: Saudi energy intensity measured against U.S. and OECD, 1991-2011. (Source: EIA 2013) 
Oil exporting countries face depletion at varying time horizons, based on the level of production 
relative to the size of their resources, and the cost of production relative to the commodity’s price. As 
production reaches a plateau, exports typically drop as domestic consumption rises. Unless an 
increase in the commodity price makes up for exports foregone, the producer experiences a decline in 
export revenues as resources sent abroad are gradually displaced by domestic consumption. This 
trajectory suggests that deriving maximum benefit from natural resources requires careful 
consideration of domestic use. 
Intensity of domestic consumption is a key determinant of the longevity of a country’s status as an oil 
exporter, as Lahn and Stevens have shown.339  As domestic consumption outstripped production in 
China and the United States, for example, these former oil exporters became net importers. Their 
diversified economies were able to absorb the loss. Oil and gas exporters Malaysia and Indonesia are 
reaching this stage, and both have significantly diversified their economies for the transition. 
How do energy prices figure in this debate? Low pricing encourages consumption at rates above those 
warranted by the opportunity cost of these fuels on global markets. Low prices also distort energy 
338 Energy intensity of GDP is an imperfect measure in the GCC, since GDP figures are influenced by oil prices 
as well as economic productivity, while intensity figures also reflect feedstocks used in industry. See Lahn and 
Preston 2013. 
339 Lahn and Stevens 2011 
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allocation preferences while undercutting upstream investment and efficiency incentives. Each of 
these factors has contributed to ongoing shortages of natural gas.340 But the lack of constraints on 
consumption in the GCC is at odds with its near-total dependence on export revenues. Oil and gas 
exports typically provide 40% of collective GDP and 80% of government revenues. Such one-sided 
dependence confers a high value on energy resources that is not reflected in prices. 
As covered in the literature review, converting depletable resource stocks into cash represents a 
transfer of one type of asset to another. Authors such as Stauffer, Mitchell, and Heal maintain that 
these revenues should not be considered income.341 Sustainable depletion requires conversion of 
below-ground assets into new forms of above-ground wealth. Heal and Stauffer argue that oil 
revenues should not even be reflected in GDP figures, since revenues stem from “asset disposal” 
rather than earnings. Heal contends that a country becomes poorer by spending resource income for 
any purpose other than capital investment.  
By this reckoning, the GCC countries are poorer for not deploying the full investment value of their 
depleting resource. Much of the Gulf’s consumption does not cover cost, let alone create above-
ground wealth. Domestic sales of potential oil and gas exports are usually done near the cost of 
production, rather than at global market prices. Instead of providing income, local consumption thus 
serves to reduce the state’s revenue, either real or potential. Rents are foregone in the failure to sell 
energy at market prices (an implicit subsidy), and further costs are accrued by below-cost sales of 
refined fuel and electricity (an explicit subsidy).  
Hartley and Medlock have demonstrated the economic underperformance of state-owned oil 
companies, finding that national oil companies’ social welfare mandates leaves them less revenue-
efficient than their shareholder-owned counterparts.342 In the Gulf region, well-documented 
distributive political structures lay behind this underperformance. Rent distribution was a tool of 
political control even before the onset of oil or independent states in the Gulf, as Foley and Davidson 
have shown.343 The arrival of oil revenues into this framework magnified the political clout of ruling 
sheikhs, helping them maintain power long after the sweeping aside of counterparts whose resource 
endowments relative to population did not provide them the same co-optive power.344 In particular, 
however, it is the practice of in-kind distribution of energy commodities (as distinct from rent 
distribution) that encumbers these regimes with structural encouragement of resource demand.  
340 Razavi 2009; Darbouche and Fattouh 2011 
341 Stauffer, Thomas 1987; J. V. Mitchell 2006; Heal 2007 
342 Hartley and Medlock III 2013 
343 Foley 2010; Davidson 2005. Among the examples Foley documents are the al-Saud’s distribution of 
revenues from Hajj fees.  
344 Egypt’s monarchy was overthrown in 1952, Iraq’s in 1958, Yemen’s in 1962, Libya’s in 1969 and Iran’s in 
1979. 
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4.3 Electricity Policy: Generation, Fuels and Prices 
The arrival of electricity in the Arabian Peninsula is a relatively recent development, coming within 
the lifetimes of many residents. Much of the region was un-electrified as late as 1960. Electrification 
in Oman did not begin in earnest until the 1970s. Since then, growth in power generation has been 
dramatic, especially in the richer states of Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE. These states now consume 
more electricity per-capita than the United States. Power generation growth averaged 7% per year 
between 2000 and 2010, slightly faster than average GDP growth of 6.5%.  In 2011, power generation 
consumed about a third of all GCC gas production. Gas, in turn, accounted for 60% of total 
generation, versus 40% for liquid fuels.345 (Figs. 4.4 and 4.5) 
 
Figure 4.4: Gas consumed in power sector 2011 
as a proportion of domestic gas production 
(Source: IEA 2013) 
 
Figure 4.5: Aggregated total GCC electricity 
generation by feedstock, 1971-2011 (Source: IEA 2013) 
In all but Qatar, growth in electricity demand has outstripped domestic supply of natural gas, the 
region’s chief generating feedstock. This shortage heralds an important shift in the Gulf power 
generation paradigm. In the past, governments had to cope with the cost of building power plants, 
while feedstock came from cheap and plentiful domestic sources. Now, regimes must cope with an 
array of new costs: market-priced imported fuels, expensive production of unconventional gas346 or 
the opportunity cost of burning crude oil and other liquids. The rising costs of electricity generation 
are not, for the most part, offset by rising end-user prices. 
345 55% of Saudi power was derived from liquid fuel-based generation, as was 71% in Kuwait and 18% in 
Oman, where (as in Saudi Arabia) diesel generation provides electricity in areas beyond transmission grids:  
International Energy Agency 2012a 
346 Unconventional gas developments such as the Shah project in Abu Dhabi, Block 61 in Oman, and others 
under consideration in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia entail much higher lifting costs. 
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4.3.1 Electricity Demand 
Energy demand is a function of several factors, among them income, population, technology, climate 
and price. Each of these factors has contributed to the composition of GCC energy demand. 
Populations have quintupled over four decades, as a result of high birthrates and large-scale 
immigration. (Table 4.2) Combined population in the six states rose from 8.2m in 1971 to 44.8m in 
2011, an annual growth rate of 4.3% – nearly triple the global average – albeit slower than growth 
rates in energy consumption and power generation reported above. At the same time, rising individual 
wealth has also increased demand for energy, with per capita GDP growing by an average of 2.2% per 
year since 1981, and 4.3% since 2000.347 (Table 4.3) The effects of the hot and humid climate in the 
Gulf play a role, especially in the high rates of utilization of cooling technology. The GCC industrial 
structure also contributes, given the profusion of energy-intense processes in petrochemicals, fertilizer 
and aluminum and within the oil and gas sectors.  
Table 4.2: GCC population growth since 1971 
 1971 pop. 2011 pop. Growth  
multiple 
1971-2011 
Yearly  
growth 
rate 
Bahrain                        220,000   1.3m  6 4.5% 
Kuwait                        810,000   2.8m  3.5 3.1% 
Oman                        758,000   2.8m  3.8 3.3% 
Qatar                        118,000   1.9m  15.8 7.2% 
Saudi Arabia  6m   28.1m  4.7 3.9% 
UAE                        273,000   7.9m  29 8.8% 
GCC             8.2m            44.8m  5 4.3% 
World  3.8bn   7bn  1.9 1.5% 
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank 2013 
 
Table 4.3: Growth in GDP per capita and oil demand since 1971 
 GDP per cap 
1971 (curr 
US$) 
GDP per cap 
2011 (curr US$) 
Yearly 
growth 
rate 
Oil demand 
1971 (k b/d) 
Oil demand 
2010 
Yearly 
growth 
rate 
Bahrain $8,584*  $18,184  2.5% 15  50  3.1% 
Kuwait $4,784  $62,664  6.6% 70  366  4.3% 
Oman $397  $25,221  10.9% 25  141  4.5% 
Qatar $3,280  $92,501  8.7% 2  192  12.4% 
Saudi 
Arabia 
$1,127  $20,540  7.5% 307  2,687  5.7% 
UAE $27,590**  $45,653  1.4% 3  620  14.6% 
Source: World Bank, IEA 2013 (*1980, **1975) 
 
Since this chapter examines the effects of policy on energy demand, the contribution of low fixed 
prices becomes significant. Price is a key component in demand for energy as well as in the choices of 
347 Per capita GDP growth is PPP and averages all six GCC growth rates since 1981 on an unweighted basis; 
source:   International Monetary Fund 2012 
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energy-consuming equipment and its operating efficiency, and the rate of utilization of that 
equipment. Thus, the region’s low prevailing prices relative to income offer little incentive for 
conservation, for investments into more efficient technology, or for reducing rates of utilization. 
When prices are as low as those in the Gulf, it can be economically rational for people to maintain 
high rates of consumption using inefficient technology, rather than investing in more efficient 
replacements. Pricing has thus contributed to path dependence on high consumption, encouraging 
development of energy intensive infrastructure and habits, while locking-in traditional energy sources 
and blocking transitions to low-carbon and non-fossil generation. Subsidies encourage energy 
intensive behavior in other ways, including by encouraging long-term investments by firms which 
seek to maximize their capture of subsidy components of profits (a form of rent-seeking) by investing 
in technology that is more energy intensive than would otherwise be warranted. These effects tend to 
be perpetuated because firms cannot unwind these investment decisions without eroding profits. 
Rather than retool, firms tend to lobby to retain their benefits. This typical behavior pattern has led 
subsidies to be described as asymmetric because introduction is easy but removal is not.348  
Today’s electricity prices have their roots in low valuations of natural gas, which stem from an era 
when associated gas was considered a nuisance and often flared off, rather than put to productive use. 
Marcel describes how Kuwait’s 1975 nationalization of the Kuwait Oil Co., then held by BP and Gulf 
Oil, was driven in part by flaring.349 Newly nationalized Gulf NOCs soon diverted associated gas to 
the power sector.350 Given the near-zero domestic value of the gas, electricity tariffs needed only 
cover costs of infrastructure, operation and maintenance.351 “Stranded” gas was thus used to develop 
these lightly populated states, providing improvements in lifestyle while shoring up the political 
legitimacy of ruling families.352 Once fixed, electricity tariffs that might have covered costs in the 
1970s or ‘80s have stagnated, or been reduced. Kuwait’s price of 2 fils (0.7 U.S. cents) per kilowatt-
hour has been fixed since 1966. Residential tariffs in Saudi Arabia have been reduced six times since 
1950. (Fig. 4.6) By the mid-2000s, these (by then) subsidized prices were seen as a convenient way to 
distribute oil rents. 
348 Arias and van Beers 2010 
349 Marcel 2006 
350 Aramco World (magazine) 1982 
351 Scott 2010 
352 There is debate about whether electricity provision was an explicit quid pro quo for citizen political support, 
or whether its subsidization owes itself to an unintentional failure to index tariffs to inflation. 
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 Figure 4.6: Historical electricity prices in Kuwait and Jeddah 1950-2012: Price per kWh in U.S. 
cents at 2012 exchange rates (Kuwait source: al-Qudsi and al-Shatti, 1989, and Kuwait Ministry of Electricity and Water; Saudi 
source: Electricity Cogeneration and Regulatory Authority of Saudi Arabia, 2012) 
What share of GCC energy demand is attributable to low prices? While a detailed decomposition of 
demand lies beyond the scope of this chapter, calculations based on plausible estimates of price 
elasticity suggest that low prices contribute significantly to demand, and that reforms would provide 
substantial savings. 
Despite relatively low estimates of price elasticity of demand353 that circulate in literature on the Gulf, 
the increase in price required to cover the full cost of various energy products is so large that 
corresponding reductions in demand become significant. In their examination of subsidy effects on 
GCC energy consumption, Rodriguez, Charap and Ribeiro da Silva use the region’s very low gasoline 
prices as a proxy for underpriced energy in general.354 Table 4.5 shows the percentage by which 2010 
energy prices in four GCC countries would need to rise to cover the opportunity cost implied by 
international market prices. Rodriguez et. al calculate reductions to demand in oil-exporting countries 
using two long-run price elasticities, -0.3 and -0.5, based on averages of previous estimates. Here, I 
provide initial calculations using the plausible middle range figure of -0.4, while acknowledging the 
difficulty in estimating consumption behavior in the Gulf, given the lack of empirical evidence from 
price increases in the region, as well as the large variation in long-run price elasticity estimates in the 
literature. These estimates range from -0.07 at the low end355 to -0.86 at the upper end.356  
353 Many scholars predict that energy demand in the Gulf (and elsewhere) is not very sensitive to increases in 
price; i.e. a $1 increase in price would have a smaller corresponding effect on demand. A price elasticity of -1 
implies a one-to-one relationship between price and demand; price elasticity of -0.3 implies a 1-to-0.3 
relationship and an elasticity of -0.5 implies a demand response half as large as the price increase.  
354 Rodriguez, Charap, and da Silva 2012 
355 IMF World Economic Outlook, April 2011, cited in Rodriguez, Charap, and da Silva 2012 , p. 23. 
356 Dahl and Sterner 1991 
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Others examining energy demand in the Gulf have found it to be price inelastic, albeit within a broad 
range. As shown in Table 4.4, Eltony and al-Mutairi found long-run gasoline and overall energy 
demand in Kuwait relatively inelastic, ranging from -0.23 and -0.46.357 Narayan and Smyth found 
very little price elasticity in oil demand in the six GCC states, with estimates from -0.01 in Kuwait to -
0.07 in Saudi Arabia.358 In Dubai, a government examination of a 15% increase in electricity prices in 
2011 found a small, albeit temporary, decrease in demand.359 Wade, in the 2003 National Energy 
Modeling System estimates, obtained long-run price elasticities of -0.49 pertaining to buildings in the 
U.S. residential sector and -0.45 in the U.S. commercial sector.360 These were based on a doubling of 
the electricity price. In general, energy demand is thought to be quite insensitive to price increases in 
the short run, since energy has few substitutes and rates of consumption are linked to existing 
infrastructure, which itself is based on past prices. In the longer run, demand is assumed to be more 
elastic, since consumers and product developers will have had time to respond to higher prices with 
greater efficiency.  
Table 4.4: Price elasticity estimates for the Gulf countries 
Authors Sample Product Method Long-term  
price elasticity 
Eltony and Al-
Mutairi 
Kuwait 1970-89 Gasoline Co-integration and error 
correction 
-0.46 
Al-Mutairi and 
Eltony 
Kuwait 1965-89 Energy Co-integration and error 
correction 
-0.23 to -0.43 
Narayan and Smyth 6 GCC (among 12 
Mideast countries)  
Oil panel unit root and co-
integration 
-0.01 to -0.07 
Rodriguez et. al 9 energy-exporting 
countries 
Gasoline OLS regression -0.3 to -0.5 
 
Here, I use a simplification of the demand equation from Rodriguez et. al: 
 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝛿𝛿 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝛽𝛽            (1) 
In this equation, 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 denotes energy demand of country i at time t, α denotes a constant, 𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡 denotes 
technology, 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 denotes country-specific factors such as weather, 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 denotes the real income of 
country i at time t, 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 denotes the real price of energy, δ is the income elasticity of energy demand, 
and β is the (negative) price elasticity of energy demand.361 
357 Al-Mutairi and Eltony 1995; Eltony and Al-Mutairi 1995 
358 Narayan and Smyth 2007 
359 Dubai energy sector officials interviewed by the author estimated an average 3% decline per user in 2011, 
which implies a short-run price elasticity of -0.2. Data and full details were unavailable. Note that price 
elasticity calculations in Dubai would be hampered by factors including wide price differences between citizens 
(just 5% of the population) and majority expatriates, who exhibit high levels of transience. 
360 Wade 2003 
361 Rodriguez, Charap, and da Silva 2012, 24. 
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In the case of Kuwait, where the IMF has determined energy prices would need to rise by 183% to 
account for the opportunity cost of foregone revenue, the demand adjustment is calculated below. 
Conforming to the equation above, elasticity is derived by: 𝑞𝑞1
𝑞𝑞0
= �𝑝𝑝1
𝑝𝑝0
�
𝛽𝛽
, where β is the price elasticity, 
in this case -0.4. Given the required 183% increase in gasoline prices, 𝑝𝑝1
𝑝𝑝0
=  2.83, which, raised to 
power of -0.4 equals 0.66; which means 𝑞𝑞1
𝑞𝑞0
= 0.66. It thus follows that a 183% increase in price leads 
to a long-run drop in demand of 100*(1-0.66), or 34%. Note that the large increases in energy price 
required to reach international levels requires use of this non-linear function, rather than the simpler 
linear price elasticity function.  
How would such a price hike play out on long-run energy consumption in Kuwait? Looking ahead, 
one projection of GCC electricity demand forecasts 5% average growth over each of the 14 years 
between 2011 and 2025.362 At that rate Kuwait’s power demand would double from 43 to 86 TWh. 
By increasing prices to opportunity cost levels, Kuwait’s projected 2025 demand of 86 TWh would be 
reduced by a third, to 57 TWh. The portion of 2025 power demand that is attributed to subsidy is 
therefore 29 TWh. Converted to barrels of oil equivalent using BP’s conversion rate of 1 TWh = 
610,948 boe, a 29 TWh reduction represents a savings of 17.9m boe, roughly equivalent to three 
weeks of Kuwaiti crude exports.363  For the UAE, where fuel and some electricity prices are closer to 
international parity, the effects of subsidy removal are less dramatic. The UAE’s 2011 consumption of 
80 TWh would be expected to reach 140 TWh, even when allowing for a 12% reduction in demand 
implied by a 38% increase in power prices. See Table 4.5 for results of further calculations.  
Table 4.5: Power demand and energy savings in 2025 in business-as-usual case (BAU) and after 
rationalizing electricity prices 
 2011 
power 
demand 
(TWh) 
2025 power 
demand 
BAU 
(TWh) 
Price 
increase 
to displace 
subsidy 
Drop in 
demand at    
-0.4 price 
elasticity 
2025 Power 
demand 
with no 
subsidy 
(TWh) 
Savings in 
TWh in 
2025 
Savings in 
BOE terms 
(m/b/year) 
Kuwait 43 86 183% -34% 57 29 17.7 
Qatar 28 55 242% -39% 34 21 12.8 
Saudi 
Arabia 
220 436 306% -43% 249 187 114.2 
UAE 80 158 38% -12% 139 19 11.6 
 
The estimates above depict long-run reductions in demand ranging from 12% in the UAE to 43% in 
Saudi Arabia that would result from a hypothetical rationalization of electricity prices. The savings 
calculated above are indeed significant, but were calculated using the IMF’s method which simplifies 
362 Lahn, Stevens, and Preston 2013, 41. 
363 Export figures from Joint Organizations Data Initiative (JODI) oil database 2013.  
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the task by using gasoline prices as a proxy for energy prices in general. However, Kuwait’s 
electricity pricing is distorted by a much larger subsidy relative to that which reduces prices of its 
gasoline. The electric power subsidy is equivalent to 95% of the cost of generation, transmission and 
distribution.364 A price increase of 1829% would be required for a full rationalization of electricity 
prices. Using the same formula, such an increase implies a doubling of the long-run decrease in 
demand, which reaches 69%.   
Table 4.6 shows percentage reductions in long-run demand from price increases on various energy 
products at three plausible levels of price elasticity (results conforming to the above -0.4 elasticity in 
bold), using the same adapted IMF demand formula. Significant decreases are depicted in all 
examples, ranging from a 20% reduction in electricity consumption by expatriates in Abu Dhabi or of 
gasoline in Oman, at the most inelastic representation of demand; to drops of 60% and 77% in power 
consumption in Abu Dhabi and Kuwait, at the highest estimate of price elasticity. Short-run demand 
effects would be smaller. It is clear that, regardless of whether or not one regards such increases as a 
possibility, price exerts strong encouragement over energy demand in the Gulf monarchies. 
Table 4.6 
 
Product 
Price 
(US$
) 
Unsubsidized 
price (US$) 
% increase to 
displace 
subsidy 
% decrease in 
long-run 
demand at -
0.3 
% decrease in 
long-run 
demand at -
0.4 
% decrease in 
long-run 
demand at-0.5 
Kuwait: 
electricity 
0.007 0.135 1829 -59 -69 -77 
Kuwait: 
gasoline 
0.23 0.65 183 -27 -34 -41 
Saudi 
Arabia: 
gasoline 
0.16 0.65 306 -34 -43 -50 
Abu Dhabi: 
electricity 
(expats) 
0.041 0.089 117 -20 -26 -31 
Abu Dhabi: 
electricity 
(citizens) 
0.014 0.089 536 -43 -52 -60 
Oman: 
electricity 
0.026 0.1 285 -33 -42 -49 
Oman: 
gasoline 
0.31 0.65 110 -20 -26 -31 
Source: Current prices and estimates of unsubsidized prices compiled by author. Price elasticity estimates are 
based on literature review compiled by Rodriguez et al. (2012). Demand effect calculations are based on energy 
demand formula in Rodriguez et al. (2012), which uses a non-linear function that reflects effects of large price 
increases. 
 
364 In 2011, it cost the government 13.5 US cents per kilowatt hour to provide electricity it sold for 0.7 US cents, 
according to data provided to the author by the Kuwait Ministry of Electricity and Water. 
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Moving to a less hypothetical example, how much electricity consumption is explained by price when 
comparing subsidized and unsubsidized markets that exhibit otherwise similar characteristics? In 
other words, what happens to consumption when controlling for income and climate? The UAE 
emirate of Abu Dhabi and the US state of Arizona exhibit many similarities, including a hot climate 
(average temperature 27 degrees centigrade in Abu Dhabi and 24 degrees in Phoenix), and high 
incomes (2007 GDP per capita $76,000 in Abu Dhabi and $42,000 in Arizona). But electricity prices 
are very different. Arizonans paid an unsubsidized average tariff of 9.7 cents per kilowatt hour (kWh), 
while Abu Dhabi nationals pay just 1.4 cents and expatriate residents pay 4.1 cents. As Table 4.7 
shows, the two markets also exhibit major differences in household electricity consumption, with 
Arizonans consuming just a fifth as much electricity as Abu Dhabi nationals and just under half as 
much as expatriates in the emirate.  
Table 4.7 Avg. consumption 
(kWh/yr) 
Tariff per kWh Avg. yearly bill Az. demand 
as a factor of 
Abu Dhabi 
Abu Dhabi nationals 71,000 (2006) 1.4 US cents $967 20% 
Abu Dhabi expatriates 26,500 (2006) 4 US cents $1,082 53% 
Arizona residents 14,000 (2009) 9.7 US cents* $1,600 - 
Note: consumption is per household; * = average tariff 
Source: Abu Dhabi Regulation and Supervision Bureau; US Energy Information Administration  
 
 
Using the same price elasticity formula, would equalized prices lead Abu Dhabi’s consumption to 
resemble that in unsubsidized Arizona? For Abu Dhabi nationals, raising prices to the level of 
Arizona implies a drop from 71,000 kWh/year to 40,000 kWh/y at a price elasticity of -0.3 and to 
27,000 kWh/y at a price elasticity of -0.5. These revised consumption figures, while remaining 
substantially larger than per capita consumption in Arizona, suggest a large and plausible role for 
price in contributing to demand. The calculation does not control for other demand contributors, such 
as the role of higher average temperatures and incomes in Abu Dhabi, the common inefficiencies of 
building envelopes and appliances in Abu Dhabi, and the characteristically larger size of Emirati 
households.365 For Abu Dhabi expatriates (with typically smaller families and homes), consumption 
adjusts even closer to that of Arizona. Using the price elasticities above, consumption drops to 20,400 
kWh/y and 17,200 kWh/y, just 45% and 23% above that of Arizona.366  
365 Abu Dhabi households tend to be larger than those in the West, given larger typical family size as well as the 
likelihood that extended families are also accommodated, along with domestic staff, such as maids and 
gardeners. 
366 Arizona consumption comes from US Energy Information Administration. (Dec. 6, 2011) Table 5A. 
Residential average monthly bill by Census Division, and State 2011.  [Accessed Apr. 12, 2012: 
http://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=97&t=3]   
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This calculation is not meant to serve as an econometric model that disaggregates and accounts for all 
components of demand – a task that is outside the scope of this dissertation – but rather as a second, 
less hypothetical method of revealing the role of price in energy demand in the Gulf. Taken together, 
these two sets of estimates show that subsidized prices in the Gulf account for a significant share of 
energy consumption, which I estimate at between one quarter and one half of total demand for 
electricity and other forms of energy. As mentioned, there is very little empirical data on behavioral 
responses to energy price increases in the Gulf monarchies, in part because there have been few such 
increases. Hence the estimates above can be said to provide basic insight into the relative share of 
GCC energy demand that can be attributed to subsidy, as distinct from the other factors driving 
demand, and to a hypothetical response by consumers to rationalized prices.367  
4.3.2 Policy Approaches to Electricity Demand  
A sudden 18-fold increase in electricity prices might offer a useful hypothetical exercise, but it is 
unlikely, by itself, to provide a viable policy choice to the region’s governments. As depicted in the 
literature, energy subsidies and other welfare benefits are understood to substitute for citizens’ lack of 
political participation. Taking them away constitutes a reneging on the implied social contract in these 
countries, with potential consequences for political stability. A more measured policy might opt for 
targeted subsidies designed to protect low-income and vulnerable groups, while allowing prices to rise 
for those deemed more able to pay. And, if policymakers believe that citizens are entitled to a given 
level of welfare benefits, they may wish to structure reforms so that overall consumer welfare is not 
lost when energy subsidies are removed. In such a case, they may seek to replace energy subsidies 
with a cash transfer or an alternate benefit holding an approximately equal value, minus the 
deadweight loss that accrues from inefficient allocation. 
There is some precedent for such a policy. In 2010, Iran became the first country in the world to 
replace energy subsidies with a universal cash transfer program that distributed payments averaging 
$40 per month to nearly all households.368 Direct payment subsidy is a more efficient and equitable 
redistribution mechanism because increased energy prices encourage consumers to reduce 
consumption, which, as in the Iranian case, allows households to use part of their compensation to buy 
preferred goods and services. Distributing cash rather than in-kind energy also improves social equity 
since subsidy accrues disproportionately to wealthy households which have more means to consume. 
Iran’s reform achieved a positive assessment from the IMF for reducing demand while halving the 
world’s largest energy subsidy burden, valued at around $100 billion or a quarter of 2010 GDP. And, 
367 A more thorough examination of price increases would also examine income elasticity, which tends to 
decline as income rises. 
368 Tabatabai 2011 
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perhaps of equal significance, a large segment of the Iranian public supported the reform.369 
(Discussed further in Chapter 6) 
Policymakers in the Gulf have devised various means and proposals to increase energy prices. None 
(that this author has seen) follow the Iranian path of maintaining consumer welfare through rebating 
the cash value of the subsidy. A few regimes have managed to target electricity and water subsidies 
toward the influential citizen residential sector, while tariff increases have been levied on those 
holding relatively low levels of political influence. Rising prices have been imposed on industrial and 
commercial customers, and, in Qatar and the UAE, expatriate residents. Low tariffs for citizens are 
deemed a crucial endowment within the paternalistic social contract between ruling sheikhs and their 
subjects. Expatriate residents and foreign investors are more likely to see low pricing as a windfall. In 
the UAE, non-citizen power prices have been raised to at least triple the level of citizens. In Qatar, 
citizens continued to receive free electricity, while foreign residents are charged 2.5 U.S. cents per 
kilowatt-hour. Fig. 4.7 illustrates sector pricing in the Gulf, which runs contrary to that in 
unsubsidized markets like the United States, where lowest rates tend to be reserved for industrial 
consumers. 
 
Figure 4.7: Retail electricity prices for an initial 2,000 kWh in comparison across sectors in the six 
GCC countries and the United States. Note that four utilities operate in the UAE. (Source: Author’s 
compilation from national utilities, interviews and media sources; All GCC prices are fixed by the state. Those in Dubai include 
additional fluctuating surcharges for LNG, which have not been included. U.S. figures are 2012 averages from U.S. Energy 
Information Administration, 2012.)  
 
More recently, the Saudi Electricity & Co-Generation Regulatory Authority (ECRA) has initiated 
efforts to target its electricity and water subsidy toward low-income households. ECRA tried and 
369 Guillaume, Zytek, and Farzin 2011 
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failed to raise residential rates in 1999 when a public outcry forced it to back down. In 2012 ECRA 
arranged for the Ministry of Social Affairs to pay “reasonable” residential consumption of low-
income Saudis, in hopes that the king and his advisers will agree to higher rates on remaining 
households once ECRA can show that poor and vulnerable customers have been protected.370  
4.3.3 Electricity Subsidy and the Residential Sector 
One of the consequences of policies that reserve the cheapest electricity for residential customers, as 
opposed to typically larger consumers in the commercial and industrial sectors, has been the 
residential sector’s rise to dominance. In all but Qatar the residential sector is the largest consumer of 
electric power, most of which is used in cooling. In Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Oman and Bahrain, it 
represents more than 50% of national power consumption.371 Residential consumption poses three 
problems for governments. First, most electricity is sold at a loss, so its provision is a drag on the 
economy. Second, this demand produces an additional opportunity cost by diverting exportable 
hydrocarbons into the domestic economy, where they are provided at low fixed prices. Third, as 
mentioned, residential demand is difficult to reform because of the implied risk to political stability. 
The difficulty in targeting residential demand is apparent in Oman’s 2009 proposal for cost-reflective 
tariffs, which calls for prices for commercial and industrial customers to rise to cost-reflective 
levels.372 The intent is to reduce Oman’s recent 10% yearly increases in electricity demand, which 
claim an ever-larger share of the sultanate’s budget and gas resources. However, the proposal, which 
would not affect residential consumers, remained on hold at the time of writing. The country’s 
electricity regulator said the Arab Spring uprisings, which included virulent demonstrations in Oman, 
increased government sensitivity to potentially unpopular measures.373 Among the nine tariff-setting 
entities in the GCC, only Dubai has raised prices on citizens’ residential consumption in the last 
decade. (Covered in Chapter 5)  
In summary, 40 years of rising electricity consumption has been driven by extraordinary growth in 
population and individual wealth in the Gulf monarchies. These structural demand factors have been 
exacerbated by subsidies based in distributive patrimonial politics, to which I attribute between a 
quarter and a half of GCC electricity demand. Regimes have failed to expose consumers to price 
signals that might reduce consumption in line with rising government costs. In turn, their subsidies 
have become the world’s largest, on a per capita basis. (Fig. 4.8)  
370 Al-Shehri 2012 
371 International Energy Agency 2012a; In the UAE, homes were responsible for 43%, the largest sector overall. 
372 “Public Consultation on Proposals for Cost Reflective Tariffs for Commercial and Industrial Consumers of 
Electricity” 2009 
373 Cunneen 2011 
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 Figure 4.8: Per capita fossil fuel subsidy in 2001 US$, country 
rankings (Source: IEA 2012) 
4.4 Natural Gas: Price, Production and Shortfalls 
As mentioned, natural gas feedstock accounts for the largest share of GCC power generation. If the 
Gulf comprises one of the most gas-rich regions on earth (Table 4.8) why would five monarchies find 
themselves in short supply? In similar fashion to the electricity sector, underpricing is driving 
demand. But in the gas sector, underpricing is also stifling production. Partly as a result, the GCC is 
being transformed into an importing region.  
Most current GCC gas production stems from low-cost associated gas yielded in tandem with oil. By 
contrast, non-associated reserves in the five gas-short monarchies tend toward the geologically 
difficult:  deep rock-bound “tight” gas, as well as sulfuric “sour” gas. Production costs run between $3 
and $9 per million Btu (MMBtu).374 Such costs render upstream investment commercially unviable in 
countries with bulk gas prices capped under $2. And, since most production is sold in-country, the 
typical incentive for foreign investment – a profitable netback – is eliminated.375  
 
374 Gulf-based IOC executive, interview with author on condition of anonymity, Muscat, Nov. 15, 2011. 
375 Mabro and Razavi argue that Mideast gas exports are also driven by subsidies, since low domestic prices 
incentivize firms to reap higher export returns, even when those gains are outweighed by the economic benefits 
of using gas domestically. See Mabro 2006; Razavi 2009. 
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Table 4.8: Natural gas reserves of the Gulf  
and Arabian Peninsula 
4.4.1 Gas Trading in the Gulf 
Unmet demand suggests that pipeline imports from 
gas-rich neighbors, especially Qatar and Iran, would 
be attractive. But the region’s only cross-border 
conduit is the Dolphin Pipeline, endowed with a 
nameplate capacity of 33 bcm/year, but which 
maintains an operational capacity of just 20 bcm/year. 
In 2011, it operated at about two-thirds nameplate 
capacity, carrying 17 bcm from Qatar to Abu Dhabi 
and Dubai, and a further 2 bcm to Oman. The pipeline 
could be filled to capacity if equipped with additional 
compression, but political differences over pricing 
have undermined Qatari willingness to earmark 
additional gas for the pipeline.376 
There is nothing in the way of a gas market pricing mechanism in the Gulf region, such as an index 
based on trade at a hub. Prices vary widely. Dolphin-delivered gas rises in price slightly each year, 
with UAE prices around $1.50 per MMBtu in 2012. That is considered a significant underpricing, and 
has pushed Qatar to seek oil-linked prices and markets outside the Gulf. Qatar’s neighbors have been 
unwilling to pay more than what they consider a reasonable markup on production costs below 
$1/MMBtu. But Qatari officials who value gas by the far higher netbacks from customers in Asia and 
Europe, view regional requests for “discounted” gas as unrealistic. Other pipeline proposals have 
failed. (Table 4.9) Recent sales provide further information on the value of gas in Persian Gulf. A so-
called “interruptible supply” of Qatari gas sold to Abu Dhabi via the spare capacity in the Dolphin 
Pipeline is priced near $5, and resold in the UAE for $7 to $10.377 Kuwait and the UAE also have 
resorted to LNG imports, with Kuwait reportedly paying above $15.378  
  
376 A $250m contract to maximize the pipeline’s capacity by adding three compressors was awarded in 
November 2012, but did not include mention of availability of additional gas. See: Watts, Mark. “Dolphin 
Energy awards Qatar gas contract to Larsen & Toubro.” MEED, Nov. 13, 2012. See also: World Bank 2013, p. 
xvi and 44. 
377 Gulf-based IOC executive, interview with author on condition of anonymity, Doha, Nov. 29, 2011. 
378 Kuwait LNG import price is from Petroleum Economist 78, issue 9 (2011), http://www.petroleum-
economist.com/Article/2912531/Kuwaits-growing-need-for-LNG-imports.html. 
 Size 
(Tcm) 
Share of 
world 
total 
Bahrain 0.2 0.1% 
Iran 33.6 18% 
Iraq 3.6 1.9% 
Kuwait 1.8 1% 
Oman 0.9 0.5% 
Qatar 25.1 13.4% 
Saudi Arabia 8.2 4.4% 
UAE 6.1 3.3% 
Yemen 0.5 0.3% 
GCC total 42.3 22.6% 
Region total 80 42.7% 
World total 187.3 100% 
Source: BP 2013   
 
  
124 
 
 
                                                     
Table 4.9: GCC gas pipeline proposals that failed 
Project Year 
launched 
Gas 
source 
Importing 
countries 
Reason for failure Source 
GCC gas grid 1988 Qatar KSA, Kuwait, 
Bahrain, UAE 
Political/territorial disputes Dargin 2008 
Crescent Petroleum 
pipeline 
2001 Iran UAE (Sharjah) Pricing disagreement. Contract 
nullified by Iran after pipeline built 
Jafar 2012; 
Carlisle 2010; 
Adibi, Fesheraki 
2011 
Dolphin Pipeline 
extension to Kuwait 
2005 Qatar Kuwait Saudi refusal to grant access to 
territorial waters 
 
Dargin 2008 
4.4.2 Increasing Reliance, Increasing Cost 
Despite these difficulties, the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) projects that gas 
consumption in the Middle East’s generating sector will grow by nearly 150% by 2035.379 Drivers 
include rising population and energy intensity, industrialization, and gas-for-oil substitution to 
maximize exports. The marginal cost of additional gas to meet these needs will be far higher than that 
of domestic associated gas. For example, Abu Dhabi projects a widening deficit in gas feedstock until 
2017, when the first of its four nuclear power plants is expected to begin producing power. The Abu 
Dhabi leadership opted to import LNG to bridge this deficit. The price differential is roughly 
sevenfold. Current supply costs roughly $1.50/MMBtu. LNG imports will be priced above $10.380 
In Oman, rising domestic demand and depleting conventional gas reserves have forced reductions in 
LNG exports. Unconventional reserves are under development, but lifting costs could run beyond 
$8/MMBtu.  In Saudi Arabia, a $9bn gas investment campaign aims to slow the growth of crude oil 
and diesel in the power sector by substituting with gas. Saudi Aramco hopes to increase gas output by 
50% above 2011 production of 280MMcm/day,381 but, like Oman, most of its non-associated reserves 
consist of difficult formations. 
4.4.3 The Gulf as an Importing Region 
Despite the discomfort of paying world market prices for a commodity recently considered “free,” the 
GCC is becoming a gas importing region. The EIA projects that the “Arabian producers” (UAE, 
Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman and Yemen) will require 40 bcm in yearly imports by 2025 and double that in 
2035. (Fig. 4.9) The EIA expects that Saudi Arabia will remain self-sufficient. However, a senior 
Saudi energy official told this author that gas imports for the power sector were under 
consideration.382 
379 U.S. Energy Information Administration. (September 2011). International Energy Outlook 2011. Chapter 5: 
Electricity. Figure 83. Middle East net electricity generation by fuel, 2008-2035. 
380 Abu Dhabi energy sector official, author interview on condition of anonymity, March 12, 2012. 
381 Lamotte 2012 
382 Saudi energy official, Ministry of Petroleum and Minerals, author interview in Riyadh, Oct. 15, 2012, on 
condition of anonymity. 
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Figure 4.9: Projected gas imports of Arabian producer countries (Source: EIA, International Energy Outlook 
2011) 
From which countries will these imports be sourced? Inexpensive supply from the largest resource 
holders in the region, Qatar and Iran, appears unlikely. If Qatar’s moratorium on further North Field 
production is lifted after 2015, Qatari policymakers have signaled that the country will market any 
increased production on a commercial basis.383 Imports from Iran have been thwarted by price and 
political disputes, as well as by Iran’s prioritizing of reinjection.384 Iraq also appears a doubtful 
source. It also requires gas for reinjection, power generation and industry. The most likely 
destinations for any Iraqi exports are said to be Turkey and Europe.385 Barring major discoveries, it 
appears that the limits to the GCC‘s inexpensive gas supply have taken shape. In all but Qatar, 
marginal increases in gas demand will be met by higher-cost sources, mainly non-associated and 
unconventional gas, or market-priced imports. Policymakers have sought other avenues of redress 
from their gas challenge, as evidenced by investments into nuclear and renewable generation. These 
technologies are likely to provide only marginal relief.  
4.5. Conclusions 
Rising domestic consumption is a familiar menace to oil-dominated economies. Venezuela, Iran and 
Indonesia have experienced similar quandaries. These were addressed in Iran and Indonesia by 
subsidy reductions and in Venezuela by increasing government debt. Rarely a straightforward 
process, the subsidy challenge in the Middle East has been magnified by the pan-Arab uprisings. The 
overthrow of neighboring autocrats has infused caution into Gulf regimes, which responded by 
increasing social spending and withdrawing subsidy reforms. As will be shown in Chapter 5, this 
383 Author interviews with IOC executives and government consultants in Qatar, Spring 2012. 
384 Adibi and Fesheraki 2011; Wietfield 2011 
385 Yacoub and Rutledge 2011 
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author’s 2012 survey of UAE policymakers found a deep reluctance to raise electricity and water 
prices, and a heightened sensitivity to citizen opinion.386  
Despite the difficulty in reforming energy policy, alternatives appear worse. It is hard to overstate the 
importance to the Gulf monarchies of preserving hydrocarbon export revenues. Despite modest 
success with economic diversification, energy exports still comprise the largest share of GDP and 
government budgets. These earnings provide the hard currency required to maintain imports, to meet 
social welfare outlays, to develop infrastructure that can drive industrial growth and diversification, 
and to create jobs for burgeoning workforces.  
The Gulf energy conundrum can be read in two ways. On the one hand, it provides an impetus for 
these historically durable monarchies to renegotiate socio-economic relations between government 
and citizen, and to begin the inevitable journey toward more efficient and diversified economies. In 
other hydrocarbon exporters, such as Indonesia, Malaysia and Mexico, political liberalization has 
been part of this journey. On the other hand, this conundrum could lead to crisis responses that 
damage state-society relations, if unsustainable welfare schemes are not reframed on agreeable 
terms.387  
Academic works that examine this issue are split on the likelihood of continued stability. On the 
pessimistic side are arguments like Davidson’s, that shrinking resource rents per capita are 
undercutting the ruling families’ levers of power as globalized media tools undermine their controls 
on political discourse.388 More optimistic voices such as Lahn and Stevens maintain that deficits in 
the non-hydrocarbon fiscal and current accounts are being addressed through industrial diversification 
that will supplant depleting hydrocarbon sectors. They argue that energy consumption will be 
addressed through upgrades in efficiency and largely without antagonizing citizens.389 Others, 
including the policymakers and experts in Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Oman surveyed for Chapter 5, 
believe that energy prices can and will eventually be raised, even on the sensitive residential sector. 
The optimistic view is bolstered by the historical resilience of the GCC monarchies, which managed 
to survive both the Arab Spring uprisings and the 1980s-‘90s oil bust. It bears recalling that in Saudi 
Arabia, oil revenues plummeted from $120bn to $17bn over the four years to 1985, while GDP per 
386 Fifteen of 25 policymakers polled (60%) said “events of the Arab Spring” had made the UAE government 
“less willing to raise water and electricity prices.” Twenty-one of 26 respondents (81%) said the UAE 
government was either “very sensitive” or “extremely sensitive” to citizen opinion on tariff increases. 
Anonymous online survey of 36 UAE government policymaking employees conducted by the author between 
Feb. 22 and March 5, 2012. 
387 Coates Ulrichsen 2011 
388 Davidson 2012 
389 Lahn and Stevens 2011 
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capita fell from its 1980 peak of $19,000 to reach $6,900 in 1996. Then, too, scholars predicted the 
fall of the sheikhs390 but none of the six Gulf ruling families was toppled.  
Assessments of the well-being of the Gulf monarchies tend to revolve around global oil prices, and it 
has been the rising oil price that has enabled recent increases in social welfare, rather than a rise in 
productivity. However, assuming steady global demand, the crisis covered here is playing out 
independently of oil prices. That is not to say a falling oil price would be irrelevant, but that a rising 
price can only temporarily hide the growth of domestic consumption.391 Ruling sheikhs face a new 
and distinct challenge. Besides the more widely discussed brushes with globalization, internal 
opposition, and external market forces, regimes must address domestic consumption of their chief 
exports, including the subsidies that contribute to demand.  
The Gulf monarchies, like exporters before them, have encountered the need to prepare their political 
economies for the inevitable decline of oil exports. The policies behind their quandary – and the 
pressures to overcome it – are internal. Regimes have not been galvanized to seek energy efficiency 
by an economic shock or international outcry. Rather, energy policy has drifted along on formulae set 
in the 1970s until becoming apparent that exports are at risk. The Arab Spring uprisings add 
contradictory pressure to increase or prolong subsidies, deepening the medium-term resource 
predicament in the name of short-term political expediency.  
Further, it appears that any international outcry will be muted. The Gulf energy crunch coincides with 
a global boom in unconventional energy. Whether one looks at the shale oil and gas production in the 
United States; the huge finds off Brazil, East Africa, and the Levant; or the ramping up of LNG 
exports from Russia and Australia, the world appears less alarmed by the potential for reduced 
Mideast supply than might have been the case. In fact, cheaper outside gas supply could help these 
“Arabian producers” transition to “Arabian importers.” 
This chapter has outlined factors driving Gulf monarchies to encourage local consumption of export 
commodities, and the resulting changes to energy balances and electricity models. I have presented a 
picture of regional energy supply and demand to advance the argument that maintaining in-kind 
resource distribution entails rising direct costs in the form of subsidies, rising opportunity cost in the 
form of lost export earnings, premature displacement of exports, and premature resource depletion, 
due to uneconomic demand. Reforms can therefore extend the monarchies’ status as exporters, bring 
them higher value from natural resources, and assist with maintenance of prudent fiscal balances. 
Distributional politics has long been understood as a key element in the Gulf’s vaunted political 
stability, and in-kind resource distribution has been an important component of that model. But this 
390 Sick 1998, 211; Hunter 1986; Roberts 1987; Al-Ebraheem 1996; Al Rumaihi 1996 
391 For a projection on oil prices required to accommodate future Saudi consumption, see: Bourland and Gamble 
2011 
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practice, however effective over the past 40 years, now comprises a structural encumbrance that 
threatens the GCC’s economic and political models.  
Fast-rising demand for electricity is shifting the region to a higher-cost model of provision that poses 
an economic drag on the state, since the largest source of demand – the residential sector – is not 
linked to productive activity. The shortage of natural gas that affects five GCC states is ultimately due 
to pricing disincentives on production and the distributional imperatives of the social contract that 
bind the regime to low energy prices.  
The political-stability-versus-economic-sustainability puzzle illustrated here suggests a response. Gulf 
ruling families will be forced to protect their oil revenues, their key stability resource, before 
preserving energy subsidies, which are a legacy of surplus production. Whether regimes can meet 
their medium-term imperative without triggering their short-term fear – a popular uprising – remains 
to be seen. But the future of monarchies that depend so heavily on exports of hydrocarbons cannot be 
protected unless their leaders find ways to maintain them. 
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Chapter 5: Revolution and the Rentier State: Theory of Stability to Theory 
of Crisis? 
5.1 Introduction 
For at least forty years, the Gulf monarchies have engaged in implicit distributive social contracts 
with their citizenry which include generous energy subsidies.  Social contracts in these six Gulf 
countries have been key factors in maintaining political stability. But these social contracts are based 
on an unsustainable practice: Encouraging domestic demand for their chief export commodities. 
Decades of fast growing demand now threaten resource exports in five of these monarchies. Thus, a 
variable once associated with the longevity of these monarchies – the in-kind domestic distribution of 
energy – now threatens their survival. This chapter disaggregates regimes’ energy rent distribution 
practices to isolate and examine the viability of energy subsidies. It argues that theories of politics of 
rentier states must acknowledge the contradictory nature of subsidized energy distribution and 
concede the possibility of its reform, through the social contract.  The chapter presents evidence that 
reforms have taken place, and offers results from a large survey of experts on GCC energy and 
finances predicting that further reforms are likely. These reforms, which run contrary to the 
implications of rentier theory, are possible because a plausible alternative scenario is worse. If the 
Gulf monarchies are unable to arrest growth in domestic demand for their chief export commodities, a 
subsequent drop in exports and earnings could force changes in the character of governance, if not in 
the regimes themselves.  
The Gulf monarchies are exemplars of the oil-exporting rentier state that prevails in the wider Middle 
East and North Africa and among mineral export-dominated economies more generally.392 Since the 
onset of large-scale exports in the 1960s, and especially since the oil crisis of 1973, their regimes have 
followed a well-documented distributive script that cultivates political legitimacy for monarchs by 
granting citizens a lengthening menu of welfare and employment benefits.393 The means for this 
exchange is described in the political economy literature as a social contract, through which the 
political support of the public is procured in exchange for shares of resource rents. These rents, which 
flow directly to ruling families in payment for the state’s hydrocarbon exports, form the revenue 
source for 80% of aggregate government budgets. Resource rents underwrite citizen welfare benefits 
including state jobs, housing and other subsidies. 
392 By Gulf monarchies, I refer to the six Gulf Cooperation Council or GCC states: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.  
393 Mahdavy 1970; Beblawi and Luciani 1987; Anderson 1987; Crystal 1990; Gause III 1994. Note that 
distributive structures were in place before oil, but the discovery of oil and subsequent flow of rents energized 
this system and shifted political power to ruling families which received and distributed those rents. See 
Anderson 1986; Crystal 1990; Foley 2010. 
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This distributive social contract has long been an important factor maintaining political stability 
within the rentier Gulf monarchies.394 But the strategy that helped these regimes survive and societies 
prosper includes the counterproductive encouragement of demand for domestic energy, a practice that 
appears unmaintainable in the long term. Of the six Gulf monarchies only Qatar remains comfortable 
in its ability to meet both its international export commitments and foreseeable domestic demand. In 
the other five, the rentier recipe for stability has become a script for economic decline and, perhaps, 
public disaffection.  
This chapter argues that consumer subsidies on energy, which have been aggregated within the rentier 
literature among the broader distribution of resource rents, carry different properties and stronger 
implications for political structures, and warrant separate treatment. If this special group of rent-
distributing states is unable to reduce growth in domestic demand for export commodities, exports 
may be displaced. Thus the subsidy burden poses a more damaging encumbrance on the state than do 
fiscal burdens, since subsidies affect the vital flow of revenues that support the rentier system. A 
sustained drop in exports would probably reduce the amount of export rents available to the 
government, as demonstrated in the thesis introduction.  
If the loss in hydrocarbon rents was not replaced by an alternate source, as in Dubai, a scenario could 
emerge that led to regimes making cutbacks in distribution, which, according to theory at least, would 
force changes in the character of governance. From benevolent395 autocracies that wield mild 
repression396 to restrain those unwilling to relinquish political rights for economic security, these 
regimes may increase repression as they become less able to comply with expectations for continued 
rises in benefits. Or, as theory would also seem to prescribe, some regimes may compensate by 
creating openings for political participation, as a replacement for benefits withdrawn from the social 
contract. Either way, the character of near-absolute monarchical institutions that have used generous 
subsidy regimes to suppress dissent may face challenges from reductions in revenues from resource 
exports and subsequent declines in distribution of benefits.397  
On the other hand, Gulf regimes may be able to arrest or at least ease the trend toward consuming 
ever-greater amounts of their chief exports, thereby preserving their export-oriented political 
economies for a few more decades. One route to this goal is by removing distribution of hydrocarbons 
from their social contracts by reforming subsidies on fuels, desalinated water and electricity.398 
394 B. Smith 2004; Ross 2001. In their analysis of Arab Spring effects, Yom and Gause found hydrocarbon rents 
a key factor in preserving stability; Yom and Gause III 2012, 83–4. 
395 With a caveat for the recent state repression seen in Bahrain 
396 Luciani 1987, 76 
397 Desai, Olofsgard, and Yousef 2009 
398 A third “perpetual growth” route may also be possible. This entails shifting domestic consumption to an 
alternate energy source while diversifying the economy beyond hydrocarbon exports. This is a stated goal of all 
six countries, but progress has been spotty. It is not examined in depth here because this route does not 
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Simply put, the mispricing of key export resources to buy domestic popularity cannot be sustained if 
the supply of that resource rises less quickly than demand. Indeed, the post-oil sheikhdom of Dubai 
has already reduced subsidies on fuel, water and electricity without noticeable alteration in the 
character of its governance, or the granting of a quid pro quo increase in political participation or 
alternate social contract benefit. Dubai’s practices thus appear as a violation of the social contract, at 
least in the fashion that this state-society relationship is typically framed in the rentier literature. As 
this chapter will show, other tariff-setting entities399 in the Gulf may enact similar reforms. By 
following this route, these states will also appear to be infringing upon social contracts by reducing or 
ending long-time entitlements. 
The problem of energy subsidies and reform thus poses a challenge not just to the hydrocarbon-export 
economic models of these states but to the rentier scholarship itself. The literature emphasizes the 
stability gained by resource distribution rather than its dangers; it implies that regimes cannot 
legitimately reform this contradiction by retracting citizen welfare benefits. History has, for the most 
part, backed up these premises. Previous attempts to raise electricity prices on the citizen residential 
sector, the most politically sensitive of the tariff groups, have failed or been reversed.400 However, as 
these states continue to undergo far-reaching changes in population and development, some of the 
once-robust tenets of rentier theory have weakened. My argument holds that it is not theory that has 
proven wrong per se, but that theory has failed to anticipate fast-changing circumstances on the 
ground, and that these circumstances are providing a stress-test that theory may not withstand.  
5.2 Structural Encumbrances of the Rentier State  
As shown in the literature review, the subsidies-as-birthright formulation has been and remains a 
fundamental tenet of rentier theory that is incorporated within the foundation of the literature’s 
arguments and narratives. This chapter diverges from the rentier literature’s key tenets in three 
important ways. First, I hypothesize that rentier systems are encumbered with a structural 
contradiction: encouraging domestic consumption of the state’s chief export commodity and only real 
source of earnings. Rentier scholarship is in basic agreement that distributional practices are linked 
with political stability, even though the fiscal viability of these policies has been called into question. 
By contrast, I argue that, while resource distribution may continue to bring stability in the short term, 
if maintained in the long run it will accomplish the opposite.  
challenge theory. In reality, some combination of demand-oriented and supply-oriented “diversification” reform 
is most likely.  
399 There are nine electricity tariff-setting bodies in the GCC. The federal UAE has four: One each in Dubai, 
Abu Dhabi, Sharjah and the Northern Emirates. The other five GCC states have one each. 
400 Saudi Arabia imposed electricity tariff increases in 1985 and 1999 that were quickly reversed. 
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Second, while generally agreeing with other scholars regarding rising fiscal pressure from 
monarchies’ continued expansion of welfare benefits, I argue that the domestic distribution of natural 
resources comprises a fundamentally different encumbrance on the state. This burden manifests itself 
not in terms of cost or fiscal pressure, but on the revenue side of the balance sheet, where national 
incomes are tallied. Whereas for fiscal burdens, often associated with reduced oil prices, the state 
possesses temporary policy options such as deficit spending and debt issuance. I argue that the 
potential loss of export revenue affects the state in a different way and, I believe, poses grounds for 
more concern than does the increasing fiscal costs of rent distribution. I therefore disaggregate the 
regime’s distributive outlays into two categories: rents, and in-kind energy resources. The former 
includes rent-funded employment and welfare benefits such as housing, education and subsidized 
food staples. I focus on the latter category, which includes subsidies on electricity, fuel and water. 
Section 5.3 examines these subsidies within the context of theoretical prohibitions on their reform, 
showing evidence of initial reforms that run contrary to theory, and Section 5.4 provides results from 
a survey of experts which reveal an expectation that some countries will reform, which challenges the 
theoretical depiction of subsidies. 
Third, this chapter’s results reveal deep heterogeneity among states treated as a regional aggregate and 
expected to behave in similar fashion, especially in the literature’s early phase. Even the richest 
rentiers maintain differing energy policies, resources per capita, and levels of regime autonomy. As 
the findings will show, one of the six monarchies, Qatar, is less affected by the same resource 
concerns that afflict the others, due to the size and variety of its hydrocarbon reserves relative to 
population. 
A fourth dimension may also require consideration in the literature: a potential endgame for the 
rentier state that cannot maintain the social contract. Modernization theorists such as Deutsch and 
Huntington saw structural political change as an inescapable process for the modernizing monarch 
who built institutions that would eventually bring democratic opening.401 The rentier literature, which 
has mainly concerned itself with identifying factors contributing to the longevity of monarchy, tends 
to overlook pathways for political restructuring402 although Luciani touches upon it in his seminal 
work403 and articles emerging during the oil bust of the 1980s and 1990s suggested that the prolonged 
decline in aggregate rents was imposing pressure for increases in pluralism.404 While most of the Gulf 
monarchies will probably take steps to reduce domestic energy consumption or otherwise seek to 
diversify sources of rent or domestic energy, the results below suggest that one or more regimes may 
not. State revenues may eventually fall short of social contract requirements, reprising pressures last 
401 Huntington 1968; Deutsch 1961 
402 With recent exceptions, including Davidson 2012; Coates Ulrichsen 2011; Tetreault 2012. 
403 Luciani (1987, 82) describes the rentier state as a “passing phenomenon” since the economic foundation of 
the state consists of a depletable asset. 
404 Luciani 1988; Anderson 1992  
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experienced during the oil bust, leading to altered governance strategies, perhaps even unrest or 
regime change. While I do not examine the likelihood of this eventuality, I acknowledge the 
deficiency in the literature and suggest it as a path for future scholarship.  
Finally, it bears noting that relations between rulers and ruled are far more complex than portrayed 
here. Ruling families in the Gulf monarchies possess numerous intertwining strands of legitimacy that 
extend beyond the simple distribution of state benefits that are the focus of this chapter. Legitimacy 
resources also include, for example, families’ centuries-long history of rule, their country’s 
achievements in human and physical development, including living standards and political stability; 
their personal charisma; their ability to deal effectively with the outside world; and, especially in 
Saudi Arabia, their role as protector of holy sites and of Islam more generally.405 Beyond these, they 
retain shared experience that has helped them survive through decades of low oil prices, insurgency 
and other challenges to their rule.406  
5.2.1 Disaggregating Distributive Practices 
Central to this thesis is the distinction of energy-distributive practices from those of rent distribution. 
Governments have, over the years, fostered energy-intensive domestic economies and lifestyles by 
making available abundant supplies of domestic oil and natural gas. Low prices of these resources 
were determined by the low costs of production, a sense of collective ownership, and the view that 
supply was so large that domestic demand would not affect exports. Energy distribution availed the 
same political structures used to dispense economic rents, and the distribution of cheap (or free) 
electricity, desalinated water and fuel produced the same sense of citizen entitlement to these benefits. 
Among regimes, energy distribution appears also to have produced the same expectations for political 
quiescence of recipients. 
However, there are important distinctions between distribution of rents and that of in-kind resources. 
Distribution of energy resources is a less flexible practice than distribution of energy rents. Whereas 
rents can be generated from myriad non-hydrocarbon sources, as Gray and Davidson have shown to 
be the case with Dubai,407 national oil and gas resources are finite. Rates of extraction are subject to 
technical and economic limits. Resources are large in four of the six GCC states, but production has 
reached or is nearing a plateau. Increasing oil production capacity in these countries requires major 
new investment, which, in most of the GCC, must be borne domestically because of prohibitions on 
foreign concessions. It thus follows that, unless current rates of domestic consumption growth are 
checked, domestic demand will displace resources available for export, and exports will fall.408 
Instead of providing income, local consumption serves to reduce the national income, either real or 
405 Nonneman 2005, 320 
406 Yom 2013 
407 M. Gray 2011b; Davidson 2005 
408 Bourland and Gamble 2011; Tottie 2011; Lahn and Stevens 2011; Lewis and Hsueh 2012; Rehman 2012  
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potential. Rents are foregone in the failure to sell energy at market prices, which constitutes an 
opportunity cost or implicit subsidy,409 and costs are incurred by below-cost sales of refined fuel and 
electricity, which require explicit subsidies. Domestic distribution of exportable resources therefore 
comprises depreciation of natural capital. It reduces the state’s ability to reinvest in the sector – given 
that resources are sold below market price – and gives rise to depletion of an exhaustible resource 
without the capture of its full value. These natural resources are “too cheap for the good of future 
generations,” to borrow from Hotelling’s still relevant 1931 argument, and “in consequence of their 
excessive cheapness they being produced and consumed wastefully.”410 By comparison, other forms 
of rent distribution appear as government spending. 
How should theory address these effects? I argue that rentier politics in the Gulf monarchies is 
encumbered with a structural contradiction, in a similar manner to the “perverse expenditure 
mechanisms” described by Beblawi and Luciani, and the similar language employed by Farsoun. But 
the classic theorists, writing during the long oil bust period of the 1980s and ‘90s, saw the 
unsustainability of the social contract in fiscal terms that were associated with international oil prices 
and revenues that were insufficient to meet budget requirements. They argued that growth in social 
spending would outpace export revenues, which did happen, forcing Saudi Arabia and other GCC 
states into deficit spending and borrowing.411  
But the sustained rise in oil prices that started in 2002 and which remained at historic highs at the time 
of writing (notwithstanding a short-lived plunge in 2008) erased those deficits and pushed the Gulf 
monarchies into fiscal surplus, easing the risk of financial crisis and allowing the monarchies to 
reinvigorate and expand their clientelist commitments. This improvement in fiscal health, and the 
policy maneuvering that allowed regimes to maintain social contracts during the stagnant decades, 
exemplifies the problems with previous theoretical declarations of unsustainability. Fiscal recovery 
also obscures the challenge of domestic resource consumption, which has risen steadily through 
decades of bust and boom.412 Thus, while some rentier theorists argued that fiscal constraints were the 
chief limiting factor facing distributive practices, I argue that, ultimately, resource constraints 
comprise a more fundamental hindrance on state capacity to maintain distributive social contracts, 
since they pose a structural limitation within the national economy that allows fewer avenues for 
redress. Unlike fiscal constraints, resource constraints cannot be assuaged by rising oil prices, at least 
not beyond the short term, as demonstrated by the example of Indonesia in the thesis introduction. 
409 Darbouche and Fattouh 2011, 18 
410 Hotelling 1931 
411 Chaudhry 1997, 34-5, 274–5; Crystal 1990, 191–2; Luciani 1988; Anderson 1992. For a detailed discussion 
of Saudi deficit spending and borrowing, see Cordesman 2003, 383–415. 
412 Gately, al-Yousef, and al-Sheikh 2013 have shown that oil consumption has grown faster than economic 
growth in all OPEC countries since 1971 except those that have undergone disruptions (Iraq, Kuwait) or 
stagnant or uneven economic growth (Nigeria, Libya). 
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Economic diversification such as that which has come alongside reduced fossil fuel exports from 
Indonesia, Mexico and Malaysia is one avenue for respite from the loss of exports. But the present 
record of GCC diversification includes many schemes focused on energy-intensive sectors which 
have increased resource demand. Another avenue is diversifying supply, by expanding domestic 
production of oil substitutes such as natural gas and nuclear and renewable electricity generation. 
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, the countries generating largest shares of electricity with liquid feedstock, 
stand to benefit most from substitution. A third avenue is to reduce domestic demand. As this chapter 
will show, fledgling efforts at managing demand have met with little success outside Dubai. 
By exchanging in-kind energy for political support, ruling families have fostered political dependence 
on the same commodity on which they depend for economic sustenance. Tétreault identified this 
problem by arguing that domestic stability “increasingly means preserving domestic access to fuels 
whose sale abroad is the foundation of the edifice of state and society.”413 Growth in domestic 
demand for oil, doubling nearly every decade on average, competes with and displaces exports, which 
account for virtually all foreign currency earnings. As shown in the thesis introduction, a series of 
analyses414 have projected dates as early as 2030 for the end of Saudi Arabia’s crude oil exports, amid 
further signs of pressure on exports.415 The contradiction inherent in this competition for natural 
resources has been noted by scholars in ad hoc terms, but it has not been framed within the theoretical 
context of distributive politics. This oversight may stem from an inability to imagine how decades of 
growth would transform energy demand in the region, a predicament that would have appeared far-
fetched during theory formulation in the 1970s and 1980s. Simply put, the converging trends of 
rapidly rising domestic consumption and essentially stable production mean that the countries will 
face an increasingly sharp conflict between sustaining export earnings and low domestic prices. 
Theoretical prohibitions on reforming welfare benefits will be stress-tested. I argue that theories of 
politics of these states must acknowledge this contradiction and concede the possibility of its reform, 
through the social contract. 
Scholarly documentation of fundamental characteristics of rentier systems should be amended to 
document this self-consuming feature: The domestic distribution of primary exports that is 
characteristic of the rentier state comprises an encumbrance on its economy, which, in the 
longer term, becomes a potentially destabilizing factor within the governance structure. This 
characteristic, which I propose as a theoretical tenet, does not challenge or undermine the validity of 
rentier theory, which retains considerable power in its explanation of regime durability, behavior and 
413 Tetreault 2012  
414 Bourland and Gamble 2011; Tottie 2011; Lahn and Stevens 2011; Lewis and Hsueh 2012; Rehman 2012  
415 These include Saudi Arabia’s summer imports of heavy fuel oil and diesel feedstock for power generation; 
Kuwait’s curtailed summer exports of crude oil and imports of liquefied natural gas (LNG); The UAE’s 
increasing dependence on imports of natural gas, and its emergency diversion of gas from reinjection in 
maintaining oil reservoir pressure; and Oman’s underutilization of its LNG export facilities. 
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relations with society. Rather, it points to a weakness in the literature’s previous theoretical 
prohibitions on subsidy reform.  
This statement does not imply that domestic consumption poses the sole threat to GCC exports and 
revenue. Cyclical reductions in energy prices remain a pervasive danger to revenues. Exports can be 
threatened by numerous factors including reduced external demand, whether due to increasing self-
sufficiency in former export markets such as North America, future climate-based policies, or 
unforeseen advances in technology. It also bears mention that any reduction in GCC oil exports – 
outside of those caused by receding external demand – could have the perverse effect of raising 
market prices and export revenues. Thus, given the right market conditions, a loss of exports from 
Saudi Arabia or another key supplier that coincided with an environment of strong oil demand could 
wind up augmenting revenues, at least temporarily.  
The rest of this chapter examines the data and findings in the context of the rentier literature. Section 
5.3 outlines the research context and methodology. Section 5.4 presents results that differentiate 
monarchies’ means to afford their social contracts, and supplies evidence for reforms running contrary 
to theory. The final section weighs the options for monarchical longevity in the context of maturing 
resource-exporting states. 
5.3 Trends and Research Design 
The phenomenon of rising energy consumption in the Gulf producer countries has been well 
documented. As mentioned, previous analysis has shown that if policies are not adjusted spare 
production capacity will be lost and exports may decline. Over the past decade, oil consumption in the 
six GCC states has grown by a yearly average of 6.5%. In Saudi Arabia the percentage of oil 
production consumed domestically has risen from 5% in the 1970s to near 25% in 2009. Table 5.1 
offers a simple insight into these trends, without purporting to offer any predictions. It extrapolates the 
number of years, at recent rates of growth, to reach 50% and 100% domestic consumption of oil 
production, with production, demand and other factors held constant. For instance, at current rates of 
consumption growth, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Bahrain, and Qatar consume 50% of 2009 oil production 
within a decade, and 100% before 2040.  
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Table 5.1: Oil consumption in the Gulf monarchies    
 2009 oil 
produced  
(MMt) 
2009 oil 
consumed  
(MMt) 
% of oil 
production 
consumed in 2009 
Average % 
growth/year 
2000-09 
Years to reach 50% of 
2009 production, at 
current rates (year) 
Years to reach 100% 
of 2009 production, 
at current rates 
Bahrain 9.5 2.2 23% 5.1% 15 (2024) 29 (2038) 
Kuwait 119.0 19.7 17% 4.6% 24 (2033) 40 (2049) 
Oman 43.0 6.7 16% 8.3% 15 (2024) 23 (2032) 
Qatar 58.0 6.5 11% 11.5% 14 (2023) 20 (2029) 
KSA 457.0 107.2 23% 5.4% 14 (2023) 28 (2037) 
UAE 126.0 27.8 21% 4.2% 20 (2029) 37 (2046) 
Source: IEA Oil Information 2012, BP Statistical Review 2012; author’s calculations 
 
In contrast with oil, natural gas in five of the six the Gulf monarchies is mainly a domestic resource 
used in power generation, desalination and industry. Qatar, the world’s third-largest exporter in 2010, 
is the major exception. Oman exports roughly half of its production.416  
Table 5.2: Natural gas consumption in the Gulf monarchies, 2011 (bcm/yr) 
 Gas production 
 
Gas consumption 
 
net exports 
(imports) 
Bahrain 9.9 9.9 0 
Kuwait 13.8 16.5 (3.6) 
Oman 30.8 15.0 15.0 
Qatar 151.4 32.4* 119.0 
KSA 92.2 92.2 0 
UAE 51.8 62.0 (10.2) 
*includes feedstock for export-oriented industry. 
Source: IEA Natural Gas Information 2012  
 
Saudi Arabia, like the rest of the GCC and most exporters of crude oil, is forgoing future exports by 
burning crude oil at home. But Saudi Arabia’s increasing domestic demand also threatens an 
important aspect of its identity that has broader implications for global oil markets: its spare 
production capacity. It is difficult to overstate the consequences for the kingdom of the loss of its 
spare capacity. Saudi Arabia’s flexibility in production and export capacity allows it to influence 
market prices, offset disruptions in production elsewhere, and command the strategic interest of the 
West. A capacity loss would reduce these advantages and diminish the kingdom’s stature among 
exporters and as a prominent participant in multilateral organizations such as the IMF, WTO and 
World Bank. Energy dependent countries would also suffer, with markets probably growing more 
volatile. Even the perception of a threat to Saudi spare capacity could affect markets, economies, and 
the kingdom’s role in international affairs. 
416 Energy statistics: BP 2012; International Energy Agency 2012b  
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5.3.1 Research Design  
Given the stakes involved, I sought to gauge and compare the relative threats to individual GCC 
economies from domestic consumption, and prospects for reform, in three ways: first, through 
numerous interviews; second, via the complementary method of an expert elicitation survey, which 
acts as a bootstrapping “robustness check” on qualitative interview data; and third, by means of a case 
study of reform in Dubai. Using these methods I gathered input from policymakers and experts in 
Gulf politics and energy, ranging from academics with understanding of rentier theory to energy 
sector officials with knowledge of resource constraints. Interviewees included senior policymakers in 
all GCC countries but Bahrain. These data-gathering techniques focused on trends in domestic energy 
demand as well as the policies being developed to avert reductions to energy exports, including 
reforms of subsidies. The interview data were used primarily to add context to results from the expert 
elicitation surveys. 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, expert elicitation (EE) is a common method for gathering subjective 
expert judgments that combine facts and opinion into probabilistic assessments of uncertain 
circumstances under study. These judgments are typically used in research contexts like this one, 
filling a need to forecast trends when important values are unavailable. For this chapter, experts were 
asked questions about likelihood of future subsidy reforms among a set of states, and to characterize 
the probable extent of those reforms. My expert elicitations were designed as structured stakeholder 
surveys that requested quantitative probabilistic judgments about future energy prices, economic 
effects, and forecasts for reform. The first EE involved 92 experts who provided responses between 
November 2011 and November 2012. In March 2012, I conducted a second expert elicitation among 
35 members of the policymaking staff of UAE Prime Minister and Dubai ruler Sheikh Mohammed 
bin Rashid al-Maktoum. (See Chapter 3 for full details) 
5.4 Results 
How do individual states approach the “structural encumbrances” of rentierist energy distribution 
described in section 5.2? Will regimes target demand (and contravene theory) by raising prices on 
subsidized electricity? Or will they act as theory prescribes, by avoiding the retraction of subsidies 
and perhaps finding a more deferential approach? Regional experts broadly interpret current energy 
distribution practices as unsound. The results below show that subsidy policies are likely to be 
reformed in some of the rentier monarchies of the Gulf, which supports the argument above that 
theory should disaggregate the allocative stream to differentiate among fiscal and in-kind benefits, 
and allow for the reform of the latter. The Dubai case study below finds that this process has already 
started, with price reforms breaching the literature’s framing of the social contract.  
139 
 
 
5.4.1 Government Priority and Threat Perception 
The expert elicitation first sought to measure the relative importance of the resource consumption 
issue to GCC governments by asking respondents to “classify the issue of domestic energy 
consumption (oil, natural gas and electricity)” in their chosen country or countries, while taking into 
consideration the other issues facing the government. Responses ranged on a 5-point Likert scale from 
“The government’s No. 1 priority (1)” to “Not a concern (5).” 
Responses showed that concern is lowest for Qatar, where just six of 21 (29%) of respondents placed 
energy consumption within the government’s top three priorities. The remaining GCC states polled 
higher levels of policy priority. Over half of respondents (10 of 19 respondents or 53%) placed energy 
consumption among the top three priorities in Kuwait. The score for Saudi Arabia was 14 of 29 or 
48%; and for the UAE 14 of 37 or 38%, and 44% for UAE government policymakers. (Fig. 5.1) 
Oman and Bahrain are omitted from this analysis, given the small number of responses.417 One would 
expect importance to vary on governments’ policy agendas regardless of the severity of the issue, 
depending on whether a country had more immediate alternate policy worries, such as political 
stability. 
 
Figure 5.1: EE responses on energy consumption as a government priority (percentages represent 
respondents who listed energy reform within top three priorities) 
I also sought to gauge whether respondents perceived growing domestic resource consumption as an 
“economic threat” to the country concerned. This question was meant to capture a respondent’s 
overall positive or negative characterization of energy consumption in a country prior to giving them 
specific information that could influence those perceptions. For this reason the question did not 
specify what constituted a threat, nor did it supply information about the size of consumption, or use 
417 Bahrain has been omitted from this analysis given its small resource base, the small sample of EE 
respondents, and domestic circumstances that overshadow energy policy such as political unrest and the military 
and economic intervention of neighboring states. Oman has also been dropped from some analyses because of 
small sample size. 
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language implying it was a problem. Since low-priced energy is typically understood as an 
advantageous input for economic growth (witness the current perception of inexpensive shale gas in 
the United States) a perceived “threat” response would indicate an atypical perception of energy’s role 
in the economy.  
Responses, arrayed on a 7-point scale, reveal a sharp divide among the countries. (Fig. 5.2) Saudi 
Arabia elicited the strongest agreement that consumption posed an economic threat, with 24 of 29 
respondents (83%) choosing either “agree” or “strongly agree” among the seven possible choices. 
UAE policymakers in the second EE displayed similar agreement, with 21 of 27 (78%) agreeing or 
strongly agreeing. Respondents found consumption less urgent in Kuwait (58%) and the UAE (51%) 
although in both cases, when “somewhat agree” responses were added in, negative perceptions 
surpassed 80%. For Qatar, only 3 of 21 respondents (14%) agreed or strongly agreed with the same 
statement.  
Figure 5.2: EE responses on perception of economic threat (percentages represent combined “agree” and 
“strongly agree” responses) 
These results show that, in all but Qatar, domestic energy consumption appears to be perceived as an 
economic threat and a government policy priority. Agreement with the “threat” perception was 
particularly strong for Saudi Arabia and among UAE policymakers. These results correlate with 
interviews, descriptive statistical sources, and public statements of Gulf policymakers illustrating the 
growing share of natural resource production that is consumed in their domestic economies. If such 
perceptions are as widespread among elites as these results suggest, one would expect to find support 
for policies aimed at reducing demand, including through domestic prices. A year after the EE was 
carried out, one participant, Oman’s Minister of Oil and Gas Mohammed bin Hamad al-Rumhy, 
publicly characterized energy consumption as a threat. "We are wasting too much energy in the region 
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and the barrels that we are consuming are becoming a threat now, for our region particularly... I think 
we have a serious problem," he said.418  
5.4.2 Likelihood of Reforms 
Gulf regimes are preparing a range of energy policy initiatives meant to reduce demand for exportable 
commodities, as well as increase supply of replacement commodities and technologies. These reforms 
should be viewed as attempts to sustain hydrocarbon export-led economies and dependent political 
institutions.419 On the supply side, governments are pursuing new sources of natural gas as a 
replacement for oil and other liquid fuels in the domestic market. This is evidenced by surging gas 
exploration and production in Saudi Arabia, Oman and the UAE, including capital-intensive 
investments in unconventional gas. In power generation, supply-side efforts include diversification 
into nuclear power and renewables. The most advanced of these investments lie in Abu Dhabi. On the 
demand side, initiatives aim at reducing consumption through “green” building codes that mandate 
energy-efficient design and materials; appliance standards that effectively ban inefficient air 
conditioners and other electric appliances; public “mainstreaming” campaigns that seek voluntary 
reductions in electricity and water usage; and – those of most interest to this chapter – increases in 
prices of electricity.  
It is in electricity pricing, with its flexibility in rates among customer groups, where rentier state 
theory has proven itself particularly robust in predicting government behavior. Policymakers in eight 
of the GCC’s nine tariff-setting entities have spared citizen customers in the residential sector from 
paying higher rates for electricity and water, ostensibly to avoid violating social contract stipulations. 
In Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE, governments have raised electricity prices for commercial and 
industrial users. In Qatar and the UAE, where separate rates for expatriate residents have been 
created, prices have also been raised. As will be discussed below, only the UAE emirate of Dubai has 
raised electricity prices in citizen homes.  
Politicized tariff behavior in electricity markets is not unique to monarchies or even state-run 
electricity markets. Brown and Mobarak show how democratization in poor countries tends to be 
accompanied by an increased supply of electricity to residential customers relative to that of the 
industrial sector, as political structures tilt away from concentrated interests and toward individuals.420 
However, in the rentier-autocratic Gulf, the residential sector is already unrivaled. Rentier theory 
holds that supply of (cheap) electricity is the product not of an increase in democracy, but 
418 Fineren 2013, emphasis added 
419 Note that regimes are also working to augment depleting natural resources by diversifying into sectors that 
can provide alternate sources of rent, while maintaining job guarantees for citizens. Dubai has been particularly 
successful in this regard. See Gray 2011. 
420 Brown and Mobarak 2009 
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compensation for the lack of it, although quasi-democratic Kuwait offers a confounding counter-
example.  
5.4.3 Evidence of Reform: Dubai 
Dubai, a nearly depleted oil producer that forms one of seven subnational states within the UAE, 
began confronting its citizens’ rising energy demand in 2009, during a period of financial crisis. The 
global financial meltdown that started in 2008 affected all the GCC states, but none as deeply as 
Dubai. There, the crisis triggered a crash in the real estate market and a painful economic recession. 
Government-linked businesses halted much of their activity and declared their inability to meet terms 
on more than $100 billion in short-term debt. The emirate required economic assistance from 
neighboring Abu Dhabi and was forced to renegotiate repayment terms on most of its debt to avoid 
default. The Dubai government also imposed restrictions on spending in an effort to stabilize the 
city’s finances. In this context, the government decided to address the rising cost of distributing 
subsidized electricity and water to the heretofore untouchable citizen-residential sector.421  
Rising utility expenses were exacerbated since 2008 by Dubai’s importing of liquefied natural gas 
(LNG) at market prices which were several times higher than unit prices on the limited supply of gas 
provided by Abu Dhabi. While the Dubai Electricity and Water Authority (DEWA) had been able to 
raise rates in 2008 to cost-reflective levels on commercial, industrial and foreign residential 
customers, a large share of electricity and water was also flowing to the heavily subsidized citizen 
residential sector, where prices had not been touched. At least two-thirds of the costs of citizen 
consumption was paid by direct subsidy from the Dubai Department of Finance, the same office 
charged with overseeing the city’s financial obligations, including the debt restructuring. Subsidies 
were thus encouraging higher consumption and increasing government costs, all the while insulating 
citizen consumers of electricity and water from the austerity measures that were otherwise being 
imposed across the board. Policymakers interviewed in the emirate said that higher prices for citizens 
had been discussed but never implemented in prior years.  
After the crash, Dubai ruler Sheikh Mohammed installed a known spending hawk, Mohammed al-
Shaibani, as the head of the ruler’s diwan, and gave him firm support for necessary austerity 
measures. Al-Shaibani, with the ruler’s support, ousted several members of the ruler’s old guard who 
were associated with the previous era of overspending. With al-Shaibani in charge of the diwan, there 
was a mandate for reform along with a personality minded to pursue it. Dubai’s financial predicament 
– exacerbated by the exponential increase in marginal cost of natural gas feedstock – provided the 
impetus to impose new prices.   
421 This material and much of this section is based on multiple interviews with Dubai government officials in the 
energy sector and municipal government who spoke on condition of anonymity, 2011-13. 
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Sheikh Mohammed agreed with al-Shaibani that citizens needed signals to change their consumption 
behavior, and that signals were most convincingly conveyed by raising prices. Despite widespread 
perceptions of citizen entitlement to these subsidies, the ruler gave personal permission for a 30% 
increase in electricity prices. Half of that increase would be imposed through a 15% increase in 
electricity consumption tariffs on all customer classes, including citizens. The other half would take 
the form of a surcharge added to bills that would cover imports of LNG when costs rose beyond a 
baseline which was set at 2010 levels. The ruler also agreed to impose the first-ever limits on citizens’ 
receipt of free municipal water, which had to be desalinated at high cost in the same gas-fired co-
generation plants that produce electricity.422 
Imposing these measures was left to the Dubai Supreme Council of Energy, a high-level body created 
in June 2009 that was given broad powers to create policy and regulate the electricity and water 
sector. The DSCE’s aim was to increase efficiency in a city in which infrastructure and habits had 
been shaped by the prior availability of plentiful cheap energy. The council’s director was Nejib 
Zaafrani, a former Shell executive and board member on Abu Dhabi’s state-owned oil and gas firms. 
Zaafrani declared that Dubai, as a net importer of energy, would seek to reduce projected electricity 
demand in 2030 by 30%. This, he said, would reduce 4 gigawatts from forecast requirements in 
generating capacity, allowing Dubai to forgo construction of several power plants.423 Raising tariffs 
would be the most challenging aspect of a program that also included efficiency standards on 
buildings and appliances. Zaafrani warned that efficiency programs would not function unless 
subsidies were cut.  
Dubai’s tariff increase went into effect on January 1, 2011. There had been a few cursory news 
announcements of the price increases, which tended to downplay the magnitude of the changes. There 
was little public debate and appears to have been very little consultation within the government about 
the increase.424 The measure came as a surprise to many utility customers, including business owners, 
and even to staff within the Dubai Executive Council, the body normally tasked with evaluating and 
implementing policy proposals.425 
The DEWA increase initially raised few serious objections among the majority expatriate community, 
given that it took effect during the winter season when electricity consumption is at its lowest. 
However, during the peak summer season, invoices combined the seasonal increase in consumption 
422 Author interviews with Dubai government officials in the energy sector and municipal government who 
spoke on condition of anonymity, 2011-13. 
423 Nejib Zaafrani, CEO, Dubai Supreme Council of Energy, speech at the Dubai Global Energy Forum, 18 
April 2011, Dubai; as quoted by author. 
424 A Dubai government interviewee told the author in 2012 that the government discussed the impending 
increases in a closed-door session with leaders of prominent families. 
425 Author interviews with Dubai government officials in the energy sector and municipal government who 
spoke on condition of anonymity, 2011-13. 
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with higher tariffs and the new surcharge for imports of LNG. With the surcharge, expatriates began 
to pay rates that were roughly quadruple those of citizens. (See Appendix 5 for detail) A story in 
Dubai’s Gulf News was flooded with more than 200 comments from foreign residents shocked by the 
increases. “I can attest to the tremendous and horrifying increase in my DEWA bill as I kept copies of 
the bills,” one respondent wrote, offering comparisons of summer 2010 and 2011 invoices in UAE 
dirhams which showed increases of 70% or more, for example from AED530.70 ($144.50) in July 
2010 to AED900.85 ($245.26) in July 2011. However, expatriate complaints elicited little official 
sympathy, with DEWA executives advising customers to “stop wastage of precious resources.”426 
Rising prices created a more worrying stir within the ranks of citizens, many of whom were also 
unaware of the government’s plans. Dubai nationals commonly own businesses, and many merchants 
complained of simultaneous increases in business and living costs. Angry citizens brought their 
invoices to the DEWA headquarters building and demanded to see the person in charge of billing, also 
an Emirati citizen who, by tradition, is expected to meet with citizens and propose a solution to any 
impasse. One government official said: 
“The uproar came as a surprise. The government didn’t realize that people would complain so 
much. They didn’t have a plan for managing this. (Citizens) were coming to the head of the 
DEWA billing department and complaining. For some of these people it was the first time 
they had ever looked at their electricity bills.”427 
Other citizens went to tribal leaders, who, in turn, approached the ruler, Sheikh Mohammed, to pass 
along word of the discontent. 
“People went to the sheikh and complained. There were a lot of articles in the press,” a 
second Dubai official said. “After a few days the sheikh ordered the increased prices to be 
waived for certain segments. People were coming to the government asking for increased 
social benefits to pay their bills because they couldn’t afford the new rates.”428 
Even more citizen outrage greeted the imposition of water tariffs, the first time a charge had been 
imposed on Emirati nationals since the municipal water system was built in 1968. Securing water for 
the population has been a longstanding duty of the ruling sheikh, an important indicator of stature in 
the pre-oil era.429 However, the introduction of desalination allowed consumption to grow unfettered 
by the limits of a small underground aquifer. Since water was given away, consumers failed to gain an 
426 Comment No. 31 in Bitar 2011b 
427 Author telephone interview with UAE government official on condition of anonymity, Oct. 29, 2013. 
428 Author interview with member of UAE government on condition of anonymity, Dubai, April 8, 2012. 
429 In discussing this point during a Nov. 11, 2010 interview with David Scott, executive director, Economic and 
Energy Affairs Unit, Abu Dhabi Executive Affairs Authority, Scott noted that tribal sheikhs required others to 
participate in guarding water sources and it was thus more of a community task than simply a source of 
patronage. 
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understanding of the high cost of production. Waste was rampant. “Forty years ago drinkable water 
was hard to access. The leadership of this country offered people water for free. That’s very 
honorable,” Zaafrani said in an interview with the author. “But that was 40 years ago. It’s a different 
world today.”  
Angry citizens complained to the Arabic press and radio talk shows, and launched a spate of illegal 
well-drilling.430 The revised tariff structure gave citizens a free allotment of 10,000 gallons per month 
before imposing a modest (by unsubsidized market standards) rising tariff for additional use. 
Expatriates, who were not receiving a free allotment, also received a price increase. 
Prominent Emirati nationals made their way to Zaafrani. “The ones who made much more noise after 
we made the increase were UAE nationals,” he said. “For UAE nationals, water is not free anymore. 
Human beings do not want to be told to pay more. People came to me and said, ‘We are being 
penalized!’ I said, ‘No, we’re trying to save energy and raise awareness.’” 
In what appears an untimely coincidence, the tariff increase was imposed as the Arab Spring uprisings 
unfolded in Tunisia and Egypt, and by February in neighboring Bahrain and Oman. 431 My survey 
with UAE policymakers determined that these uprisings put the government on the defensive, by 
increasing sensitivity to citizen opinion on the subsidy reform.432 As opposition grew to the price 
increases, the Dubai ruling family made three separate retractions of parts of the 2011 tariff reform, 
all of which affected only the citizen residential sector. Government officials interviewed portrayed 
these retractions as ad-hoc decisions made without consulting or involving usual government 
policymaking channels. First, the ruler quietly rolled back electricity prices for low-income 
households receiving social benefits to previous levels.433 Second, one of the ruler’s sons announced 
that the government would pay LNG surcharges on behalf of citizens.434 And in October, the Dubai 
430 Newspaper websites allowing reader comments on stories about the price increases included some purporting 
to be from citizens. Most lamented rising prices and an insufficient quota of free water, as well as higher prices 
for citizens in Dubai than for those in other emirates. See, for example, 
http://www.emaratalyoum.com/business/local/2010-12-09-1.326917, and 
http://www.alwasluae.com/vb/showthread.php?t=154768, and http://www.emaratalyoum.com/local-
section/hotline/2011-10-04-1.427746. 
431 The most vehement protests, clashes and government crackdowns in Bahrain, and to a lesser extent, Oman, 
took place between February and June 2011. 
432 Author results from expert elicitation with UAE policymakers, March 2012. Fifteen of 25 respondents said 
the Arab Spring events made the government “less willing” to raise utility rates; 21 of 26 respondents said the 
government was either “very sensitive” or “extremely sensitive” to citizen opinion on subsidies. 
433 Author interview with member of UAE government on condition of anonymity, Dubai, April 8, 2012. Also 
detail from policymaking focus group held at UAE Prime Minister’s Office, March 5, 2012. 
434 Dubai electricity sector official, interviewed by author on condition of anonymity, Jan. 9, 2013. See also: 
Bitar 2011a  
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ruler relented on the increase in water prices and announced a doubling of the free water quota for 
citizen households to 20,000 gallons per month.435  
“This is what happens when you announce the policy with no proper analysis or consultation,” a 
government policymaking official said. New prices remained in effect for less politically sensitive 
sectors such as commercial, industrial and expatriate-residential. 
Raising prices reveals one side of the issue. Collecting payment is another matter. DEWA has touted a 
record of effective bill collection, which is uncharacteristic in the region. DEWA gives its customers 
just 47 days to pay before facing disconnection. This approach does not apply to citizens or “certain 
designated institutions” which are presumably linked to the ruling family and prominent tribes. A 
2013 financial risk prospectus accompanying the issue of a Dubai sukuk noted that “UAE nationals 
are required to pay their own electricity bills.” But that, when it comes to water, “While the 
government encourages UAE nationals to pay their own invoices, the Government issues credit notes 
to cover any unpaid residential water invoices of UAE nationals.”436 Two years after imposing a 
charge for water, the government’s representatives put in writing that citizen payments for water were 
considered voluntary. 
5.4.3.1 Discussion 
These policy retreats reveal the resilience of social contract provisions enshrined in rentier theory. In 
Dubai, even during a financial crisis that should have provided cover for reform, the regime could not 
hold the line on increased utility rates for citizens. The loss of benefits – considered entitlements by 
many – triggered a rash of complaints, but did not appear to inspire demands for democratic 
representation, as predicted by theory’s taxation-representation link. A UAE-wide petition calling for 
increased political participation did in fact emerge shortly after the price increase, but was unrelated 
to Dubai’s tariff measure.437 One petition-signer told this author that the issues of subsidy reform and 
political participation were not linked in the direct manner described in the rentier literature; energy 
subsidies were a vestige of the UAE’s emergence from poverty a generation ago and were now more 
detrimental than helpful, given citizens’ high average personal incomes.438  
Development of political participation, enshrined in the UAE constitution, has lagged modernization 
in the economic and social spheres. Participation needed to be addressed – in the manner described by 
435 The Media Office for HH Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid al-Maktoum, 2011. Note that some citizen families 
never received an increase at all. Some of these were headed by current or retired members of the security 
services, or important tribal or ruling family members, whom continued to receive free or discounted electricity 
due to favored relations with the ruling family. 
436 Dubai Electricity and Water Authority 2013, 81-82, 91.  
437 The Dubai benefit reform came just three months prior to a petition for increased democratic representation 
that emerged in 2011. That petition, signed by 132 prominent Emiratis, circulated prior to the tariff hike. Several 
signers of that petition were jailed. See: Coates Ulrichsen 2012 
438 Author interview with Abdulkhaleq Abdulla, UAE political scientist, Dubai, Jan. 31 2012. 
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modernization theory – because it was required by a more sophisticated populace, which, as Lerner 
wrote in 1958, could now visualize itself in a new role.439 As for the retraction of welfare benefits, 
Peterson argues that when citizens feel that the ruling family has broken the social contract, they tend 
to express discontent through a “time-tested mechanism of feedback and response.” In the case of 
Dubai, the mechanism appears to have functioned properly. When this acceptable form of criticism 
fails, Peterson argues that citizens may transition to visible forms of discontent – such as Oman’s riots 
and sit-ins of 2011 – to push regimes to restore the social contract.440 
As mentioned in the literature review, government subsidies create groups of beneficiaries which can 
confront political leadership when their interests are jeopardized. Welfare societies thus maintain a 
constant potential for mobilization, which raises the stakes of reform.441 The difficulty of benefit 
reform is exacerbated in centralized state power structures which concentrate both authority and 
accountability. Retrenchment by a centralized autocracy such as Dubai’s exposes the regime to the 
full force of public reaction. In Dubai, prominent citizens directly petitioned the ruler for relief. 
Pierson and others argue that welfare reforms are thus best pursued when centralized regimes are 
either secure enough to absorb the political consequences, or when a budgetary crisis or external 
pressure sheltered leadership from blame.442 In Dubai’s case, the 2008 financial crisis offered a 
helpful shield that allowed the reform to be launched, but the outbreak of the Arab Spring, including 
uprisings in neighboring monarchies, reduced the regime’s sense of security and changed its 
calculations.  
However, the fact remains that Dubai’s 15% increase in electricity tariffs stayed in place for the 
majority of citizens, and citizens were now – in principle – expected to pay something for excessive 
water consumption. As of mid-2013, DEWA remained the sole GCC utility to have raised citizen 
electricity and water rates. By the end of 2011, the increase in electricity and water prices is said to 
have reduced power consumption by an average of 3% per account and water consumption by an 
average of 7.2%. The tariff hike saved Dubai the equivalent of around six shipments of LNG that 
year, worth some $300 million at prevailing prices.443 Dubai’s electricity tariff increase breached an 
important barrier; that of the rentier theory claim that subsidies – once extended – are understood by 
citizens as rights that cannot be retracted. Whether or not Dubai citizens felt entitled to their subsidies 
on power and water, a portion of that entitlement was taken away. Only indigent citizens on income 
support avoided increased electricity rates, which amounts to a targeting of the subsidy toward the 
poor. Even this result represents a theoretical breach of sorts. As mentioned in the literature review, 
439 Lerner 1958, 44–75  
440 Peterson 2012, 20-21. 
441 Pierson 1996  
442 Pierson 1996; Arnold 1992; Patashnik 2003; Hertog 2010a, 223–245 
443 Author interviews with energy policy officials in Dubai government, 2012 and 2013.  
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rentier states are supposed to be unable to retract subsidy entitlements or even restrict their delivery to 
the poor.444 For households and citizen-owned businesses which lost benefits, the regime offered no 
replacement (as Iran did, discussed in Chapter 6) nor any increase in political participation, as 
prescribed by classic rentier theory. Citizens protested the reform but the regime was never 
endangered. Public acquiescence to the rule of the al-Maktoum ruling family appears intact.  
In many quarters, the tariff reform passed without notice. Some observers expected a stronger public 
reaction. In an interview in 2010, prior to the increase, one of the UAE government officials quoted 
above had been skeptical that the Dubai government would risk angering citizens by reducing their 
subsidies on power and water. When reminded of this skepticism, the official acknowledged being 
surprised by the evidence showing that most citizens were willing to relinquish what had been 
considered a “right.”  
The partial success of Dubai’s benefit reform suggests that the UAE, and particularly Dubai, may 
assume the role of testing ground for regional subsidy reforms, given the polity’s public support and 
decision-making autonomy, the concurrent energy shortages and rising consumption trends, and the 
added pressure of substantial sovereign debt. In fact, another tariff increase for UAE citizens was the 
top recommendation emerging from an internal government energy workshop in April 2012. A 
policymaking official in attendance blamed the Dubai government’s 2011 climbdowns on lack of 
preparation:  
"We made a mess of it last time. The number one thing we learned from the last tariff increase 
was the importance of involving the public in the decision.  People need to know where their 
energy comes from, how much it costs, and what they can do about it.  If you educate and 
include them far in advance, then any changes necessary should be easier to accept, because 
they will be more informed and more willing to compromise."445  
Outside of Dubai, price increases that would challenge social contract outlays have been minimal, 
pointing up the predictive resilience of the theory and the difficulties for policymakers in being seen 
to renege on social contract terms. 
5.4.4 Prospects for Reform  
5.4.4.1 Saudi Arabia 
Nearly simultaneously with Dubai’s 2010 subsidy reform, energy officials in Saudi Arabia announced 
that an electricity tariff increase was under consideration. With natural gas in short supply, the 
kingdom had generated half its electricity that year by burning oil and diesel fuel. The prospect of 
444 Beblawi and Luciani 1987, 16 
445 UAE energy policymaker, interview with author on condition of anonymity, April 22, 2012. 
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another doubling of power demand over the coming decade led Saudi electricity regulator, Abdullah 
al-Shehri, to declare that electricity consumers required price signals to help them adopt efficiency 
measures.446 Al-Shehri was able to impose higher tariffs on commercial and industrial users, but did 
not win support from the Saudi Council of Ministers for a residential increase. His agency, the 
Electricity & Co-Generation Regulatory Authority (ECRA), had been forced by political outcry in 
1999 to retract its previous attempt to raise rates for large residential consumers. 447 
Al-Shehri believes his next attempt will succeed. In 2012 ECRA prepared the ground for a tariff 
increase on the residential sector, the largest overall sector in all the Gulf monarchies but Qatar. The 
authority arranged for the Ministry of Social Affairs to pay “reasonable” residential consumption of 
low-income Saudis, in hopes that the Saudi king and his advisers will agree to higher rates on 
remaining customers.448 Saudi subsidy reform has been aided by high-profile warnings from oil 
minister Ali al-Naimi and deputy oil minister Prince Abdul-Aziz bin Salman that the kingdom’s oil 
exports were threatened by growing domestic demand. Al-Naimi called for “a highly efficient 
rationalization program with the participation of the public and private sectors and all citizens in order 
to reduce consumption."449 
The cautious nature of subsidy reform in Saudi Arabia is reflected in recent rentier scholarship, which 
has emphasized not the autonomy of the state vis-à-vis its citizens, as early theorists held, but the 
opposite: The increasingly deferential treatment by a state that is wary of antagonizing citizens who 
possess new communication tools aiding mobilization. Gray describes a “responsive but undemocratic 
state,” which employs consultative mechanisms to respond to concerns of citizens impacted by 
policy.450 This responsiveness is aimed at maintaining the political status quo by alleviating pluralist 
pressure. One Saudi energy official interviewed for this research said that policymakers needed to first 
convince the public that prices need to rise, rather than the king and Council of Ministers. He said that 
convincing the Saudi public to turn against its own interest requires a well-crafted campaign that 
highlights waste and the regressive nature of subsidies, which proportionally benefit the rich.451  
Another delaying factor appeared to be the caution injected into policymaking by the Arab Spring. 
Majid al-Moneef, a key energy policymaker and member of the Saudi Shura Council, said the Arab 
uprisings would not derail reforms. “The impact of the Arab Spring … concerns the timing. It could 
446 Abdullah M. al-Shehri, governor, Electricity & Co-Generation Regulatory Authority of Saudi Arabia, Dubai 
Global Energy Forum, 18 April 2011, Dubai; as quoted by author. 
447 Author interview with Abdullah M. al-Shehri, governor of Electricity & Co-Generation Regulatory Authority 
of Saudi Arabia, Dhahran, Oct. 21, 2012. A previous residential electricity tariff increase, imposed amid the oil 
bust in 1985, was retracted after just a few months by Saudi Arabia’s King Fahd. 
448 ibid, al-Shehri interview. 
449 See, for example: Dourian 2012; Said 2012b; Said 2012a. Note that Ahmed al-Khateeb, CEO of a Riyadh 
investment bank, called for elimination of all energy subsidies for all but the poor: Arab News 2013 
450 M. Gray 2011b 
451 Saudi energy sector official, author interview on condition of anonymity, Khobar, Oct. 19, 2012. 
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delay reforms or make compensation schemes a bit different. But it will not, I don’t think, take price 
out of the agenda of economic reform in the region.”452  
5.4.4.2 Kuwait 
Kuwait is also under pressure to reform energy pricing. Rising demand for electricity has diverted 
ever-larger amounts of crude oil into the power sector, and has led the country to begin importing 
LNG at world market prices. However, Kuwait’s polity combines an unstable mix of autocratic and 
democratic institutions that impose an obstacle for reform. Scholars have shown that autocracies with 
high degrees of political participation are among the least stable polity types.453 A tariff increase in 
Kuwait would first have to be approved by the Emir and his cabinet, and then face the unlikely 
prospect of passage in Kuwait’s populist parliament, members of which tend to see themselves as 
advocates of increasing government welfare outlays.454 Residential electricity prices in Kuwait are 
thus among the cheapest in the world, just 2 Kuwaiti fils, or about 0.7 US cents per kWh, which 
amounted to about 5% of the government’s cost in providing power in 2011.455 (See Fig. 5.3) 
 
Figure 5.3: Cost-price differential (Source: Kuwait Ministry of Electricity and Water) 
5.4.4.3 Qatar 
The only Gulf monarchy with cheaper electricity than Kuwait is Qatar, where it is free, for citizens. 
Tariffs are also unlikely to rise in Qatar, but for different reasons. The tiny monarchy sits atop the 
world’s largest unassociated gas field. Only 7% of gas produced is consumed in the power sector. 
Eighty percent is exported.456 With an absolute monarch dependent on citizen support, Qatar appears 
comfortable paying for citizens’ unlimited residential consumption. A manager within the electricity 
452 Author interview with Majid al-Moneef, member, Shura Council of Saudi Arabia, Oct. 17, 2012, Riyadh. 
453 Eckstein 1973; Gurr 1970; Gates et al. 2006 
454 For more on Kuwaiti populism, see Hertog 2010b. 
455 Electricity tariff and cost details from Kuwait Ministry of Electricity and Water, in data received and 
interviews conducted during visits in March 2012. 
456 International Energy Agency 2012a 
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sector said he was leaving his job after failing to raise prices. “My role when I came here seven years 
ago was to introduce cost-reflective tariffs. I’ve been incredibly unsuccessful,” he said. “The locals 
have this right to free power and water. For the foreseeable future it won’t change.”457 
5.4.4.4 Oman 
Oman was the last of the Gulf monarchies to be electrified, beginning after the current ruler, Sultan 
Qaboos bin Said, overthrew his anti-development father in 1970. Since then, growth has been rapid, 
with output increasing by an average of 7% per year for the past decade. Per capita energy 
consumption remains the lowest in the GCC, but energy intensity is rising across all customer 
categories. Oman’s electricity regulator has warned that low tariffs are enabling an energy-inefficient 
building boom. The fear is that a dangerous path-dependency on high consumption is being created at 
a time when feedstock costs are rising dramatically, as oil and gas production shifts from the 
sultanate’s depleting conventional reserves to its more difficult deposits of unconventional gas.458 
Significant political barriers confront any welfare reform agenda. In 2011, Omanis surprised the world 
– and Middle East scholars459 – by joining the Arab Spring. After Bahrain, Oman was the Gulf 
monarchy that produced the most virulent uprising.460 Sultan Qaboos responded by calling in the 
army, while quickly creating jobs, increasing employment benefits and firing several members of his 
cabinet. In the power sector, the regulator delayed plans to impose cost-reflective tariffs on 
commercial and industrial users, even though the increase would not have affected the residential 
sector. However, senior energy policy officials said that Oman’s residential tariffs were not 
sacrosanct.  “It’s being discussed,” said Zaid al-Siyabi, who heads exploration and production at 
Oman’s Ministry of Oil and Gas. “For higher consumption, maybe the subsidies will disappear.”461 
And, as mentioned, in 2013, Oman's oil and gas minister Mohammed bin Hamad al-Rumhy made an 
unusually strong public exhortation for higher energy prices in the GCC.  
5.4.4.5 UAE 
The UAE, the largest net importer of energy in the Gulf, has launched the deepest reforms. Dubai, as 
shown, has used price to target demand. Abu Dhabi’s policy focuses on increasing and diversifying 
electricity supply, by increasing production of unassociated gas as well as investing in nuclear and 
457 Government official in Qatar electricity sector, one of two co-interviewed by author on condition of 
anonymity in Doha, April 4, 2012. 
458 Author interview with John Cunneen, executive director, Authority for Electricity Regulation, Oman; 
Muscat, Nov. 15, 2011. 
459 Author interviews, Oman. See also: Worrall 2012; Abdulla 2012. For a broader explanation of scholarly 
surprise at the Arab uprisings, see Gause III 2011a. 
460 Other protest demands included jobs, marriage subsidies, increased freedoms of expression and of the press. 
Protesters demanded an end to government corruption while expressing support for Sultan Qaboos. See, for 
example: Fuller 2011 
461 Author interview with Zaid al-Siyabi, director-general for oil and gas exploration and production, Oman 
Ministry of Oil and Gas, Muscat, Nov. 13, 2011. 
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renewable generation.462 The UAE’s two remaining utilities, in Sharjah and the Northern Emirates, 
have raised prices on foreign residents and industrial and commercial customers. In interviews prior to 
the Arab Spring, senior Abu Dhabi energy policy officials predicted that tariff increases would be 
needed to reduce peak electricity demand growth that had reached 16% per year. Previously protected 
UAE nationals would not be exempt from increases.463 One of the officials said: 
“The government accepts that the rate should be hiked and that consumers should have the 
right pricing signals to help them with their behavior. There is no sense in the government 
that asking Emiratis to pay for electricity and water is verboten; just the opposite. I get the 
sense that they believe that individuals should pay, and more importantly that they should get 
the right signals, whether expatriates or nationals, that they should be more efficient in their 
consumption. There aren’t really strong political barriers. There is some resistance.”464  
The official took issue with the view that citizen “rights” to cheap electricity were enshrined in a 
state-society social contract. 
“I think it is more accurate to describe it as, this is how things always have been done. The 
precedent is that I’m changing electricity and water prices, rather than any kind of formal 
social contract that says ‘These products should be free to the population.’ When Sheikh 
Zayed first set electricity and water prices, those weren’t heavily subsidized. There was no 
sense that people should be getting a free ride. … [W]hat you see is an inattention to pricing 
… rather than a political commitment to free electricity.” 
However, at the time of writing in 2013 no residential tariff hike had been imposed in Abu Dhabi. 
Prices remained at 1989 levels of 5 fils (1.4 US cents) per kWh for citizens and 15 fils (4 cents) for 
expatriates.  
5.4.5 Projections from EE Results: Residential Tariffs 
The case narratives above reveal strong potential for subsidy reform in Saudi Arabia and the UAE – 
including evidence of citizen subsidy retraction in Dubai – and pro-reform messages in Oman. The 
narratives find weakest reform potential in Kuwait and Qatar. The expert elicitation results above 
showed that energy consumption is considered a “threat” and a major policy priority in some GCC 
states, especially Saudi Arabia, UAE and Kuwait.   
462 For further details on Abu Dhabi’s power sector and gas shortage, see Krane 2012. 
463 Author interviews with Nick Carter, director general, Regulation and Supervision Bureau, Abu Dhabi. Abu 
Dhabi, Nov. 9, 2010; and David Scott, executive director, Economic and Energy Affairs Unit, Abu Dhabi 
Executive Affairs Authority, (telephone interview) Nov. 11, 2010. 
464 Author interview with David Scott, executive director, Economic and Energy Affairs Unit, Abu Dhabi 
Executive Affairs Authority, Nov. 11, 2010. 
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The next cluster of EE results, presented below, examines likelihood of tariff reform by 2020, under 
four scenarios. First, the expert survey asked whether domestic consumption would cause GCC 
governments to raise residential (or where tariffs were split, citizen residential) prices by 2020. As 
discussed, low citizen residential tariffs are important social contract provisions. Raising these prices 
would violate existing ruling bargains and contravene rentier state theory. Second, it asked whether 
commercial and/or industrial tariffs would be raised. Third and more broadly, the survey asked 
whether electricity subsidies would be reduced. And fourth, experts were asked to provide estimates 
of base tariffs in 2020. These estimates allow for a quantification of respondents’ conceptualization of 
pricing changes (See Annex 1 for results). For the first three questions, seven response choices were 
arrayed on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from virtually certain (greater than 95% probability) to 
exceptionally unlikely (5% or lower).  
EE responses from the residential tariffs question correlate strongly with interview data above that 
depict Saudi Arabia and the UAE as most likely reformers. In Saudi Arabia, only four of 27 
respondents (15%) thought it was unlikely (at any level) that the government would raise tariffs on 
residential customers by 2020. In the UAE, six of 35 respondents (16%) thought it unlikely that 
citizens would receive residential tariff increases. Among UAE government policymakers, only 12% 
(3 of 26) said a tariff increase was unlikely. This score may be unsurprising since these policymakers 
would have had knowledge of the 2011 tariff increase in Dubai and the ensuing debates. (Fig. 5.4) 
Residential subsidies appear more likely to remain intact in Qatar, Kuwait and Oman. In Qatar, 13 of 
21 respondents (61%) and in Kuwait, 9 of 18 respondents (50%) thought reforms were unlikely. Both 
of these figures support interview assessments in the country cases above. In Oman, where I received 
only 11 EE responses, there appeared to be disagreement with interviewee optimism about prospects 
for reform, with six of 11 (55%) saying a residential tariff hike was “unlikely.” However, it should be 
noted that Oman interview subjects said that any price increases would only target excessive 
consumption, leaving tariffs for the majority of consumers unchanged. 
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Figure 5.4: EE responses on probability of increased electricity rates 
The separate UAE expert elicitation added further questions differentiating the likelihood of 
residential rate hikes in Abu Dhabi, Dubai and Sharjah and the Northern Emirates (the last two 
aggregated in the question). The responses show a strong consensus that UAE citizens in Dubai, and 
in Sharjah and the Northern Emirates would receive a price increase (only 12%, in each said it was 
unlikely). In Abu Dhabi there was more uncertainty, with responses nearly evenly divided between 
likely and unlikely. (Fig. 5.5 and Table 5.3)  
 
Figure 5.5: UAE EE results on likelihood of increased prices at emirate level 
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Table 5.3  
Emirate 
Mean response  
(where 1=virtually certain  
and 7=exceptionally unlikely) 
Std. deviation  
Abu Dhabi 3.69  1.69  
Dubai 2.68 1.46  
Sharjah and N. Emirates 2.88 1.64  
 
5.4.5.1 Projections from EE Results: Commercial and Industrial Tariffs  
Rentier scholars argue that citizen benefits must be protected because of benefits’ role in generating 
legitimacy for ruling families. Theory makes no such claims about subsidies enjoyed by commercial 
entities. Does that mean companies make softer targets for reform? Yes. Expert respondents accorded 
higher probability to increased commercial and industrial electricity prices, perhaps given the relative 
lack of political clout of these customers. Again, Saudi Arabia and the UAE appeared the likeliest 
reformers (neither received an “unlikely” response), probably given the history of non-residential 
price increases in both. Oman and even Qatar were also deemed as likely reformers, moreso than 
Kuwait, perhaps because of an understanding of the reform barrier represented by the Kuwaiti 
parliament on the one hand, and the lack of such a barrier elsewhere. 
 
Figure 5.6: EE predictions on commercial/industrial tariffs (percentage figures represent combined “likely,” 
“very likely,” and “virtually certain” responses) 
 
5.4.5.2 Projections from EE Results: Electricity Subsidies  
Finally, I asked respondents to gauge the likelihood by 2020 of reductions in residential electricity 
subsidies (explicitly on citizens in countries with split tariffs). This question is nearly identical to the 
above query on residential prices and it returned a nearly identical response. The use of redundant 
survey questions, as mentioned in Chapter 3, provides an indication of the validity of previous results 
and mitigates anchoring bias. Once again the results show a bifurcation among countries that were 
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assessed as likely to reduce residential electricity subsidies – the UAE (66% likely) and Saudi Arabia 
(68% likely) – and those on the other side of the divide, Kuwait (42% likely), Oman (36% likely) and 
Qatar (26% likely). (Fig. 5.7)  
 
Figure 5.7: EE predictions on electricity subsidies (percentage figures represent combined “likely,” “very 
likely,” and “virtually certain” responses) 
 
5.4.5.3 Discussion 
The aggregated probabilistic judgments above are significant for two reasons. The first relates to the 
undesirable growth in domestic consumption of export commodities. Since electric power in the Gulf 
is generated by exportable fossil fuels, and reducing demand is likely to ease pressure on exports, 
price reforms would show evidence that Gulf regimes were likely to take the political risk required to 
extend the lives of export-oriented political economies. The second reason relates to the portrayal of 
subsidies in the literature. Since electricity subsidies are considered an integral component within the 
state-society social contract, and reforming them (in theory) represents a reneging on the government 
side of the bargain, the probability of rising prices foreshadows an impending challenge to this 
hypothesis. 
Regional experts broadly interpret current energy distribution practices as unsound. Results illustrate a 
consensus that these policies are most likely to be reformed in Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Dubai’s 
government has already breached the literature’s framing of the social contract, and the results above 
show that further such breaches are likely. As the theoretical heartland of rentier state theory, any 
outcome that undercuts validity in the GCC ought to call into question overall robustness of this 
theory, as currently framed. However, it bears noting that the theoretical infringements outlined above 
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all relate to the government’s second distributional stream, the flow of in-kind energy resources to 
citizens. Distributional flows from the fiscal channel, which redistributes export revenues in the form 
of services and financial benefits, have not been subject to the same concern or pressure. In fact, fiscal 
distribution increased dramatically upon the onset of pan-Arab uprisings. What do experts foresee in 
regards to the overall value of benefit distribution?  
5.4.6 EE Results: Distribution of Future Resource Benefits 
Beyond the narrow area of electricity prices and prospects for reform, I sought a way of gauging 
opinion on the long-term viability of social contracts. EE respondents were asked to characterize the 
evolution of state benefit distribution over the next two decades. Given the plateauing production of 
oil and gas, the increasing domestic demand for those resources, and the shrinking size of per capita 
resource endowments due to population growth, would the state retain the wherewithal to meet its 
obligations (i.e. would benefits “grow larger” or “remain the same”)? Or would welfare outlays 
become fiscally unsupportable (i.e. “grow smaller”)? These questions were asked as a way of 
illuminating the fiscal pressure on regimes that has been described elsewhere in the literature, and the 
environment for recalibrating the state’s rent allotments. 
Responses reveal broad uncertainty about the future direction of the rentier welfare state. 
Distributions were nearly even in Kuwait and the UAE in the general EE. The strongest trend 
obtained in Qatar, where unsurprisingly, not a single respondent said benefits would grow smaller. 
Two-thirds said they would increase. The UAE government EE produced the most pessimistic result, 
with half of the policymakers polled (10 of 20 responses) predicting benefit reductions, which 
contrasts with the broader UAE result.   
 
Figure 1: EE predictions on direction of future benefits 
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What is suggested by the ample showing of the “remain the same” and “grow larger” categories, 
especially for the UAE and Saudi Arabia, is that many respondents who foresaw electricity price 
increases do not believe that a loss of electricity benefit heralds an overall reduction in state benefits, 
but rather that the menu will be rearranged. “Either you will find a way to pay people money, or you 
keep the subsidies,” said Stéphane Michel, who heads the Qatar office of Total, the French energy 
firm. “There is no way the government will decrease the amount of money that is given to the 
population. No way. It will be political suicide.”465 Framed in terms of this chapter’s disaggregated 
distributional paradigm, many respondents who predicted that regimes would move to constrain flows 
of in-kind energy resources also believed that these reductions would be offset by increased 
distribution through the fiscal channel. However, a substantial number of EE respondents on Saudi 
Arabia and Oman, as well as among UAE policymakers, believed that the aggregate level of 
government benefits is unsustainable and will be reduced.  
5.4.7 Robustness of EE Results 
Expert elicitation as a methodology is well suited to the uncertainty that characterizes this research. 
Distributive governance structures erected in the early days of the oil boom are undergoing stress 
tests, with domestic consumption beginning to conflict with exports. Determining probable state 
responses, which, for the most part, have not been launched, involves making a judgment under 
conditions of uncertainty, the very purpose for which EE was designed. My elicitation follows 
established practice by using clearly formulated questions and statements characterizing the problem, 
offering responses based on gradations of certainty, and presenting those formulations to a panel that 
pooled experts and policymakers whose knowledge and experience qualifies them to provide credible 
insights. Their aggregated judgments compliment the interviews, case study and descriptive statistics 
also deployed in this chapter. The combination of these methods provides a robust triangulation 
approach for examining the subsidy issue and differentiating among the Gulf monarchies and their 
probable responses. Each methodology provides complementary data. Interviews add richness and 
nuance to the less detailed findings of the EE. The case study offers thick description of a relevant 
reform that has already occurred. Descriptive statistics describe the energy trends that illustrate the 
intensity of the reform context. 
5.6 Conclusion 
The data presented above suggest a convergence of expert understanding that some of the Gulf 
monarchies will act to reduce current trajectories in domestic resource consumption by raising prices. 
The results also illustrate the limitations of two theoretical constructs at the heart of rentier theory, 
whereby regimes exchange “rent” for political quiescence, and that, once extended, these 
465 Author interview with Stéphane Michel, managing director, Total E&P Qatar. Doha, Nov. 29, 2011. 
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distributional flows become considered rights of citizenship. These constructs can be strengthened if 
revised in a way that allows for the state’s “rent” flows to be disaggregated into two streams: one for 
fiscal allotments based on oil exports at market prices, and another for in-kind resources. The in-kind 
resource distribution channel must be managed so that it does not interfere with the more significant 
fiscal distribution stream, since financial benefits depend on maintaining resource exports sufficient to 
fund state budgets – at least until alternate economic sectors can assume that role. This chapter does 
not challenge the literature’s framing of the first stream as a crucial component of regime legitimacy 
and political stability. It does, however, argue that the literature’s framing of energy subsidies – 
described here as the second distributional stream – is undergoing a stress test. Policymakers and 
experts have altered their views on energy distribution, regarding it as a threat rather than a stability 
enhancement: "We are wasting too much energy in the region and the barrels that we are consuming 
are becoming a threat now, for our region particularly,” Oman’s minister of oil and gas, Mohammed 
al-Rumhy, said publicly in 2013. “What is really destroying us right now is subsidies.” (emphasis 
added) This chapter argues that this altered perception has not yet been adopted by the academic 
literature. Rentier approaches must be revised; first, to accommodate this change in perception of 
subsidies, and second, to adapt to the possibility that these subsidy entitlements may be revoked, as 
demonstrated by Dubai, or replaced, as Iran has done. (Described in the following chapter) 
Continuing growth in population and wealth in the Gulf monarchies implies further increases in 
domestic energy demand. In such an environment, the region’s subsidized energy prices are likely to 
represent an increasingly important and accessible target for demand-side management. However, it 
bears recognizing that other means – ranging from fuel and technology substitution to energy 
efficiency standards – remain companion pieces of holistic energy policy. Despite this assessment, 
only two of the six monarchies – the UAE and Saudi Arabia – can be said to be preparing the 
groundwork for reforms of residential electricity subsidies that comprise part of the state-society 
social bargain. Oman also appears likely to reform some prices, but recent treatment in the media 
suggests that residential electricity rates are not among those targeted in the near term.466 Kuwait 
emerged as less likely to pursue reforms, despite a widely recognized need to reduce domestic 
consumption. In a class by itself was Qatar, which exhibited neither need to reduce energy use nor to 
cut back on benefits.467  
Other exporters have managed to dismantle domestic energy subsidies that were either interfering 
with exports or threatening to do so. Indonesia and Mexico are examples of depleting exporters 
winding up energy largesse from a previous era. In their cases, subsidy reforms were accompanied by 
466 James, A. E. “Gradual subsidy cut to strengthen Oman's fiscal position: IMF.” Times of Oman. (Feb. 2, 2014) 
[http://www.timesofoman.com/News/Article-29203.aspx] 
467 Bahrain has been dropped from this analysis given its small resource base, the small sample of EE 
respondents, and domestic circumstances that overshadow energy policy such as political unrest and the military 
and economic intervention of neighboring states. 
160 
 
 
                                                     
increases in political participation. More germane to the Gulf monarchies are the 2010 reforms in Iran 
– itself a former monarchy – that slashed energy subsidies and recast them as cash transfers to 
families.468  
Subsidy reform may offer relief to rentier regimes, but it is a problematic outcome for rentier state 
theory. In the EE, 80% of experts agreed that citizens consider subsidies as “rights of citizenship,” 
backing up the claims in the literature.469 This consensus sets up a knotty construct. If energy 
subsidies are “rights,” how is it possible to reform them? Ultimately, one would want to 
systematically examine citizen concepts of social contracts in Gulf monarchies, and consider their 
perceptions of higher prices. This is the task of the following chapter. Here, I argue simply that 
Dubai’s reform casts doubt on the universality of subsidy rights, as do the predictions for price 
increases outlined above.  
Outside the literature, interviews found an alternate interpretation of subsidies in which low prices are 
considered an outdated holdover from the post-1973 welfare state. Ruling sheikhs who deployed 
windfall rents to improve living standards never meant to create entitlements.470 Even in the UAE, 
where the government has phased in subsidy reductions on diesel fuel and gasoline, and Dubai has 
added to these an increase in power and water prices, there remains a segment of society that opposes 
benefit reductions. These voices are expressed in newspaper articles grumbling about rising gasoline 
prices or through political representatives who have asked for reversal of price increases.471 UAE 
political scientist Abdulkhaleq Abdulla, who described energy subsidies as an unnecessary relic, 
estimates that as much as a third of the population of UAE nationals still believes in welfare benefits 
as a birthright.472 
A second question posed by the aggregated EE results is just as messy. Electricity subsidies are a 
small part of the overall rentier benefit package, but a particularly damaging one because of the 
undermining of the export economy. It therefore ought to be among the easiest welfare components to 
reform. But only two of the six Gulf monarchies appear likely to raise prices by 2020. What is the 
future for the others, if they do not follow along? If regimes are unable to develop an alternative 
legitimacy formula that can substitute for in-kind resource distribution, how long can these rentier 
political economies be expected to survive? If, as scholars claim, autocracies such as those in the Gulf 
are sustained by patronage, repression and – when patronage is unavailable – increases in repression 
468 Iran will be discussed in depth in the following chapter. 
469 Sixty-one of 76 respondents, said “yes” to the question “Several academics have stated that subsidies in the 
GCC are perceived by nationals as rights of citizenship. Do you agree?”  
470 This was the opinion of multiple interviewees. 
471 Such as Ahmed al-Shamsi, representative to the UAE Federal National Council from Ajman, who called in 
2012 for reduced gasoline prices, and for all UAE nationals to pay the same electricity price, with everyone 
paying the lower price of Abu Dhabi. The proposal seeks electricity tariff reductions for UAE citizens in the 
other six emirates with higher rates. Author interview, Dubai, April 8, 2012. 
472 Author interview, Dubai, Jan. 31, 2012. 
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or pluralism, one suspects that for states which forfeit their patronage, resources will be mobilized 
toward repression or pluralism.473 
A third question concerns theory. Have scholars been wrong all along in declaring the inviolability of 
the rentier social contract? No. Classic rentier theory is grounded in the 1980s context of 
comparatively undeveloped political economies. Although core theoretical tenets retain substantial 
explanatory power, theory has required updates through the years to cope with the growth and 
modernization of these monarchies.  Amid such thoroughgoing change as has occurred in the Gulf, 
one expects that theory and governance structures would require substantial adjustment. Despite these 
circumstances, it is surprising to discover the extent to which energy policy still adheres to the 
literature’s view of the “inviolable” social contract. Ministries and regulators in the Gulf have sought 
to ease demand by raising electricity prices nearly everywhere else first: on commercial and industrial 
customers and on foreign residents. The agonizing difficulty in raising citizen prices shows that this 
aspect of the theory retains substantial explanatory power. 
Scholars examining the stress-testing of the social contract during the oil bust period found similar 
regime creativity in maintaining subsidies they could no longer afford. Chaudhry documented Saudi 
Arabia’s failure to implement austerity measures, including a tax proposal repealed three days after it 
was announced.474 Crystal documented Kuwait’s similar failure, including an attempted electricity 
tariff hike in 1986, which revealed “the great reluctance of these regimes, even in times of 
substantially reduced revenues, to tax more resources from the population, or to cut back substantially 
on social services, preferring instead to draw down reserves or flout (OPEC) production quotas.”475 
However, as mentioned, the current dilemma is distinct to that of the oil bust, since it is of a structural 
rather than fiscal nature. A rising oil price can provide only temporary fiscal relief if exports are 
displaced.  
Economic necessity is forcing a change in government perception of once sacrosanct social contracts. 
More tariff-setting entities in the Gulf monarchies will embrace reforms, most likely beginning with 
those in the UAE and Saudi Arabia, because abiding by a narrow interpretation of the social contract 
presents regimes with the potential for a worse outcome than antagonizing citizens with rising prices. 
Absent reform, and all else equal, regimes face diminishing hydrocarbon exports and the subsequent 
loss of all-important rents. Whether one takes the view that social contract menus are rigid or 
malleable, these findings suggest that energy subsidies will either become “replaceable” or, as in 
Dubai, “expendable.”  
473 Desai, Olofsgard, and Yousef 2009; Tullock 1987 
474 Chaudhry 1997, 34-5, 274–5  
475 Crystal 1990, 191–2 
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I argue on both theoretical and empirical grounds that the rentier constructs that purport to explain 
stability of the Gulf monarchies through their distributional structures will need to be updated to 
accommodate the separation of rent distribution from in-kind resource distribution, and the winding 
up of the latter practice in the name of preserving the state. This revenue maximization strategy entails 
an instability risk. By cutting back on energy handouts, regimes risk triggering a backlash from 
citizens angered by the loss of benefits which are often understood as compensation for their lack of 
political participation. 
The ongoing Arab Spring has made regimes reluctant to move ahead. By retaining energy subsidies, 
regimes must continue to shoulder the threat to vital exports and rent streams. This means that one of 
the state’s key political structures – the distribution of energy benefits – will remain locked in an 
escalating conflict with the state’s chief economic structure, the export of that same energy resource. 
As mentioned, domestic mispricing of a primary export commodity can only be sustained if 
production of that resource rises at least as fast as domestic demand.476 Since production is essentially 
flat and economies have not diversified much beyond reliance on resource exports, these countries 
will face an increasingly sharp conflict between sustaining export earnings and keeping prices down 
for domestic customers. In short, in spite of the risks, reform is likely because the alternative is worse. 
Whether or not reform comes to pass, this chapter has demonstrated that rentierism is structurally 
encumbered with a stability threat. Theories of politics of rentier states must acknowledge this 
contradiction and concede the possibility of its reform, through the social contract. My research shows 
that reform is either happening or likely in at least two of the six Gulf monarchies, states occupying 
the epicenter of natural resource rentierism. Together, Saudi Arabia and the UAE account for 80% of 
the GCC population, 70% of oil exports and 75% of oil reserves. The increasing potential for subsidy 
reform does not mean that rentier theory lacked predictive power, but rather that it was unable to 
foresee the evolution of internal dynamics in these countries that conflict with export models.  
  
476 Or if the economy is diversified sufficiently to offset the loss of commodity exports 
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Chapter 6: The ‘Demand Side’ of Persian Gulf Energy Subsidies: Citizen 
Attitudes on Proposed Reform 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Are citizens of autocracies entitled to cheap energy? How amenable are they to losing the subsidies 
behind those “entitlements”? A public survey in the six Persian Gulf monarchies reveals levels of 
public entitlement to energy subsidies that are less universal than those inferred by rentier theory. As 
theory would suggest, citizens claiming entitlement to national resource wealth are those least willing 
to accept higher prices. On the other hand, a substantial portion of the public did not oppose higher 
prices. Support for higher electricity prices rose substantially when the public was given a national-
interest explanation, and when an alternate benefit was offered. These findings suggest that the Gulf 
public may be more amenable to subsidy reform than current caution in policymaking implies. 
Subsidy reform has become a major priority, albeit with steep political hurdles, given the rapid growth 
in domestic energy consumption that threatens to displace hydrocarbon exports, the economic 
mainstay of the Gulf monarchies. This chapter uses interviews and surveys of policymakers and other 
regional elites to reveal notions of “rigid” social contracts and welfare expectations that are consistent 
with rentier theory, while public survey data demonstrates that society holds a more varied and 
flexible interpretation. Results show that subsidy reforms predicated on appeals to the national interest 
may win support among some citizens, while opposition remains staunch among those who attribute 
energy subsidies to personal “ownership” of national resource endowments.  
Classic rentier literature makes bold claims about regimes in resource-exporting states while offering 
underdeveloped sketches of societies living under their typically autocratic rule. Rentier regimes are 
depicted as autonomous from their publics, securing public support by abundant distribution of 
natural resource revenues. For their part, citizens are portrayed as complacent and lacking in 
motivation for economic and educational self-improvement, since their incomes flow from citizenship 
rather than from hard work.477  
Several recent studies on the Gulf Arab states pose challenges to some of these claims through close 
examination of state obligations, which might be described as the “supply” side of the social contract. 
These include work by Gray on the Gulf monarchies, Davidson and Calvert Jones on the UAE, 
Hertog on Saudi Arabia and Jocelyn Mitchell on Qatar, which dispel some of the more caricatural 
477 Mahdavy 1970; Beblawi 1987; Luciani 1987; Gause III 1994; Crystal 1990  
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notions of early theory, while depicting regimes as increasingly deferential toward citizens.478 
However, other than Mitchell’s depiction of citizen activism among Qataris, these works ascribe little 
agency to citizens or suggest that Gulf nationals can mobilize to pursue their interests. Rather they 
imply that regimes have maintained or increased benefit allocations in the interest of avoiding citizen 
mobilization. As in the classic literature, the state-society social contract is still understood as difficult 
to change. 
With this chapter I illuminate a portion of the less-explored “demand” side of the rentier social 
contract, which comprises the expectations of citizens. My results challenge the literature’s 
monochrome view of the citizen by showing a more complex public understanding of the 
interconnection between the state’s natural resources and citizen welfare benefits. I gather public 
attitudes toward reform of energy subsidies, a topic with present-day policy relevance, and show that, 
while many citizens do express notions of entitlement to welfare benefits and opposition to reform – 
in this case of subsidized energy – others are willing to consider the loss of those benefits under 
certain conditions. 
One reason why the citizen “demand” side of the social contract has been relatively unexplored is lack 
of data. There have been few public surveys on attitudes toward energy in the Gulf and none that 
delve into matters comprising the foundations of public support for ruling families.479 To compensate, 
I gathered views of the general population by conducting a major public survey of 730 Gulf nationals 
that sought insights into their sense of energy entitlement and attitudes toward higher retail prices. I 
use these responses to revise theoretical assumptions on the distributive practices of Gulf monarchies 
in three ways. First, by measuring citizen interpretations of the patronage distribution mechanism, to 
which scholars ascribe so much magnitude in generating regime support; second, by contrasting 
citizen interpretations with expectations in the literature; and third, by contrasting citizen views with 
those of elites and experts.   
The data reveal a disparity suggesting that commonly held assumptions – and academic theory – are 
wide of the mark. Where theory and elite observers remain beholden to views of a rigid social 
contract that precludes “extraction” from the public, citizens reveal notions of a more flexible 
compact. While elites see citizens as fierce opponents of proposals that would erode public “rights” to 
cheap domestic energy, only a subset of the public conforms to this view. A substantial portion of the 
public appears more amenable to subsidy reforms, especially when portrayed in the national interest. 
478 Such as M. Gray 2011b on the Gulf monarchies and Hertog 2010a on Saudi Arabia, Davidson 2005 on the 
UAE, J. S. Mitchell 2013 on Qatar. Earlier works touched on these themes, including Anderson 1986 on Libya 
and Tunisia, Chaudhry 1997 on Saudi Arabia and Yemen, and Vandewalle 1998 on Libya.  
479 Willis Energy Services and the Nielsen Co. used survey methodology to prepare their Study of Modes of 
Energy Consumption in the UAE (2011), a government document obtained by the author. However, the survey 
does not address public conceptions of entitlement. 
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Citizens are less likely to claim rights to subsidized energy than scholars and experts are to concede 
those rights.  
This disjuncture between views of citizens and those among scholars and elites is consistent with the 
“dictator’s dilemma” problem, in which policymaking in autocracies is insufficiently informed by 
public opinion.480 Results of an expert elicitation reveal overestimation of public opposition that is 
symptomatic of this view. Elites, policymakers among them, develop understandings and make policy 
under certain assumptions and conditions. Given their imperfect information on public opinion, those 
assumptions may be misguided, as this chapter will illustrate. However, the observation that policy is 
crafted under conditions of imperfect information does not invalidate the methodology of expert 
elicitation, nor does it undermine the findings of the previous chapter, which suggest that policy 
reforms may go ahead in certain states and perhaps not others. Policymakers and experts may not 
have perfect information about the preferences of policy recipients, but that does not stop them from 
making policy. 
The survey results detailed below suggest that policymakers may have more scope than commonly 
understood for reforming the trends of resource consumption that characterize these monarchies. This 
chapter focuses on reform of residential electricity prices because of the large and growing amounts of 
exportable energy commodities consumed in the sector, and because electricity’s distribution 
technology allows regimes leeway to impose discriminatory pricing in ways that reflect a customer’s 
economic status or political clout. Electricity pricing thus provides information on political 
entitlements that is more difficult to obtain from pricing of transportation fuels, for example. 
The reform challenges facing these regimes are of enormous significance for their countries, as well 
as for international energy markets and the global community of resource-importing states. State-
society relations and the social contract are the underlying structures on which questions of reform of 
domestic resource consumption are situated. The manner in which states and societies confront these 
issues will provide clues about the viability of an important source of supply to energy markets, and 
the ultimate longevity of some of the world’s last remaining absolute monarchies.  
The rest of this chapter unfolds as follows: Section two reviews literature on social contracts and 
subsidy reforms, with a focus on rentier states. Section three offers my research design, hypotheses 
and methods, as well as my statistical model. Section four provides the results of the statistical 
analysis. Section five offers an in-depth discussion of the survey results and introduces additional 
qualitative research data from an expert elicitation and discusses potential biases that could affect 
results. A brief section on policymaking amid uncertainty precedes the conclusion. The public survey 
text and associated variables are given in the appendix. 
480 Wintrobe 2001; Tullock 1987; Desai, Olofsgard, and Yousef 2009 
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6.2 Subsidy Reform and the Social Contract 
As discussed in the literature review, rentier scholarship affords little ambiguity on regime options 
vis-à-vis citizen subsidies. Welfare benefits are portrayed as vital components of citizenship which, 
collectively, comprise the citizen’s most important inducement for acquiescence to his government’s 
rule. This acquiescence is typically framed as a social contract or “ruling bargain.” Authors declare 
that benefits cannot be retracted without offsetting their loss with a corresponding increase in 
democratic legitimacy. To do otherwise would challenge the basis of the state. 
The concept of the social contract is thus central within the rentier state and in the theoretical works 
examining these states. Whereas in democratic states, social contracts generally refer to collective 
bargains among representatives of labor, capital and the state,481 in more autocratic states the social 
contract becomes a redistributive “authoritarian bargain” enshrining the terms by which citizens 
legitimate governing regimes and the constraints and incentives that apply to both parties. In the 
rentier Middle East, these pacts assume the crucial role of institutions that in more participatory 
polities confer government legitimacy through formal citizen input. Farsoun argues that rentier social 
contracts wind up according citizens with political rights to economic security which go beyond mere 
humanitarian aspirations. In so doing, Farsoun argued presciently that Arab regimes unwittingly 
created a bargain they could not maintain forever, ensuring that the growing expense of providing 
subsidy “rights” would become a central issue of governance in the current century.482  
Benefit reforms have been amply covered in the political literature on welfare states, but mainly in 
reference to reforms done under democratic governance. However, works on the risk of 
“retrenchment,” or retracting benefits, also contain much of relevance for autocracies. As in 
democracies, government subsidy creates solidarity among beneficiaries who can rise up and threaten 
political leadership when their interests are jeopardized. Pierson argues that welfare societies thus 
maintain a constant potential for mobilization that raises the stakes of reform.483 As mentioned in the 
literature review, centralized power poses an additional obstacle to subsidy reform, since it 
concentrates accountability. Reform-minded regimes are exposed to the full force of public reaction. 
There is little doubt that Middle East social contracts are sheltered by formidable barriers to reform, 
despite their “negative effects on employment, productivity, foreign investment, trade, and 
macroeconomic performance.”484 Heydemann and others characterize reluctance to reform as an 
incumbent’s rational response to circumstances in which costs of reform are immediate, while 
481 Yousef 2004a, 6 
482 Farsoun 1988, 231 
483 Pierson 1996 
484 Heydemann 2003a 
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benefits are delayed and uncertain. Regimes pondering changes to state benefits – including those on 
energy – face a daunting confrontation with the social contract. 
6.2.1 Dangers of Abrogating Gulf Social Contracts 
Gulf scholars have speculated for decades on how the public might react to government violations of 
the social contract, including in the area of energy pricing. Writing during the oil bust of the 1980s 
and 1990s, Crystal saw the threatened (but mostly unimplemented) reduction of welfare benefits and 
imposition of taxes in Kuwait and Qatar as a source of instability that would drive demands for 
participation.485 Gause argued that Gulf monarchies’ failure to meet their ends of the social contract 
would jeopardize the future of their political systems.486 More recently, Davidson forecast in 2012 
that an inability to maintain social contracts – along with a technology-empowered political 
opposition – will bring about the demise of all six Gulf monarchies by 2017.487  
Regarding the energy subsidies that are the focus of this research, Hertog and Luciani have been 
among those arguing that higher prices would be helpful in reducing demand, but conceding that 
regimes would be unlikely to raise prices, especially on citizens’ residential consumption.  
“Encouraging (residents) to change their electricity consumption pattern is much more 
difficult than pursuing a more rational use of energy in industry, and it is especially difficult if 
the price lever cannot be used. It is therefore expected that emphasis will be on increasing 
electricity production rather than reining in consumption and, if anything, savings efforts will 
be focused on industry rather than the residential sector.”488 
Dargin writes that raising domestic natural gas prices to even half of international levels would result 
in severe political repercussions.489 And Kazim, in his 2007 study outlining energy conservation 
options for the UAE, stretches as far as to recommend that the Emirates cut consumption by reducing 
population growth, but does not even broach the possibility of raising residential electricity prices.490 
Perhaps the strongest reason for the one-sided portrayal of subsidies and social contracts as so 
difficult to reform is related to the risks to the survival of the regimes which launch them. As Gurr 
writes, and as history shows, declines in state benefits and social welfare are common triggers for 
political violence and even overthrow of governments.491  
485 Crystal 1990, 191–2 
486 Gause III 1994, 147 
487 Davidson 2012, ix 
488 Hertog and Luciani 2009, 6–7 
489 Dargin 2008 
490 Kazim 2007 
491 Gurr 1970, 338-40 
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6.2.2 Comparative Subsidy Reform in Energy Exporting States 
What does history reveal about subsidy reform in mineral exporting countries? The record is mixed. 
Raising prices of subsidized energy and food has been a prime driver of unrest, with numerous 
examples – including overthrown regimes in Venezuela and Indonesia – provided in the literature 
review. However, the record of subsidy reform also reveals positive outcomes. All but five of 28 
substantial energy subsidy reform efforts documented by the IMF in the past two decades managed to 
meet with some success.492 Most of those occurring in exporting states have come amid a decline in 
national oil production.  
Among energy exporters, Indonesia, after failed attempts in 1997 and 2003 successfully raised fuel 
prices in 2005 and 2008. Indonesia reduced its subsidy load from 3.5% of GDP in 2005 to 0.8% by 
2009. Yemen has also managed small reductions in fuel subsidies, which, however, still accounted for 
7.4% of 2009 GDP. Mexico reduced gasoline subsidies in 2005 and 2006493 after failing to reform 
electricity prices between 1999 and 2002. Malaysia underwent a series of attempts to reduce fuel 
subsidies (which stood at more than 1% of GDP in 2012) but most were reversed following public 
outcries.494 Nigeria’s fuel price reforms of 2011-12 triggered anti-government unrest but still managed 
to reduce costs from 4.7% to 3.6% of GDP.495 However, the most relevant example of subsidy reform 
has arisen in an OPEC member state in the Gulf, itself a former monarchy, and the country for which 
the term “rentier state” was coined.496 
6.2.2.1 Iran’s Subsidy Reform of 2010 
In December 2010, Iran became the first major energy-exporting country to drastically cut indirect 
subsidies on energy products497 as well as the first country in the world to replace energy handouts 
with a universal cash transfer program for households.498  Iran’s dramatic reform, which exchanged 
one social contract benefit for another, achieved positive welcomes from the IMF and, at least 
initially, the Iranian public.499 The IMF and press reports have credited the reform with reducing 
domestic energy demand while halving the world’s largest energy subsidy burden, valued at around 
$100 billion or a quarter of 2010 GDP. Demand reduction was sufficient to permit a temporary 
increase in oil exports, before Iran’s oil trade was blocked by international sanctions.500 The 
492 International Monetary Fund 2013a 
493 Uri and Boyd 1997 
494 Malaysia was not included in the IMF’s case study report. See instead Chyi 2012 and International Monetary 
Fund 2013b 
495 International Monetary Fund 2013a 
496 First use of the term “rentier state” is generally credited to Mahdavy 1970 on Iran. 
497 International Monetary Fund 2013a; Guillaume, Zytek, and Farzin 2011 
498 Tabatabai 2011 
499 Initial public support is documented in Guillaume, Zytek, and Farzin 2011 
500 Middle East Economic Survey (Apr. 30, 2012) “Second Phase Of Subsidy Reform Plan To Await Budget 
Approval” p. 17-18. See also: Tehran Times. (Dec. 31, 2011) “Petrol rationing saves Iran $38 billion: Official.”  
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government built support for the reform by creating bank accounts for each household and depositing 
monthly payments worth about $40 per person prior to the program’s launch. Recipients could only 
access those payments after prices were raised.501  
Iran’s reform confronted a structure of energy underpricing that the IMF described as unsustainable. 
Domestic demand was curtailing oil exports while forcing Iran to import market-priced gasoline at 
around US$2 per gallon, which it then sold domestically for 38 US cents.502 Government reports 
claimed that 70% of these subsidies accrued to the richest third of the population.503 When subsidies 
were reduced, the largest increase in price affected smuggling-prone diesel fuel, which rose from US 
1.6 cents to 37 cents per liter (an increase of more than 2,000%), followed by electricity for large 
residential consumers, where prices for consumption in excess of 600 kilowatt-hours per month 
jumped from US 1.6 cents to 19 cents per kWh (a rate nearly double the average US price in 2012). 
Rising price bands were designed to encourage conservation and protect the poor, with the first 100 
kWh of electricity per month remaining available for 2.7 US cents.504 (Fig. 6.1) 
 
Figure 6.1: Comparison of energy prices in Iran, 2010 vs 2011 
Although initial plans called for prices to be increased to 90% of international levels over five years, 
the subsidy reform was halted in 2012 by rising inflation and a lack of parliamentary support.505 The 
tightening of international sanctions targeting Iran’s nuclear program in 2010 and 2012 made it 
difficult to separate the macroeconomic effects of the subsidy reform from those triggered by the 
501 Guillaume, Zytek, and Farzin 2011 
502 International Monetary Fund 2013a 
503 Tabatabai 2011 
504 Note that 100 kWh is a fraction of Iran’s average monthly consumption of 2,500 kWh. Guillaume, Zytek, and 
Farzin 2011 
505 Bozorgmehr 2012; International Monetary Fund 2013a 
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embargo. Whatever the cause, severe inflation undermined the subsidy measure, reducing energy 
prices in real terms as well as the value of the replacement cash transfers.506 Dwindling political will 
also undercut the reform, since prices and payments were not adjusted for inflation. The overall 
outcome remains inconclusive. The IMF has reported in 2013 that energy consumption growth was 
“initially stabilized” and describes the reform as “partially successful.”507  
Regardless, the Iranian reform and replacement stipends resonated within GCC energy ministries. In 
Saudi Arabia, which operates amid similar levels of subsidy and budget dependence on oil exports, an 
adviser expressed sentiments similar to those of President Ahmadinejad, that prices needed to be 
raised to encourage efficient resource consumption, rather than to reduce the social contract’s burden 
on fiscal accounts.508 (See Table 6 in Introduction for subsidy details) 
To sum up, the literature emphasizes the illegitimacy of subsidy reform and the dangers of reneging 
on social contracts. Despite this, several countries have managed to reform subsides, albeit mainly 
outside the GCC. What do the experiences of Iran and the other reformist energy exporters portend for 
the Gulf monarchies? Will citizens in the Gulf monarchies accept reforms that reduce domestic 
pressure on exports, and, perhaps, compensate citizens for their loss in welfare? 
6.3 Research Design 
6.3.1 Hypotheses 
Regime survival considerations are surely one of the chief inhibitors of social contract reforms. If the 
literature’s picture of the inelastic social contract is accurate, regimes are in a bind. In an expert 
elicitation conducted for this research, 80% of experts (61 of 76) agreed that citizens consider 
subsidies as “rights of citizenship,” backing up the claims in the literature.509 This consensus appears 
to conflict with moves toward reducing benefits. If energy subsidies are “rights,” is it possible to 
reform them? Answering this question depends less on regime or expert concepts of the social 
contract, and more on the understandings of citizens. Policymakers contemplating a reduction in 
energy subsidies would therefore want to understand the boundaries of acceptable reform: Do citizens 
claim entitlement to energy resources? If so, does that mean they oppose higher prices? Would 
citizens require or even accept a replacement benefit in exchange for agreeing to pay more for 
506 International Monetary Fund 2013a  
507 International Monetary Fund 2013a, 6 
508 This author discussed its details with Dr. Majid al-Moneef, an advisor in the Saudi Ministry of Petroleum and 
Minerals, on Oct. 17, 2012. Dr. al-Moneef displayed in-depth knowledge of the Iranian reforms and their 
relevance for the kingdom. 
509 Sixty-one of 76 respondents (80%) said “yes” to the question “Several academics have stated that subsidies 
in the GCC are perceived by nationals as rights of citizenship. Do you agree?” See further detail below. 
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energy? With this logic in mind, I designed three hypotheses that could be tested with public survey 
data.  
First, I wanted to learn whether entitlement-minded citizens – those who express ownership over 
national resources – are more opposed to higher electricity prices, when no rationale is given for an 
increase. In numerous settings, including in Dubai in 2011, subsidized energy prices have been raised 
with little warning or explanation. Given their sense of entitlement to energy, it should logically 
follow that the entitled group would oppose encroachment on that benefit, therefore: 
H1: Citizens exhibiting entitlement are less likely to support increased electricity prices  
However, what if the national interest is invoked as the rationale for higher prices? If citizens are told 
that higher prices were needed to reduce waste so that their country’s exports of oil and gas could be 
maintained, might entitlement-minded citizens be convinced to relinquish those entitlements? The 
second hypothesis tests the assumption that entitlement-minded citizens are more inclined than others 
to remain opposed to higher prices. 
H2: Citizens exhibiting entitlement will express lower support for higher prices than the 
overall public, even if the national interest is invoked  
As mentioned above, Iran designed its subsidy reform to include a compensation payment for lost 
benefits, and citizens largely supported this strategy. Would entitlement-minded GCC citizens also 
support such a benefit swap?  
H3: Citizens exhibiting entitlement will demonstrate more support for higher prices if offered 
an alternate benefit  
I am also interested in measuring the relationship between demographic variables and support for 
higher prices. This is not because the rentier literature suggests certain categories of citizen are more 
prone to claiming subsidy rights, but to determine whether effects other than “entitlement” can better 
explain any citizen support for higher electricity prices. To test for these effects, I included 
demographic variables (presented in Table 6.1) as part of a regression which seeks to correlate 
support for higher prices with socio-economic status, education, gender, and age. One might expect 
that in the patriarchal Gulf that women and younger citizens are less likely to control household 
finances or bear the responsibility for paying bills and therefore could exhibit more support for higher 
electricity prices. Also, more educated citizens might be expected to possess a greater understanding 
of the region’s economic quandary and therefore might also support higher prices, while less educated 
citizens might be less willing to contemplate paying more.  
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6.3.2 Data and Methods 
Data from the public survey provide the source for hypothesis testing, while I also pursued a 
complimentary approach through responses to an expert elicitation (EE) of Gulf energy experts 
(discussed in Chapter 2) to illuminate elite conceptions of energy subsidies and citizen entitlement. 
The two methods are logically complementary but statistically incompatible due to differences in 
selection of respondents and their available response categories. On the one hand, the public survey 
reflects an attempt to gather a representative sample of the public. On the other, the EE selects 
particular subject-matter experts, and makes no attempt to be representative. Therefore I did not 
compare the two datasets statistically, but instead provide the aggregated EE responses as an alternate 
view of the social contract to contrast with the ground-level citizen-participant view. These 
juxtapositions are useful in establishing whether prevailing views of elites, as well as those in the 
academic literature, reflect understandings held by citizens. The EE data provide context for 
benchmarking public opinion, which eases interpretation of the survey and regression results.  
6.3.2.1 Public Survey 
The polling firm YouGov conducted the public survey online, translating it into Arabic and providing 
it to its Middle East panel, which included the 730 citizen respondents in the six GCC countries 
(Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and Bahrain) which provide the data for this chapter. The 
survey responses were gathered between from Nov. 28 to Dec. 4, 2011. (See Appendix for survey 
questions and demographics) The data is heavily skewed toward Saudi respondents and contains 
proportionately few responses from the smaller monarchies. All responses are from citizens. 
Expatriate residents did not participate. However, YouGov warned that its panel was not 
representative of the citizen population as a whole, and that it may be affected by errors in sampling 
and coverage. A company official said that, since the survey was conducted online, and Internet 
penetration remained less than universal in parts of the Gulf and Middle East in 2011, the results 
should be considered broadly illustrative of public opinion rather than statistically representative.  
Due to small sample sizes in the smaller monarchies, I aggregated the GCC responses in the interest 
of statistical robustness. While I had hoped to differentiate among the countries and recognize the 
shortcomings of grouping the responses, the aggregated results may still represent opinion in the 
smaller countries given the close regional similarities in energy pricing, level of subsidy, and in 
political structure and culture. Perhaps the chief distinction among respondents lies in income level, as 
can be seen in the Appendix. The terms of my agreement with YouGov limited me to six questions 
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and did not allow for differentiating questions by country. Survey responses from outside the six Gulf 
monarchies were excluded.510 
My approach involves examining concepts of the social contract through citizen attitudes toward their 
receipt of subsidized electricity. Given the urgency of reforming energy subsidies in five of the six 
monarchies (Qatar excepted), how amenable are citizens to paying a cost-reflective price for their 
electricity consumption? How do citizens respond to a proposed loss of energy benefits? The survey 
allowed me to tease out perceptions of entitlement among citizens and evaluate levels of public 
opposition and support for a hypothetical retraction of citizen subsidies under conditions which might 
be useful in a Gulf policymaking context. Survey responses providing data for the three dependent 
variables were arrayed on five-point Likert scales. (See Appendix for full detail) 
• I asked how willing the citizen would be to paying the full cost of electricity without 
government assistance, explaining only that “the true cost without government subsidies is 
more than the average price that citizens in your country pay now.” Respondents were offered 
five choices ranging from “very willing” to “very opposed.” Responses from this question are 
designed to measure the first dependent variable (Dep 1) and will be used to test H1. 
 
• I asked how willingly citizens would pay higher prices to moderate consumption in the 
national interest. “Some people have said that since electricity is provided to citizens at an 
artificially low price some people waste it. This consumes oil and gas that could be exported.” 
Responses on higher prices ranged from “strongly support” to “strongly oppose.” Responses 
from this question will be used to measure the second dependent variable (Dep 2) and test H2. 
 
• I sought comment on what might be termed the “Iran model,” asking whether the public 
would support a price increase if citizens were compensated with an alternate benefit of equal 
value. Responses ranged from “strongly support” to “strongly oppose.” Responses from this 
question will measure the third dependent variable (Dep 3) and be used to test H3. 
 
• The main independent variable in my model is that which measures citizen entitlement to 
subsidized energy. To measure this variable, labeled “share” below, I used responses which 
agreed with the statement that government electricity subsidies were a manifestation of “my 
share of the country’s energy wealth.” I classified those who selected this response option as 
the “entitlement-minded” group, and used their aggregated responses to discern the effect of 
the main independent variable. 
510 The YouGov panel in the GCC included few participants outside Saudi Arabia. Numbers of responses are 
lower than 730 because I excluded “don’t know” and incomplete responses from the dataset.  
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 • Remaining independent variables are taken from demographic data from the YouGov survey 
panel. These predictors include respondents’ reported gender (“female”), income (“income”), 
educational level (“edu”) and age group (“age”).  
Each of the three dependent variables measures a component of my theory. Dep 1 measures the 
impact of entitlement on willingness to pay, when prices are raised without an explanation. Dep 2 
measures the impact of entitlement on willingness to support increased prices, when invoking the 
national interest in conserving natural resources for export. Dep 3 measures impact of entitlement on 
willingness to consider a benefit swap. I also sought to determine whether, as the rentier literature 
implies, a majority of citizens believe they are entitled to subsidized electricity as their “share” of the 
national resource patrimony. As depicted in the frequency tables below (Table 5.1), and discussed in 
subsequent sections, this assumption was not accurate. 
Table 6.1: Frequency tables for three dependent and five independent variables 
Dep 1 Freq. Percent Valid Cum. 
 
Dep 2 Freq. Percent Valid Cum. 
1 (v. willing) 49 9.06 10.54 10.54 
 
1 (s. support) 64 11.83 14.1 14.1 
2 90 16.64 19.35 29.89 
 
2 117 21.63 25.77 39.87 
3 90 16.64 19.35 49.25 
 
3 110 20.33 24.23 64.1 
4 94 17.38 20.22 69.46 
 
4 114 21.07 25.11 89.21 
5 (v. opposed) 142 26.25 30.54 100 
 
5 (s. oppose) 49 9.06 10.79 100 
Total 465 85.95 100 
  
Total 454 83.92 100 
 Missing 76 14.05 
   
Missing 87 16.08 
  Total 541 100 
   
Total 541 100 
  
           Dep 3 Freq. Percent Valid Cum. 
 
Share Freq. Percent Valid Cum. 
1 (s. support) 53 9.8 11.32 11.32 
 
0 No 312 57.67 57.67 57.67 
2 113 20.89 24.15 35.47 
 
1 Yes 229 42.33 42.33 100 
3 126 23.29 26.92 62.39 
 
Total 541 100 100 
 4 130 24.03 27.78 90.17 
      5 (s. oppose) 46 8.5 9.83 100 
 
Female Freq. Percent Valid Cum. 
Total 468 86.51 100 
  
0  male 332 61.37 61.37 61.37 
Missing 73 13.49 
   
1  female 209 38.63 38.63 100 
Total 541 100 
   
Total 541 100 100 
 
           Edu Freq. Percent Valid Cum. 
 
Income Freq. Percent Valid Cum. 
1 9 1.66 1.67 1.67 
 
1 105 19.41 19.41 19.41 
2 184 34.01 34.07 35.74 
 
2 97 17.93 17.93 37.34 
3 58 10.72 10.74 46.48 
 
3 100 18.48 18.48 55.82 
4 261 48.24 48.33 94.81 
 
4 102 18.85 18.85 74.68 
5 19 3.51 3.52 98.33 
 
5 137 25.32 25.32 100 
6 9 1.66 1.67 100 
 
Total 541 100 100 
 175 
 
 
Total 540 99.82 100 
       Missing 1 0.18 
   
Age Freq. Percent Valid Cum. 
Total 541 100 
   
1   18 to 24 158 29.21 29.21 29.21 
      
2   25 to 29 149 27.54 27.54 56.75 
      
3   30 to 34 123 22.74 22.74 79.48 
      
4   35 to 39 59 10.91 10.91 90.39 
      
5   40+ 52 9.61 9.61 100 
      
Total 541 100 100 
 
6.3.3 Model Specification 
The three dependent variables for this study contain five ordered categories measured on a scale from 
1 to 5. I use OLS as my main analytical technique, since there is a long tradition of using OLS 
regression to analyze Likert scales. However, as a further test of reliability of these results, I ran 
ordinal logit models for the three dependent variables of interest. These models yielded results bearing 
the same level of significance.511 See Appendix Table A9 for results. Therefore, in the interest of 
easing interpretation, I will present findings from the OLS models. 
The basic regression model is as follows: 
Support for higher electricity price = entitlement + age + education + income + gender 
OLS (Support for Higher Electricity Prices) = α + β1 (Entitlement) + β2 (age) + β3 (education) + β4 
(income) + β5 (Female) + ε 
Where β1 through β5 are the parameters of interest in the study.  
The results are shown in Table 6.2, columns 1, 2 and 3. Each column presents results for the 
dependent variables aggregated for the six countries surveyed in the study. The tables present the 
coefficients from the multivariate model and the p-values to indicate the significance level of each 
variable. Standard errors are also given. 
6.4 Results 
What can the survey responses tell us about citizen attitudes toward subsidy reform in the rentier 
Gulf? I tested hypotheses 1, 2 and 3 using regression, with “share” as the main independent variable 
signifying a citizen’s entitlement to subsidies, and the three “support for price increase” responses as 
dependent variables. I also inserted respondent demographics as predictor variables. 
511 Robustness tests were also conducted for multicollinearity and parallel regression. Tests upon each of the 
three models revealed no multicollinearity and no violation of the parallel regression assumption.  
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The regression results for the first two dependent variables displayed the expected signs and 
marshalled strong support for H1 and H2, finding that citizens who express entitlement to national 
resources are indeed more opposed to higher tariffs under the conditions described, as shown by the 
negative signs on coefficients in Table 6.2, at the top of column 1 and 2. These findings conform to 
long-held assumptions reflected within rentier works that portray reforms of energy subsidies as 
violations of citizen rights. As shown in the table, citizen “entitlement” to energy as a personal share 
of a national resource is strongly associated with higher levels of opposition to higher prices, when 
compared with the overall population, in models 1 and 2. 
MODEL 1: The results of the first model are given in Table 6.2, column 1. Entitlement-minded 
citizens are seen to be less willing to pay the full cost for electricity in their homes when informed 
only that the government is paying for a portion of their consumption. This result provides strong 
support for H1. Also significant (at the 0.05 level) was level of education. However, contrary to what 
was surmised above, more educated respondents are actually less likely to support higher prices. 
Based on the other results of this model, there was no corroboration for assumptions that women or 
younger or wealthier people were also more likely to support higher prices.  
Table 6.2: Entitlement and subsidy reform  
(Dependent variables are "willingness to pay" variations in Dep 1, Dep 2, and Dep 3) 
Model: 1 2 3 
Share (entitlement) -.525*** -.422*** -.128 
 
(.1259) (.1142) (.1098) 
Age (age groups) -.033 .007 -.002 
 
(.0508) (.0458) (.0443) 
Income .007 .027 .0198 
 
(.0458) (.0417) (.0402) 
Education -.128* -.025 .094* 
 
(.0605) (.0549) (.0526) 
Female -.198 -.350** -.153 
 
(.1349) (.1223) (.1175) 
Constant 
 
2.61 
(.2475) 
2.61 
(.2315) 
3.25 
(.2190) 
* significant at the 0.05 level; ** significant at the 0.01 level; *** significant at the 0.001 level; 
Standard errors are in parentheses below coefficients. 
 
MODEL 2: The results of the second model are given in Table 6.2, column 2. Here again, citizens 
who expressed entitlement to natural resources were less supportive of higher electricity prices, in this 
case, when invoking the national interest. Again, this result is highly statistically significant and offers 
strong support for H2. Also significant (at the 0.01 level) was gender, but, again, contrary to what was 
surmised above, women were less likely than men to support higher prices, despite being informed it 
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was in the national interest. Based on the results of this model, there was no support for assumptions 
that more educated, younger or wealthier people were more likely to support higher prices. 
MODEL 3: The results of the third model are given in Table 6.2, column 3. Entitlement has no 
statistically significant effect on whether a respondent would accept an alternate benefit in lieu of 
higher prices. Here, education was again significant (at the 0.05 level) but this time the sign is in the 
positive direction, which signifies that respondents with higher levels of education were more likely to 
accept higher prices if provided an alternate benefit. The other demographic variables were 
statistically insignificant. There is thus insufficient evidence to support H3, which declares that 
entitlement-minded citizens will demonstrate more support for higher prices if offered an alternate 
benefit. 
6.5 Discussion 
Analysis of citizen survey responses reveals a more nuanced view of the social contract than that 
implied in the literature. Citizens who express feelings of entitlement to subsidized energy accept the 
notion that they are entitled to that energy at a special price. Significant correlations from multiple 
regressions were consistent with the subsidies-as-rights narrative in rentier theory. However, as 
demonstrated by minority of respondents who selected the entitlement option, a majority of citizens 
did not express entitlement to subsidized electricity. As mentioned, nearly six in 10 respondents (312 
of 541 total) did not select the “entitlement” option. 
How does citizen understanding of subsidy and potential reform contrast with that of experts? Broadly 
speaking, expert opinions reflect the portrayal of subsidies in the literature: Citizens are entitled to 
subsidized energy and should be expected to oppose increased prices.  
When asked a question related to that which informed H1, experts overestimated citizen opposition to 
proposals that would erode public “rights” to cheap domestic energy. Among the entire pool of citizen 
respondents (including the “entitled” and those who did not choose this option), 41% were either very 
or quite opposed and 41% were unopposed to higher prices.512 By contrast, when experts were asked 
how citizens would respond, 92% of the expert respondents portrayed citizens as opposed, with just 
5% portraying them as not opposed.  
In the second survey question that informed H2, the percentage of total respondents “strongly 
opposed” to higher prices dropped from 26% to just 10%. Therefore a substantial portion of the public 
was actually willing to make a personal sacrifice to promote the national interest513 in a more optimal 
512 The unopposed camp includes the 24% who were either “very” or “quite willing” and the 17% who were 
“neither willing nor opposed.” I excluded the “don’t know” responses. 
513 All of the GCC countries have introduced campaigns asking the public to conserve energy  
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allocation of exportable resources. (As shown above, those expressing entitlement happened to be 
much less likely to make this sacrifice.) The expert elicitation questionnaire did not contain this 
question, thus there is no comparison between cohorts. 
What if citizens were offered an alternate benefit to replace subsidized prices for electricity, as 
occurred in Iran? Alaskans, who pay some of the highest electricity rates in the United States, also 
receive a yearly cash dividend as their portion of the state’s oil revenues. Might a substitute benefit 
plan be accepted in lieu of higher tariffs in the Gulf monarchies? Responses to the survey question 
that informed H3 found that opposition was also assuaged by an alternate benefit. Opponents 
comprised 32% of respondents, with just 9% of those remaining in the “strongly oppose” category. 
Conversely, 51% of respondents did not oppose this hypothetical exchange of benefits. There was no 
statistically significant difference in response between those who expressed entitlement to subsidies 
and those who did not.  
As Table 6.3 shows, once again, the expert respondents in the EE survey assumed a greater level of 
public opposition to a tariff increase, even when replaced by a quid pro quo benefit.  
Table 6.3: Experts versus the Public 
 Public Survey Expert Elicitation 
 
 
Variable/Model 
Public 
opposition to 
higher prices 
Public support or 
indifference to 
higher prices 
Experts who 
assume public 
opposition to 
higher prices: 
Experts who 
assume public 
support or 
indifference to 
higher prices 
Dep 1: No 
explanation 
41%  41%  92%  5%  
Dep 2: Nat’l 
interest 
explanation 
32% 49% n/a n/a 
Dep 3: Alternate 
benefit 
32%  51%  53%  47%  
 
IV: Entitlement  
 
% public choosing “entitlement” 
 
 
% of experts assuming public would 
choose “entitlement” 
subsidies = “my 
share” of energy 
wealth 
 
42% 
 
75% 
Note: Figures do not add to 100% because “don’t know” responses and missing values were deleted 
 
Citizens were also less likely to claim entitlement rights to subsidized energy than elites and experts 
anticipated. Whereas 75% of experts selected the option that subsidies represent the citizen’s share of 
national resource wealth, only 42% of public survey respondents chose it. 
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The comparison of the two sets of survey results above, one from the public survey, another from an 
expert elicitation, should be treated as broadly illustrative rather than statistically robust. The 
methodologies and questions used to gather opinions from both groups differed. While the public was 
asked for personal opinion, experts were asked to estimate how the public, in aggregate, would 
respond. Therefore the right-hand column in Table 6.3 represents expectations of experts regarding 
results in the left-hand column. The differences between the two methods also extend to techniques of 
data gathering and selection of respondents. It was thus not feasible to use statistical methods to 
examine differences among the two groups, or to test hypotheses based on such a comparison. 
However the varying percentages in Table 6.3 still provide a useful illustration that citizen perceptions 
of social contract benefits are more varied and nuanced than the monochromatic portrayals assumed 
by experts and within the literature. Likewise, the expert elicitation results illustrate the extent to 
which experts’ understanding of the social contract conforms to portrayals within the literature. 
6.5.1 Other Reasons to Support Higher Prices 
The aggregate public survey results in Fig. 6.2 beg a further question: Why would anyone want to pay 
more for electricity? While the regression results found a propensity to oppose higher prices among 
entitlement-minded citizens, these citizens are in the minority. Overall, a surprising amount of the 
public did not oppose increased prices. This finding suggests that, while the subsidies-as-rights 
construct within the rentier literature holds among a subset of the public, alternate explanations for 
citizen perspectives toward energy may also hold validity. Another account suggested by the 
aggregate citizen response is desire for more prudent stewardship of national resource patrimonies, 
given that the interests of citizens and future generations are congruent with optimal allocation of 
natural resources between domestic consumption and export markets. Since the largest share of the 
rentier social benefit system rests on export revenues, citizens’ best interests might be served more 
effectively by reducing domestic waste and the associated opportunity cost of foregone revenues, 
while ensuring long-term sales at the highest possible prices, both inside and outside the country. 
Rentierist constructs of subsidy “entitlements” appeal to some members of the public, but these 
constructs probably more closely represent regime needs for purchasing domestic loyalty than long-
term interests of citizens. 
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 Figure 6.2: Public survey responses regarding higher electricity prices under three scenarios 
However, another explanation might also offer insight into this willingness to pay more. In the 
question informing Dependent Variable 1, where respondents are given no rationale for higher prices, 
a surprising 24% of the public is nevertheless willing to pay more. This choice appears to run contrary 
to the public’s immediate financial interest. One possible explanation flows from the implied terms of 
the authoritarian social contract. If a respondent disputed his or her role in exchanging political 
support for government subsidies and instead preferred more political participation, he or she might 
reject government subsidies.514  
The survey did not ask respondents outright whether they would trade subsidies for more participation 
in governance. However, if this rationale was driving some support for cost-reflective electricity 
prices, it would provide an opposing message to governments considering raising electricity prices. 
Whereas the “economic rationality” explanation by which citizens should oppose wasted resources in 
the name of preserving long-term state distribution appears to encourage increased prices, the 
explanation of demands for increasing political participation does not. In fact, this explanation would 
validate regimes’ cautious approaches to tinkering with subsidies, assuming ruling families do not 
wish to encourage participatory demands. In the past, regimes have demonstrated this stance by drip-
feeding any political openings into their societies, ensuring that they pose no challenge to ruling 
family control. Recent repression of pro-democracy forces, including violent responses in Oman, 
514 I am indebted to Bill Nuttall at Cambridge for pointing this out. This hypothesis is undermined by the 
experience of Kuwait and Bahrain, however, where democratic openings have only intensified rent-seeking 
opportunities. Also, if survey respondents support higher prices because they seek a corresponding increase in 
political participation, one would expect to see correlations between the “entitlement” explanation for subsidies 
and support for higher electricity prices. However, as shown in the retention of H2 and H3, this was not the 
case. 
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Kuwait and in Bahrain – where Saudi and Emirati forces joined in – provides another demonstration 
that regimes remain staunchly opposed to broader liberalization. 
6.5.2 Statistical Bias and Mitigation Measures 
As Weisberg argues, errors are inevitable in surveys.515 While useful in gathering an externally valid 
measure of attitudes and beliefs in society by sampling a small subsection, they remain prone to 
influencing respondents through question wording and order, as well as other effects, including 
statistical biases. One such bias that may be relevant here is the so-called “hypothetical bias” that 
stems from use of “willingness to pay” questions such as the three “support for price increase” 
questions. These constructions have been shown to overestimate actual willingness to pay because 
participants given hypothetical opportunities are more willing to commit to a purchase than those 
offered genuine opportunities.516 Since this bias might have inflated levels of citizen support for 
higher prices, especially in Models 1 and 2, I designed the response choices as a Likert range that 
allows respondents to express a level of willingness rather than a firm commitment, which has been 
shown to reduce hypothetical bias.517 Considering these responses a “range” is sufficient for the 
methodological goal of this chapter, which is to demonstrate that entitlement-minded citizens as a 
portion of society profess reduced willingness to support higher prices, and vice versa. It might be 
interesting to know whether or not hypothetical support for higher prices among the less-entitled 
cohort translates to actual willingness to pay (on behalf of heads of households with responsibility for 
utility bills) but this knowledge is not required to prove my hypotheses. 
Another effect known as “status quo bias” could be exerting a counteracting effect to hypothetical 
bias in Model 3, where subjects were queried on willingness to trade one benefit for another. 
Experiments have shown that people are reluctant to give up a good they own for something of equal 
value, and that those who own a good happen to value it more highly than those who do not. This bias 
could be dampening public enthusiasm for trading electricity subsidies for alternate benefits.518 
Mitigation strategies for status quo bias tend toward survey formulation that acknowledges 
respondents’ preferences for the status quo and their inherent resistance to change, and addressing 
those through a process unavailable for this research which involves exposing participants to an 
optimal alternate choice.519 
515 Weisberg 2008 
516 Several authors have studied this bias aiming to overcome it. In one experiment, respondents offered a 
hypothetical opportunity to buy medical supplies were more likely to buy them than those offered a genuine 
opportunity. See Blumenschein et al. 2008. See also: Cummings, Harrison, and Rutström 1995; List and Gallet 
2001; Harrison 2006 
517 Champ, Moore, and Bishop 2009; Champ and Bishop 2001 
518 Tversky and Kahneman 1991; Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1988 
519 Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1988 
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The so-called “fear bias” can affect surveys in authoritarian states, especially on questions delving 
into sensitive subjects, where respondents may be tempted to give insincere responses due to fear of 
government repression or retaliation.520 For the reasons given in Chapter 3, however, I suspect fear 
bias has not produced a large influence on responses. 
6.5.2.1 EE Biases 
Regarding the expert elicitation portion of this paper, a few potential biases bear reiterating beyond 
their treatment in the Methodology chapter. The most common is that of overconfidence on behalf of 
participants, which I address here by grouping similar responses given at varying levels of confidence, 
and by corroborating EE results against the literature and my own interview data. Anchoring bias can 
also influence responses on longer surveys like the EE. I addressed anchoring where possible by 
measures such as validating responses through redundant questions and by requesting extreme high 
and low values, followed by a request for a median estimate. Related “sequential” effects, which 
concern to a tendency to over-emphasize the importance of the first and last pieces of evidence in a 
sequence, were addressed in all surveys, where possible, by randomizing response order. The effect of 
so-called herding or rational bias has been shown to affect forecasts of GDP or oil prices, for instance, 
since analysts tend to follow a consensus,521 or in the case of anti-herding, deliberately placing 
forecasts away from the consensus.522 Herding effects are not significant here, given the lack of a 
consensus on the topics, which can be seen in the wide variations in electricity price predictions and 
large standard deviations in Appendix Table A3.  
Finally, any motivational bias associated with participant selection was probably small. This bias 
tends to arise in research on controversial topics where experts are divided. Since expert elicitation by 
its nature deals with “experts” and not random members of the public, experts should be expected to 
accord topics in their area of expertise with more importance than the average person. Experts are 
chosen precisely because of their expertise, and their selection is thus purposefully biased. Hence EE 
selection bias is related to the motivation behind an expert’s participation in the survey, not whether 
too many people were selected with higher-than-average knowledge of the topic. In my EE, 
motivational effects were probably inconsequential, given the lack of controversy or public divides 
among experts that might affect the issue under study, and the generalized wording of elicitation 
requests and questions. 
6.5.2.2 Mitigation Options for Future Research 
Limitations within the public survey might be overcome in future research by methods not available 
for this work, including a more extensive survey and a more diversified and representative panel that 
included larger sample sizes in the smaller monarchies. Questionnaires containing specific country-
520 Horne 2011 
521 Batchelor 2007 
522 Pierdzioch, Rülke, and Stadtmann 2010 
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level prices – which would detail the current average monthly electricity expense and compare it to 
the much higher spending under cost-reflective pricing – might be useful in reducing hypothetical 
bias.523 Also, an expanded survey could ask respondents whether they are responsible for paying their 
electricity bills, how much they pay, and how willingly they would accept a tripling or quadrupling of 
their current bill. Improvements in questions’ relevance to respondents would allow the researcher to 
focus on citizens with actual responsibility for payment, helping the research overcome limitations on 
bias and differentiating among countries and demographic groups. Biases associated with online 
surveys – which tend to exclude older and less technologically sophisticated segments of society, 
which remain significant in some Gulf monarchies – would be lessened over time as the Internet 
penetrates these societies.  
Even taking account of these caveats, my results provide nuanced perspective on rentier state 
subsidies that contrast with the monochromatic portrayal within the literature. These findings also 
suggest policy avenues that could address energy consumption challenges. For instance, given the 
relatively high levels of public support for higher tariffs, voluntary programs appealing to the national 
interest that encourage citizens to opt-in to higher tariffs might achieve efficiency gains without 
risking a political backlash from the entitled-opposition group.524 
6.5.3 Policymaking and the Information Deficit 
The gap in perceptions regarding the social contract – with citizen understandings diverging from 
those of experts and the literature – is consistent with the information deficit that is said to impair 
policymaking in autocracies. Scholarship examining the institutional environment of authoritarian 
states has long argued that policymakers in autocracies suffer from much weaker awareness of public 
preferences than do their counterparts in democracies.525 The democrat’s advantage stems from 
institutions that offer avenues for criticism and amendment of unpopular measures. These range from 
freedoms of speech and press, independent judiciaries, and elections that provide opportunity to vote 
for an organized political opposition. Since these constraining institutions are less common in 
autocracies, Wintrobe argues (in similar fashion to classic rentier scholars) that autocracies thus enjoy 
enhanced freedom of policy action. However, citizens in autocracies also tend to be reluctant to signal 
their displeasure with policy. Rulers are apt to fear the public since they lack information on public 
opinion. The phenomenon is known as the dictator’s dilemma. Regime understanding of public 
523 Blumenschein et al. 2008 
524 Borenstein finds efficiency gains from an opt-in tariff in California that allows utility customers to choose a 
flat rate or a variable rate with discounts at off-peak hours and a premium at peak times. See Borenstein 2012 
525 Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2002; Tullock 1987, 122–3; Kuran 1989; Wintrobe 2001 
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preferences is thus negatively correlated with repression. Rational choice literature describes this 
information deficit as the result of weak institutions that characterize personality-based rule.526 
The autocratic governance that typifies Gulf monarchies is consistent with the dictator’s dilemma, but 
the information deficit stems not only from deficient institutions and signaling, but also an absence of 
common consultative practices, such as use of survey and focus groups, that can illuminate public 
preferences. Social policy is fragmented, and regimes wield rent streams, business licensing and 
import restrictions to co-opt rivals with economic privileges that increase costs of defection.527 Policy 
proposals are typically debated in traditional family-tribal networks and then launched.  
A UAE government official’s description of policymaking reveals a process which pays little heed to 
public preferences: 
“Policymaking isn’t very mature in the government. People will just brainstorm around an 
idea, take it to the legal department and draft a law. From legal it goes to the diwan [ruler’s 
court] and then to the sheikh. He will discuss whatever proposal they bring him. Most 
(policymakers) don’t see the value in consultation.” 528   
But while avenues of citizen protest are not institutionalized in the Gulf, they still exist. The freedom 
of policy action that the literature describes often disintegrates when a public backlash ensues. 
Complaints filter into the media and social networks. Prominent citizens go directly to the ruler or his 
agents. When the outcry is sharp enough, the law is adjusted. 
“This is what happens when you announce the policy with no proper analysis or consultation. 
We don’t have a mechanism for public complaints. We hear about it through the newspapers 
and our own social connections. We need channels of communication.” 529 
6.5.4 The Uncertain Boundaries of Extractive Policy  
Sensitivity to public opinion has inculcated in governments a reflexive resistance to “extractive” 
proposals such as the subsidy reforms discussed in this chapter. Gray and other rentier scholars 
suggest that regimes increase responsiveness to society over time, while displaying little appetite for 
testing the boundaries of social contracts. Recent pan-Arab uprisings have only redoubled these 
sensibilities.530 Policymakers said they feared negative public reactions as well as unwanted scrutiny 
526 Wintrobe 2001; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2002; Bueno De Mesquita et al. 2003, 73–4; Kinne 2005 
527 Mares and Carnes 2009; Haber, Maurer, and Razo 2003 
528 UAE government official, interviewed by the author on condition of anonymity, Apr. 8, 2012. 
529 UAE government official, interviewed by the author on condition of anonymity, Apr. 8, 2012. 
530 Results from a separate expert elicitation the author conducted with UAE policymakers in March 2012 found 
that 15 of 25 respondents said the Arab Spring events made the government “less willing” to raise utility rates 
(one of three choices); while 21 of 26 respondents said the government was either “very sensitive” or 
“extremely sensitive” to citizen opinion on subsidies (of five choices). One respondent commented that the 
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from the ruler’s office. Despite the sensitivity, governments appear to be unwilling to use common 
consultative tools such as surveys and focus groups. Nor is there a clear understanding of the ruling 
family’s boundaries on policymaking. 
“I haven’t done public surveys. I don’t know what the public thinks. I’m making all kind of 
assumptions that may not be true. I don’t know whether it’s the sheikh’s perception that 
(subsidized energy) is a right. But if he got a proposal that advocated a 30 percent price 
increase, he might say, ‘Give me an idea what this means to the average person’s account.’ Or 
‘Let’s go with 10% instead.’ The answers he gets (from staff) might not be based on a proper 
study. If you develop some government policy tools to capture public opinion, then you have 
less chance to base policies on hypotheses that aren’t true.” 531 
A government official in Oman described blocking or retraction of extractive measures.  
“There have been attempts to create toll systems on the roads. Those have been stopped. 
There used to be an immigration payment of two to five riyals when you crossed the border to 
go to Dubai. That has actually been stopped. Groups of people went to his majesty to request 
exemption. It’s really not easy in this part of the world. You have to listen to the people’s 
demands. In the United States or Europe people pay 50 or 80 percent of their salaries for 
democracy. It’s a tradeoff.”532 
A prominent Saudi energy official reiterated the quid pro quo assumptions that typify the EE 
responses, which suggest that benefit substitution, as per the Iran example, remains a viable 
possibility.  
 “The residential electricity tariff is part of the social agreement between the royal family and 
the people. If you touch it you have to repay it somewhere else.”533 
An expatriate energy policymaker in Qatar echoed these sentiments, saying that any attempt to impose 
extraction would have to be balanced by a new gesture of government largesse.  
“My role when I came here seven years ago was to introduce cost-reflective tariffs. I’ve been 
incredibly unsuccessful. The locals have this right to free power and water. For the 
foreseeable future it won’t change. The government has enormous wealth. It sees distributing 
uprising had made the government “much, much, more sensitive and less willing to raise prices or antagonize 
anybody, anywhere, at any time.” 
531 UAE government official, interviewed by the author on condition of anonymity, Apr. 8, 2012. 
532 Author interview with Omani government official on condition of anonymity, Muscat, Nov. 13, 2011. 
533 Author interview with Saudi energy policymaker on condition of anonymity, Riyadh, Oct. 16, 2012. 
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free power as a way to share that wealth. If you reduce that benefit, you would have to find 
another benefit to replace it.”534  
Anonymous surveys offer the possibility of sidestepping the signaling problems and information 
deficits that obscure policymaking. Gathering survey responses allowed me to assess citizen responses 
to subsidies often described as a key component of the autocratic social contract. While the social 
contract is well understood as the mechanism governing the exchange of government benefits for 
public support, this research shows that citizen concepts of the terms of that bargain are not uniform 
or clear, nor are the boundaries for policymaking.  
Elites, perhaps because of their lack of information on public opinion, believe that the public is 
overwhelmingly opposed to subsidy reform unless it receives an alternate benefit to compensate for 
those revoked. Public survey results challenge that perception. In Model 1, the public was as 
supportive or indifferent to higher prices as it was opposed. The expert understanding was one of 
overwhelming public opposition. Public willingness increased substantially under the still-extractive 
terms of Model 2, when the national interest was invoked, and remained nearly identical to that in 
Model 3, when a replacement benefit was offered. Given the urgency of reducing energy demand in 
these countries, the overestimation of public opposition to reform would seem a costly misperception. 
6.6 Conclusion 
The relationship between state and society in the rentier monarchies of the Gulf is more nuanced and 
complex than portrayed in the rentier literature. Many citizens conform to the pronouncements in the 
literature by expressing entitlement-based reasoning for their receipt of energy subsidies. This 
“entitled” group is statistically more likely than the general population to oppose reform of those 
subsidies. On the other hand, substantial portions of the public did not express entitlement to subsidies 
or oppose higher prices. Support for higher electricity prices rose substantially when the public was 
given a national-interest explanation, although the “entitled” group still remained significantly more 
opposed. However, when the public was offered a benefit to replace the foregone subsidy, opposition 
within the entitled group dropped to the point where it lost statistical significance.  
The public’s understanding of the urgency of reform would thus appear to be an important element in 
policy acceptance. As depicted in Table 6.3, citizens in aggregate were willing to pay more in nearly 
equal measure when informed of the national interest, or when offered a replacement benefit. 
These results lead to three subsidiary findings. First, the participants in social contracts in the Persian 
Gulf monarchies exhibit divergent views of the terms of exchange. Rigid theoretical understandings 
534 Author interview with Qatar government official on condition of anonymity, Doha, April 4, 2012. 
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find more support among experts – elite policymakers, economists, and sector participants – and less 
acceptance among average citizens. This finding suggests a deficit in elite understanding of public 
preferences consistent with the signaling problems described by Wintrobe.  
Second, elites exhibit a conservative bias. The experts surveyed – whether in government or industry, 
expatriate or national – assumed higher levels of citizen “entitlement” to cheap energy and deeper 
citizen opposition to increased prices. Experts’ views on subsidy rationale and reform appeared to 
mirror tenets of the rentier literature, whereas citizen views often diverged. 
Third, the disconnect identified between theory and public opinion points to a problem with the core 
assumptions of the literature. Those assumptions imply that autocracies govern with a fixed set of 
inputs and outputs: if there is a reduction in patronage, there must be a corresponding increase in 
repression or in political participation.535 Public responses to my survey – and the public responses to 
tariff increases in Dubai536 – show that these assumptions are off-base.  
What do these findings mean for policymaking? The survey results suggest that a segment of the 
populace would consent to price reforms that might extend the economic models of these states while 
leaving regime legitimacy intact. Opposition would be concentrated among members of the public 
with a strong sense of entitlement to subsidies, based upon feelings of personal ownership of natural 
resources. Significantly, a third of the survey population remains opposed to higher energy prices, 
even when invoking the national interest or offering a substitute benefit. Even among those who claim 
to be willing to accept higher prices, one should keep in mind that a hypothetical survey is different 
from reality. Those who are indifferent or mildly supportive may be swayed by opponents once 
policies are proposed. And the presence of an anti-reform cohort appears to validate regime fears of 
antagonizing citizens in ways that could provide a conduit for protest and Arab Spring-style 
mobilization. 
Even acknowledging the necessary caveats, these findings imply that governments in need of 
reducing energy consumption may have more scope for reform than they or regional elites believe. 
Although more work must be done to investigate public opinion in the Gulf, particularly at the 
country level, results suggest that reforms could be made more palatable via a mainstreaming 
campaign that highlights resource waste and intergenerational equity, such as that which that preceded 
Iran’s subsidy reforms of 2010.537  
However, Dubai’s subsidy reform of 2011 was launched without either of these inducements. As 
described in the previous chapter, Dubai raised electricity prices by 15%, including on Emirati 
535 Desai, Olofsgard, and Yousef 2009. I am indebted to Sean Foley for suggesting this input-output construct in 
his comments on an early draft of this chapter. 
536 See previous chapter for a discussion of Dubai’s electricity price reforms 
537 Guillaume, Zytek, and Farzin 2011 
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nationals, and did so without public discussion. Citizens complained, and the new prices became a 
temporary newspaper and talk-radio theme, but the increases were ultimately accepted without a quid 
pro quo benefit, such as that provided in Iran. Most importantly, the state utility registered a 
corresponding drop in average household consumption.538 Either way, it seems that citizens may be 
willing to submit to higher prices. 
Among the oppositionist “entitlement” group, effective language advocating reform might include 
allusions to citizens’ proprietary interest over resources, and the understanding that those resources 
are being depleted on an uneconomic basis that endangers the long-term rentier bargain. In this case 
recalibrating the distributive social contract is not just in the interest of the regime, but that of society, 
even those feeling “entitlement.” 
Energy entitlement structures in the Persian Gulf monarchies appear frozen in time, with prices 
unchanged for decades in some cases.539 The gains from these welfare benefits have long since been 
eclipsed by the harm caused by wasted resources and the political-economic threat embodied in the 
state’s accumulating distributive burdens. As distribution of subsidized energy reaches its limit, 
prospects for reforming the exchange of entitlements for quiescence appear more necessary, and more 
promising, than the rentier literature – or regional elites – would accept. 
 
  
538 The Media Office for HH Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid al-Maktoum 2011; author interview with Dubai 
government official on condition of anonymity, Dubai, April 8, 2012. 
539 Kuwait’s current electricity tariff was set in 1966. Abu Dhabi’s dates to 1989. 
189 
 
 
                                                     
Chapter 7: Conclusion: Energy and the Rentier State 
 
When UAE Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid al-Maktoum was a boy, he slept in a single 
room without electricity together with his parents and siblings. His only relief from the smothering 
summer heat came via the humid breeze off the nearby Gulf, captured by a barjeel wind tower which 
rose above the roof and funneled the cooler air indoors. In the courtyard of his home, slaves carried 
barrels of Tigris River water brought in from Iraq, one of the few luxuries afforded the ruling family. 
Most of his countrymen drank brackish local water sold by donkey cart vendors.540  
The well-known transformative effects of oil swept away these humble methods of cooling and water 
distribution. Oil brought wealth and development, and oil rents flowed into distributional structures 
that allowed Sheikh Mohammed’s family – and his counterparts in neighboring monarchies – to 
maintain control of the state without needing to offer increases in political pluralism to society. 
Moreover, while export rents financed the infrastructure behind air-conditioning and desalinated 
water, it was surplus production of oil and gas that provided the primary energy required to power 
these services. Since oil, like export rent, was distributed liberally across societies and lands in the 
Gulf, it produced a distinct, energy-intensive pattern of development.  
Five decades later, Sheikh Mohammed and his children can don winter parkas and ski at an indoor 
slope in a shopping mall, even in the middle of summer. They can tend to horses in air-conditioned 
barns, or swim in chilled pools. The gargantuan un-insulated villas of Kuwait City and Riyadh, the 
skating rinks and gas-guzzling SUVs in Doha, and the irrigated golf courses and heat-trapping glass-
walled skyscrapers in Abu Dhabi are made possible not just by energy rents, but by state-subsidized 
energy products. Pricing and supply patterns set in the early days of the oil boom are integral parts of 
the distributional structures of political control. The availability of inexpensive oil and gas became an 
important component of the rentier bargain, alongside better-known inducements like jobs in the 
bureaucracy and subsidies on food and housing. Rentier energy policy shaped cities and 
infrastructure, allowing developers to reduce costs by sidestepping the expense of efficient techniques 
and “locking in” a pattern of energy intensive development that has become difficult to change. 
Energy intensity is an outcome of the rentier governance practiced in the Gulf, alongside other, 
previously documented peculiarities of rentier states.  
The influence of energy and energy prices is an underappreciated property of the rentier system, at 
least as it is conceived by scholars. This feature may have languished in obscurity even longer were it 
not for the compounding effects of steady rises in consumption that now threaten to displace exports, 
a trend that has triggered alarm among policymakers and a reappraisal of energy distribution 
540 Krane 2009 
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practices. My investigation of avenues for reforming energy subsidies found that the rentier literature, 
despite providing such a strongly predictive political economy model that has weathered enormous 
changes in these states and societies, does not sufficiently address the long-run repercussions of 
allocation.  
This dissertation has addressed this gap by documenting and elevating the under-researched role of 
energy allocation in these rentier states, and incorporating the theoretical significance of energy as a 
physical commodity – rather than as a source of rent – into the rentier literature. The entrenchment of 
energy in these political economies extends far beyond that envisioned in classic rentier state theory, 
encapsulated in Luciani’s declaration that oil “has value only to the extent that it is exported.”541 The 
practice of energy subsidization has transformed these states into prodigious consumers of their chief 
export commodities, nurturing a dependence that has driven choices in industrialization, city design, 
technology preference and use, and personal habits. Cheap fuel, electricity and desalinated water have 
supported population growth, foreign investment and the once-isolated region’s integration into the 
global economy. Price subsidies have also helped build public acquiescence to unelected regimes. But 
perhaps the more significant role of subsidies is in shaping what have become some of the most 
energy-intensive economies in the world. The Gulf and wider Middle East has become recognized as 
a rising global center of energy demand which complicates its heretofore one-sided portrayal as a 
source of supply. The duality of energy’s role contributes to the difficulty of subsidy reform. 
Externally, energy is the main source of state revenue; but domestically, it is an important driver of 
political support. 
As demonstrated in Chapter 4, subsidies account for one-quarter to one-half of energy demand in the 
GCC. Low prices have also restricted incentives for the production of natural gas, which, given the 
demand environment, has turned two Gulf states – the UAE and Kuwait – into net importers of gas. 
Five of the six GCC monarchies are shifting to high-cost models of electricity production that depend 
on costlier feedstocks such as LNG, crude oil and unconventional natural gas. Price reforms present 
an opportunity to reduce the prodigious economic cost of diverting resource production into the 
subsidized domestic market. Calculations using modest estimates of price elasticity of demand show 
that the positive economic effect of rationalizing prices would be huge. A rising tide of evidence and 
aggregated opinion demonstrate that the literature’s prohibitions on these sorts of reforms appear ripe 
for challenge. As detailed in Chapter 5, however, the disposition of states to carry out those reforms is 
far from uniform. Among the six monarchies, Saudi Arabia and the UAE appear as the most likely 
reformers of price subsidies, Kuwait and Qatar the least.  
541 Luciani 1987, 65–8 
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The imperative of accommodating energy within rentier theory is also driven by contradictions 
emerging within rentier governance structures. Rising domestic consumption and steady exports are, 
in the long run, incompatible. The limiting factor on resource draws is not the size of reserves, but the 
amount of production; and production levels have reached or are nearing plateaus. Rentier 
consumption practices now threaten the flow of rents. This dissertation has introduced the self-
consuming nature of rentierist resource distribution, while revising theory to accept a more flexible 
interpretation of subsidies as customary privileges, which allows for reform of these practices.  
Until now, the literature left energy subsidies undistinguished within the aggregate rent distribution 
stream that theory correlates with political stability. I argue on both theoretical and empirical grounds 
that the “rent distribution” construct must accommodate the separation of financial rent distribution 
from in-kind resource distribution, and allow for the winding up of the latter practice in the interest of 
preserving the system. As explained in Chapter 5, distribution of energy resources is a less flexible 
practice than distribution of energy rents. Whereas rents can be generated from many sources, 
national oil and gas resources are finite and subject to limits on extraction. Ultimately, maintaining 
exports while meeting rising domestic demand requires these governments to make choices that may 
be less palatable than constraining domestic demand. The alternative choices include coping with 
costs of rising market-priced imports, investment in alternative energy technology, or increasing 
domestic oil and gas production. Raising production for the domestic market would require states to 
make capital investments for the sole purpose of continuing to supply energy products at prices 
which, in most cases, do not even cover average cost of supply, let alone the marginal cost associated 
with additional production. In this sense, the domestic distribution of primary exports that is 
characteristic of the rentier state comprises an encumbrance on its economy, which, in the longer 
term, becomes a potentially destabilizing factor within the governance structure. My findings suggest 
that some regimes, at least, may view subsidy reform as the most sensible of their near-term policy 
options. 
For regimes, energy has heretofore proven an opportune component within social contracts. As 
Wintrobe argues, in-kind distribution allows regimes to maintain control over the type of services 
delivered, as well as preserve a more directly dependent patrimonial relationship with their 
citizens.542 Energy allocation thus conforms to regimes’ wishes to trade income for loyalty without 
the fiscal transparency associated with cash distributions. But in-kind resources may not comprise the 
preferred benefit of citizens, whose interests are more congruent with long-term maximization of 
exports and state rent distribution. Citizens in Iran and Alaska appear content to receive their benefits 
in cash rather than as in-kind energy. Moving forward, the efficiency premium implied by converting 
542 Wintrobe 2007, 98 
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the in-kind energy allocation to cash – akin to Hertog’s citizens’ income543 – may outweigh the 
potential sacrifices for the regime in opacity and political control. 
Citizens’ perceptions are another under-researched theme in the literature on rentier benefit systems. 
Scholars inveigh against ending subsidies and experts agree that they are rights of citizenship, but the 
views of citizens – the primary recipients of any reform agenda – are more complex. As demonstrated 
in Chapter 5, some citizens do claim entitlement to energy subsidies and those who do are more likely 
to oppose their reform, but these views are not representative of society at large. A substantial portion 
of the public appeared willing to go along with subsidy reform, even more so when given a good 
reason, or when offered an alternate benefit. 
Energy consumption is the latest in a series of challenges that have tested the resilience of the GCC 
monarchies. Most recently the six ruling families emerged intact from the Arab Spring uprisings. 
Previously they survived the prolonged fiscal crisis of the 1980s-1990s oil bust. The energy demand 
challenge presents a new set of factors. Prior (albeit mistaken) assumptions about monarchical 
longevity tended to revolve around global oil prices. However, assuming steady global demand, the 
trends covered here are playing out independently of oil prices. As demonstrated by the example of 
Indonesia, rising oil prices can compensate for the effects of reduced exports in the short run, but not 
forever. The consumption challenge is more structural than the fiscal challenge of the oil bust years.  
Policymakers and experts have already come around to this view, as demonstrated by Chapter 5’s 
expert elicitation results and documentation of public statements regarding the danger posed by 
subsidies. In at least four of the six monarchies, experts view rising consumption as an economic 
threat rather than in more typical fashion as a driver of growth or stability enhancement. This 
dissertation introduces this concept into the academic literature. 
Rentier approaches must accommodate this change in perception of energy subsidies. Theory must 
differentiate among various types of social benefits and adapt to the real possibility that some types of 
subsidy “entitlements” can be revoked, as demonstrated in Dubai, or replaced, as Iran has done. 
Introducing the self-consuming characteristic of rentierism and allowing for its reform does not 
challenge or undermine the core validity of rentier theory, which retains considerable power in its 
explanation of regime durability, behavior and relations with society. Rather, pointing out this 
omission highlights a long-term weakness in the literature’s previous theoretical prohibitions on 
subsidy reform. This dissertation retains the core rentier thesis on the importance of externally 
generated rents, while strengthening the theory’s explanatory power by reconfiguring subsidies from 
“rights” to “customary privileges.” This new portrayal provides theoretical allowance for the 
retraction of social contract benefits which are traded for regime support. These amendments provide 
543 Hertog 2012 
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a necessary re-alignment of theory with changes in the on-ground context within these allocation 
states, as well as with mounting evidence that state-society interactions involve more than just 
exchanges of rent for political support, as demonstrated by Dubai’s successful imposition of subsidy 
reforms, and the likelihood that other regimes may follow.  
Also worth noting is the heterogeneity among countries often analyzed as a regional unit. Some of my 
key results examine differences at the national level, showing, for instance, that subsidy reform 
pressures are not uniform across the six monarchies, nor are levels of resources per capita, nor the 
political risks of tinkering with social contracts. A few avenues to delve more deeply into regional 
heterogeneity were limited by survey sample size within some of the smaller monarchies, but the 
richness of the findings points to opportunity for further research. It is worth noting some 
differentiating characteristics. 
Qatar consistently stands out as an exception to the regional norm. Given the size of its population 
relative to the value of its resource exports, Qataris have become the world’s richest people on a per 
capita basis. The tiny monarchy is the only major gas exporter in the Gulf and surrounding region, and 
the only GCC state that is neither undergoing a shortage of natural gas nor facing the challenge of 
increasing cost in gas production and electricity generation. Qatar has experienced the GCC’s highest 
rates of immigration, economic growth and energy consumption in recent years, while simultaneously 
exhibiting less urgency for reform, despite giving its citizens unlimited free electricity and desalinated 
water. Qatar’s electricity sector is dominated by industry, which also contrasts sharply with the 
residential-dominated sectors of the other five monarchies. Unlike its Arab neighbors, Qatar’s gas 
resource is mainly unassociated with oil, which means extraction is more flexible. Production of non-
associated gas can be raised or lowered without regard to oil production and OPEC quota, in contrast 
to the more restricted opportunities in most other GCC states. However, as its oil production begins to 
plateau, Qatar will grow more exposed to global gas prices in ways unmatched by neighboring states. 
For these reasons and perhaps others, Qatar stands out from its GCC cohorts.  
The other five monarchies all exhibit unique features, but none is as regularly caveated. Perhaps 
Bahrain comes closest, given its small and depleting resource base, its marginal contribution to 
markets, and its unique sectarian character, with a Sunni Muslim regime and a population that is 
majority Shia. For Bahrain, as mentioned in the introduction, energy consumption issues are eclipsed 
by more pressing concerns of political stability. For these reasons, as well as small sample sizes, 
Bahrain was dropped from some of the statistical analyses in this thesis.  
In a more important way, Saudi Arabia also stands out. The kingdom’s sheer size and global 
importance signifies the far higher stakes that rest on its ability to restrain domestic consumption. To 
some extent, the well-being of the other monarchies – and not to mention the oil importing world at 
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large – depend on Riyadh’s response to its demand challenge, given that its spare production and 
export capacity is perhaps the single most important asset in maintaining the strategic interest and 
protection of the West. This protection, of course, undergirds the hard security needs of all six 
regimes.  
As for the UAE and Kuwait, they harbor nearly equal hydrocarbon resource bases, but display few 
similarities beyond this. The authoritarian state-capitalist UAE plays China to Kuwait’s more 
democratic India, with its vibrant but obstructionist parliament and top-heavy bureaucracy. The UAE 
federation presents an example where the rentier theory concept of regime autonomy remains strong. 
In the emirate of Dubai, regime autonomy was sufficient for the state to raise utility rates on the most 
politically sensitive customer group, the citizen residential sector. In Kuwait by contrast, there 
appeared few prospects for the retraction of citizen subsidies or indeed any other form of government 
extraction. The current level of regime autonomy in Dubai may never have existed in Kuwait.  
Oman is the easternmost and most isolated Arab state, cut off from the rest of the Middle East by sea 
and the vast sands of the Empty Quarter. Oman is arguably the most absolute of the monarchies and 
one of its more potentially volatile. The sultanate exhibits troubling characteristics in the form of an 
aging ruler who has not publicly named an heir nor institutionalized the role of his family in 
governance, as well as a very young population and fast-growing energy consumption from a 
depleting resource base. Dampening the prospects of subsidy reform in Oman is the perception that 
ruling autonomy appears to be waning in equal measure to the availability of surplus hydrocarbons. 
Finally, it bears mentioning how predictive and durable the core rentier thesis has proven over the 
years. The Gulf states modernized but remained autocratic, in defiance of the tenets of modernization 
theory. The onset of democracy in Turkey, Indonesia and other Muslim or tribally riven states 
(Tunisia being the latest) undermined political culture explanations for autocracy. By linking 
autocracy to rent, the economists led by Mahdavy, Beblawi and Luciani created an attractive and 
parsimonious explanation which has endured three-and-a-half decades of tumultuous change. Just like 
the region it analyzes, rentier theory has been challenged, amended and strengthened, while growing 
more complex and less parsimonious than it once was. 
Previous audits of rentier theory have provided timely updates that remedied earlier oversights on 
regime autonomy and deference to citizens, as well as the development of industrial and economic 
policies, even the careful reconsideration of political culture variables. This dissertation joins this 
conversation by examining trends in the rentier energy sector, neglected within the literature, and 
unearthing developments that appear incompatible with current theory. The result is another update, 
one which overturns theory’s ban on extraction – in the case of energy subsidies – and increases the 
role of energy in state formation. Reforms in energy policy are important not just because they 
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challenge the most important academic theories of governance of these states, but because they 
present a framework for understanding the difficult tradeoffs between politics and economics that 
drive to the heart of the survival of these peculiar regimes. 
The rentier monarchies of the Gulf have grown far more complex than early theorists had imagined, 
and societies and their preferences have evolved. However, the basic tenets of rentierism still pose a 
source of tension when juxtaposed with the austere features of society’s Bedouin heritage. This 
tension, which offers some optimism for outcomes to the problem analyzed in this dissertation, has 
been present for some time. The great Andalusian sociologist Ibn Khaldun, who derided “weak-
minded opportunists” who parlayed resource rents into lives of “laziness and ease,” also harbored 
great admiration for the Bedouin ancestors of the Gulf tribal clans, and the codes and values that still 
permeate institutions underlying Gulf society. These traits may well prove useful once again. “They 
pay attention to the most distant barking or noise,” Ibn Khaldun wrote of the Bedouin. “They go alone 
in the desert, guided by their fortitude, putting their trust in themselves. Fortitude has become a 
character quality of theirs, and courage their nature.”544 As the distant barking grows louder, I believe 
we will see evidence of that fortitude among Gulf’s ruling clans and their subjects, as they take up the 
challenge of energy demand. 
  
544 Khaldūn 2005, 93–5 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Fieldwork  
As mentioned in Chapter 3, below is a table outlining my fieldwork visits to the Gulf, conference 
attendance and PhD research presentations. 
Table A1: Dissertation Fieldwork  
Destination Dates Days Tasks 
UAE Nov 6-12, 
2010 
7 Meetings Abu Dhabi crown prince's court; interviews; 
presentation Dubai School of Gov't 
UAE Nov. 28-
Dec. 6, 2010 
5 Attended EU-GCC energy conference Dubai; interviews; speech 
Capital Club Dubai 
UAE Apr 16-21, 
2011 
6 Attended Dubai Global Energy Forum 
UAE Sept 25-30, 
2011 
6 Attended/presented at Dubai Future Cities Conference 
Oman Nov. 11-16 6 Interviews, presentation, tour Barka combined cycle power plant 
Qatar Nov. 17-
Dec. 7, 2011 
21 Interviews, conferences, meetings, survey design and preparation 
Qatar Jan. 16-29 14 Interviews, conferences, meetings, expert elicitation design and 
preparation 
UAE Jan. 30-31, 
2012 
2 Interviews 
Qatar Feb. 1-7, 
2012 
7 Interviews, meetings, transcripts typed 
UAE March 4-24, 
2012 
20 Interviews, conferences (MEED Power and Water Conference Abu 
Dhabi, UAE University exchange and meetings in Al Ain; 
Presentation and focus group Dubai Prime Minister's Office; 
Presentation GDF Suez Dubai 
Kuwait March 25-
30, 2012 
5 Interviews, meetings Ministry of Electricity and Water, 
presentations at American University of Kuwait, focus group 
Qatar March 30-
Apr. 3, 2012 
5 Interviews, meetings, research presentation Georgetown 
University Doha 
UAE April 4-18, 
2012 
15 Interviews, meetings, focus group Dubai School of Government 
Saudi 
Arabia 
Oct. 12-23 12 Interviews and meetings in Riyadh (Ministry of Petroleum and 
others) and Eastern Province (Saudi Aramco, GCC Interconnection 
Authority, etc.); Presentation and meetings KAPSARC, Riyadh 
Qatar Oct. 23-25, 
2012 
3 Interviews, meetings 
Austin, 
Texas 
Nov. 3-7, 
2012 
5 Attended Int'l Association Energy Economics conference, lectures 
at conference and U Texas LBJ school 
Denver, 
Colo. 
Nov. 15-21, 
2012 
7 Attended/presented at Middle East Studies Association 
conference 
Washington
DC 
Nov. 11-15, 
2012 
5 Attended/presented NDU Gulf Security conference; meetings US 
Dept. of Energy, Energy Info Administration 
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London Jan. 28-29, 
2013 
2 Chatham House MENA energy conference 
 
Appendix 2: Expert Elicitation Tariff Estimates 
Table A3 depicts the range of experts’ estimates for 2020 residential electricity tariffs in the six Gulf 
monarchies. 
Table A3: Expert elicitation results: 2020 Tariff estimates in comparison with current rates (local currency) 
What do you expect 
AVERAGE 
RESIDENTIAL tariffs 
to be in 2020? 
Lowest price 
(95% chance the 
real price will be 
higher) 
Median price 
(Your “best guess” 
prediction of the 
2020 price) 
Highest price 
(5% chance the real 
price will be higher) 
Current avg. 
citizen price 
Diff. between  
median estimate  
and current price 
Bahrain 2020 (avg. of 
3 estimates) 1.6  2.3 2.9 1.1 
+1.2 fils 
(109%) 
Bahrain std. dev. 0.8 0.8 1.0   
Kuwait 2020 
(average of 15 
estimates) 
1.4 3.1 5.9 0.7 
+2.4 fils 
(343%) 
Kuwait std. dev. 1.0 2.1 3.8   
Oman 2020 (avg. of 9 
estimates) 4.4 7.3 10.5 3.1 
+4.2 baiza 
(135%) 
Oman std. dev. 1.9 3.3 5.5   
Qatar 2020 (avg. of 
11 estimates) 4.9 7.2 10.2 
0.0  
(citizen price) 
+7.2 dirham 
(n/a) 
Qatar std. dev. 5.2 6.4 8.0   
KSA 2020 (avg of 20 
estimates) 4.9 8.9 13.2 3.2 
+5.7 halala 
(178%) 
KSA std. dev. 3.6 5.9 7.1   
UAE 2020 (avg. of 25 
estimates) 4.9 7.6 11.0 
4.1 (avg 
citizen price) 
+3.5 fils 
(85%) 
UAE std. dev. 1.9 2.9 5.1   
 
Appendix 3: Expert Elicitation Participants 
Deleted in the public version, available in the printed versions at Cambridge main and Judge Business 
School libraries. Note that the full expert elicitation questionnaire and results, too large to include 
here, is available in PDF format by emailing the author. 
Appendix 4: Pricing Comparison 
Table A5 offers a comparison of charges for residential utilities, showing a hypothetical case based on 
an actual residential utility bill issued by the Dubai Electricity and Water Authority in October 2013 
revealing that, even after a 15% rate increase, foreign residents pay substantially higher rates (slightly 
more than quadruple) than those charged to citizens. 
Table A5. Dubai residential electricity and water:  
Citizen vs. non-citizen pricing based on a residential bill from October 2013 
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Electricity use 
(kwh/mo.) 
Citizen price 
(fils/kwh) 
Foreigner price 
(fils/kwh) 
Usage Citizen cost 
(AED) 
Foreigner cost 
(AED) 
0-2000 7.5 23 2000 150.00 460.00 
2001-4000 9 28 2000 180.00 560.00 
4001-6000 10.5 32 2000 210.00 640.00 
6001 and above 12.5 38 4380 547.50 1664.40 
Subtotals:   10380 1087.5 3324.4 
      
Water (gals/mo.) Citizen price 
(fils/gal) 
Foreigner price 
(fils/gal) 
   
0-6000 0 3.5 6000 0.00 210.00 
6001-1200 0 4 5867 0.00 234.68 
12001-20000 0 4.6    
more than  20,000 1.5 4.6    
   Subtotals 0 444.68 
      
    Citizen cost Foreigner cost 
Fuel surcharge 
(electricity) 
0 6.0 fils/kwh 10380 
kwh 
0 622.8 
Fuel surcharge 
(water) 
0 0.6 fils/gal 11867 
gals 
0 71.2 
   Subtotals 0 694 
   TOTAL 
(AED) 
1087.50 4463.08 
   TOTAL 
(USD) 
$296.13            
$1,215.30 
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Appendix 5: Public Survey 
Details of public survey, coding of survey variables and demographics 
Conducted by: YouGov 
Fieldwork period: Nov. 28-Dec 4 2011 
Sample size: 730 respondents 
Language: The survey was written in English and translated into Arabic. Display language was 
governed by the user’s browser settings. The English text of the survey follows.  
Table A6: Public survey text - English version 
 
Introduction: In the GCC countries, there is increasing concern about energy issues. Some residents 
are concerned about rising prices, while governments worry about growing consumption. In this 
very short survey you are encouraged to have your say about energy issues. 
Question JK1. In 2010, GCC governments paid, 
on average, more than 50% of the cost of 
electricity in nationals’ homes. From what you 
know, why does the government contribute in 
paying for your electricity? (please select all that 
apply)  
 
1=Because it is my share of the country’s energy 
wealth; 2=Because it is the government’s 
responsibility; 3=Because the ruler is generous; 
4=Because energy is abundant in my country; 
5=Because I cannot afford to pay the full cost; 
6=Other; 7=Don’t know (Note: responses 
randomized in actual survey 
Question JK2: How willing are you to pay the full 
cost of electricity consumed in your home? The 
true cost without government subsidies is more 
than the average price that nationals in your 
country pay now.  
1=Very willing; 2=Quite willing; 3=Neither willing 
nor opposed; 4=Quite opposed; 5=Very opposed; 
6=Don’t know 
 
Question JK3: Some people have said that 
because electricity is provided to nationals at an 
artificially low price some people waste it. This 
consumes oil and gas that could be exported. If 
the government sought to conserve energy by 
asking you to pay the full cost of electricity, 
would you:  
1=Strongly support; 2=Tend to support; 
3=Neither support nor oppose; 4=Tend to 
oppose; 5=Strongly oppose; 6=Don’t know 
 
Question JK4: If your government raised the 
prices of electricity to nationals and also 
compensated them with a benefit of equal 
value, would you:  
 
1=Strongly support; 2=Tend to support; 
3=Neither support nor oppose; 4=Tend to 
oppose; 5=Strongly oppose; 6=Don’t know 
 
Question JK5: Which is the best way to 
distribute benefits from your country’s oil and 
gas resources? (please choose one answer you 
think is the best) 
1=Spend it all now; 2=Spend most now, save a 
little for future generations; 3=Spend half, save 
half; 4=Spend a little now, save most for future 
generations; 5=Save it all for future generations; 
6=Don’t know 
 
The survey also included the following demographic question: 
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Are you a national of your country of residence 
or an expatriate? 
1=National of country of residence; 2=Expatriate 
 
The survey cohort supplied the following demographic information: 
Gender:  1=Male, 2=Female 
Age Groups:  
 
1=18 to 24; 2=25 to 29; 3=30 to 34; 4=35 to 39; 
5=40+ 
Income Groups:  
 
1=Less than $266; 2=$266 to $532; 3=$533 to 
$799; 4=$800 to $1,065; 5=$1,066 to $1,599; 
6=$1,600 to $2,132; 7=$2,133 to $2,665; 
8=$2,666 to $3,999; 9=$4,000 to $5,332; 
10=$5,333 to $6,665; 11=$6,666 to $7,999; 
12=$8,000 to $10,665; 13=$10,666 to $13,332; 
14=$13,333 or more; 15=Prefer not to say; 
99=Don't know 
What is the highest level of education you have 
completed? 
1=elementary school; 2=secondary school; 
3=vocational college education; 4=university first 
degree; 5=university higher degree; 
6=professional higher education 
To which of the following religions do you 
consider you belong?  
 
1=None - not religious; 2=Islam; 3=Christianity; 
4=Hinduism; 5=Sikhism; 6=Judaism; 7=Buddhism; 
8=Jainism; 9=Zoroastrianism; 10=Other religion; 
11=Not specified 
What is your current marital status? 1=Single - never married; 2=Married with 
Children; 3=Married without Children; 
4=Divorced; 5=Widowed; 6=Not specified 
 
 
Table A7: Respondents by country and region 
GCC Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar KSA UAE 
730 36 18 36 4 611 25 
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Table A8: Coding of the Variables 
Dependent Variables 
Dep1 Support for electricity price increase, no 
explanation 
H1 1=Very willing; 5=Very 
opposed 
Dep2 Support for electricity price increase, 
national interest explanation 
H2 1=Strongly support; 
5=Strongly oppose 
Dep3 Support for price increase, with 
compensation by alternate benefit 
H3 1=Strongly support; 
5=Strongly oppose 
Independent Variables 
Share Entitlement  1=Selected, 0=Not selected 
Female Predictor-gender  0=Male, 1=Female 
Edu Predictor-education level  1-6 
Income Predictor-income level  1-15 
Age Predictor-age group  Age18-24 1=Selected, 0=Not selected 
Age Predictor-age group Age25-29 1=Selected, 0=Not selected 
Age Predictor-age group Age30-34 1=Selected, 0=Not selected 
Age Predictor-age group Age35-39 1=Selected, 0=Not selected 
Age Predictor-age group Age40+ 1=Selected, 0=Not selected 
Note: Number coding of variables D1-D3 were reversed from those in the survey to aid interpretation 
of results. Age group results were combined to form the variable Age 
 
 
Table A9: Results from ordinal logit regression 
Entitlement and subsidy reform 
(Dependent variables are "willingness to pay" variations in Dep 1, Dep 2, and Dep 3) 
Model 1 2 3 
Share (entitlement) -.719*** -.663*** -.207 
 
(.1711) (.1718) (.1681) 
Age -.046 .018 -.008 
 
(.0668) (.0666) (.0669) 
Income .021 .040 .029 
 
(.0625) (.0621) (.0619) 
Education -.172* -.056 .149* 
 
(.0821) (.0812) (.0811) 
Female -.239 -.521** -.217 
 
(.1823) (.1825) (.1782) 
* significant at the 0.05 level; ** significant at the 0.01 level; *** significant at the 0.001 level 
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